SOVEREIGN RISK AND FISCAL (IN)ATTENTION: A LOOK AT THE U.S. STATE DEFAULT OF THE 1840S∗
(PRELIMINARY & INCOMPLETE)

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Abstract

Between 1841 and 1843, nine U.S. states and territories defaulted. Open-market prices of state bonds were relatively stable in the fifteen years preceding this episode, while both defaulting and non-defaulting states experienced market premiums as defaults became imminent. We construct a novel measure of attention to the states’ fiscal positions from the volume of contemporary U.S. and British newspaper articles related to fiscal policy. This measure exhibits a regime shift at the onset of the debt crisis, displaying a higher volume of articles about fiscal policy. In addition, the measure’s ability to predict bond prices increases in the crisis period. Our results suggest investors’ attention for fiscal fundamentals matters, and such inattention can help explain low risk premia in tranquil times. We develop a simple model of inattention to illustrate this mechanism.

Keywords: sovereign default; inattention; fiscal policy

JEL Codes: E62, H30, H360, N41

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1 Introduction

In good times, the interest rate spreads on long-term sovereign bonds often are low. Spreads can remain low despite large expansionary fiscal policies, but once a stress point arrives, spreads can rise quickly and markedly. The recent debt crisis in Europe illustrates this point and stimulated a debate over the degree to which sovereign bond prices reflect economic fundamentals.\footnote{See De Grauwe and Ji (2012) and Aizenman, Hutchison, and Jinjarak (2013) for views of mispricing in the Eurozone.} Another example of this pattern is the sovereign debt crisis of the U.S. states in the early 1840s.\footnote{See Sargent (2012) for further discussion on the similarities of historical U.S. experiences and the recent Eurozone crisis.} We revisit this historical episode to highlight an element of bond pricing with relevance for today: the role of investors’ attention to fiscal fundamentals.

Our focus on the U.S. experience in the 1840s offers a unique opportunity for understanding sovereign defaults. Between 1841 and 1843, 8 of the 26 U.S. states at the time defaulted,\footnote{In addition, Florida, a U.S. territory, defaulted. See English (1996) for a timeline.} while other states appeared on the brink of default. As shown in figure 1, open-market prices of state bonds were relatively stable in the fifteen years preceding the default crisis. However both defaulting (solid lines) and non-defaulting (dashed lines) states experienced market premiums in the crisis.

We document a build-up of state debt, as well as several legislated tax and expenditure changes, in the years preceding the crisis. Some states provided direct taxation to support debt financing, while others relied more heavily on the anticipation of future economic growth for debt financing. Were investors paying attention to fiscal conditions as they developed before and during the crisis? To understand the pricing behavior of bonds, we construct a novel measure of attention to states’ fiscal policies using U.S. and British newspapers at the time. We estimate a Markov-switching process for this measure and demonstrate a regime shift in the measure in the early 1840s, i.e. the onset of the debt crisis. More coverage of fiscal-related articles appeared at the onset of the crisis and remained throughout subsequent years. Despite the proliferation of state debt in the years preceding default, our measure of fiscal information shows no discernable change until the onset of the debt crisis.

Using a panel of state bond prices, we then show our newspaper measure’s ability to predict bond prices increases in the crisis period. Our result suggests investors’ attention to fiscal fundamentals matters. In tranquil times, investors are less attentive to fiscal fundamentals and accept lower risk premiums. At the onset of a crisis, investors are more attentive to the fiscal situation, leading bond prices to reflect the perceived riskiness accordingly. Such behavior can rationalize how governments embark on policies in “good times” that in retrospect become unsustainable. Thus, not only do fiscal fundamentals carry consequence, but the perception of fiscal soundness matters.\footnote{A closely related issue is the perception of a government bailout. See section 3.3 for a discussion of bailout expectations in the 1840s crisis.} We illustrate this mechanism in a simple, theoretical model of costly information processing.

By focusing on the states within a single country, our cross-sectional analysis controls for the cultural and general economic environment. Wallis, Sylla, and Grinath III (2004) argue that there
were distinct regional patterns to default, corresponding to the level of economic development of the states. Southern states defaulted and repudiated after handing state bonds to banking institutions that failed to uphold obligations to the states. Northern states defaulted after accumulating large debts on public improvement programs. Building on this view, we categorize states into two broad categories: states whose debts were mainly tied to state banking and states whose debts were mainly tied to internal improvement projects. Our current analysis focuses on the later category.

Prior to the states’ defaults, the U.S. economy experienced two economic upheavals. First, rising price levels triggered the Panic of 1837, which forced several banks to suspend convertibility of bank money to specie at par value for a year. Following a brief recovery, a second banking crisis developed in 1839 when banks south and west of New York suspended payment and prices fell by almost one half over the next four years. Many in the literature argue these events provided the catalyst for default. Temin (1969) argues sources of capital were depleted after 1839, leading states to be in the unfortunate position of defaulting when they could no longer roll over interest payments. Wallis, Sylla, and Grinath III (2004) argue that unforeseen declines in land prices after 1839 were the ultimate cause for default. Other theories of the 1840s default suggest the state governments were truly responsible. Dewey (1968) and Kettell suggest that states were unwilling to raise taxes enough to service debts. Meyers (1957) argues that states were inexperienced, starting poorly designed projects that never resulted in their anticipated revenues. Our analysis complements these studies and reiterates the importance of fiscal policy for default.

Our findings contribute to a growing theoretical literature aimed at understanding the role of information and attention to crises. Mackowiak and Wiedenholt (2014) develop a model where individuals can process only a finite amount of information to rationalize how low-probability events can result in poor decisions. Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2012) develop a model where agents may develop private information about assets and demonstrate that bad news shocks can lead to reduced asset trade and a financial crisis. Bi and Leeper (2013) show the size of fiscal shocks significantly affect risk premia when investors must learn about fiscal policy. Paluszynski (2016) allows households to learn about the underlying income process in a strategic default model and shows that the model’s learning process can help account for the timing of Eurozone risk premia.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a synopsis of the fiscal conditions of individual states before and during the debt crisis. Section 3 presents our measure of fiscal information and the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents a simple theoretical model to illustrate how investor attentiveness can explain the patterns observed in the data and section 5 concludes.

2 Historical Background

Two banking crises in 1837 and 1839 set the stage for state default. Banking failures put pressure on state finances, while accompanying declines in land values after 1839 lowered state tax bases.

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5 Temin (1969), Wallis (2001), Rousseau (2002), and Knodell (2006) provide thorough discussions of events surrounding these episodes.

6 See the appendix for details of these two events.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Resumed or Repudiated</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>January 1841</td>
<td>Resumed</td>
<td>July 1847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>January 1842</td>
<td>Resumed</td>
<td>July 1846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>January 1842</td>
<td>Resumed</td>
<td>July 1848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>August 1842</td>
<td>Resumed</td>
<td>February 1845</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Dates of Defaults and Resumptions. Source: English (1996)

Figure 1 plots the average bond price for several states in the years before and after the default crisis. Prices for publicly traded government securities come from the price quotation database for the early U.S. securities markets from 1790 to 1860 [see Sylla, Wilson, and Wright (2002)]. This database compiled security prices from contemporary newspapers in seven markets: London, New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, Richmond, and Charleston. The majority of state bond trading occurred in the London, New York, Philadelphia (mainly for the state of Pennsylvania), and Baltimore (mainly for the state of Maryland) markets.

In this paper, we focus on seven states—Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania—mainly because of the limited bond price data for the southern defaulting states, such as Arkansas and Mississippi. In addition, these seven states shared common fiscal goals and issued debt mainly for internal improvement projects. Figure 1 plots the average bond price for each state (with par value of $100) between January 1820 and December 1859. Prior to 1840, there was little variation in the bond prices, as they fluctuate within the range of $90 to $120. All state bond prices drop in 1840, plateau in 1842, and begin recovery in 1843. Thus, all states were punished by the market at the onset of the crisis, while the extent of discounting varied substantially across states. The three states that did not default (Ohio, Kentucky, and New York) witnessed a relatively modest reduction in their bond prices, whereas states that did default (Indiana, Illinois, Pennsylvania and Maryland) experienced much deeper price cuts. Between January 1838 and January 1843, the bond prices dropped by almost $60 for Maryland and Pennsylvania and close to $70 for Indiana and Illinois. In contrast, the prices dropped only $30 for Ohio and less than $20 for New York. Table 1 shows the dates of default and resumption for Indiana, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. Bond prices of Indiana and Illinois did not return to pre-crisis levels until 1855, as seen from figure 1. This was a heavy punishment by the market, considering that Illinois resumed its debt payment in 1846 and Indiana in 1847.

U.S. Congress (1843) provides a survey of state borrowing for this period. The total outstanding debt for all U.S. states on September 1, 1841 was $198 million. Figure 2 shows the outstanding

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7 The database also includes price quotations for other securities in the Alexandria, Norfolk, and Richmond, VA markets, which were excluded from our analysis. Alexandria and Norfolk have no price listings for state debt. Richmond, VA has only two state bond listings over the period 1854-1858. The database is available online at http://eh.net/database/early-u-s-securities-prices/.

8 Of the non-southern states, Maine and Massachusetts also amassed debt in this period. Most northeastern states had essentially zero debt, including Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. We exclude Michigan from the analysis as the state’s policy more closely resembles that of the southern states, namely bank financing, see Wallis, Sylla, and Grinath III (2004).
debt in 1841 by years of authorization for the seven states we consider. The period of 1836-38 witnessed a substantial increase in debt authorization from $15 million to about $35 million, and in total about two-thirds of the debt in 1841 was authorized after 1836. A specific example for Ohio is shown figure 3, which plots the outstanding state debt as of 1842 by year of issuance. Ohio issued twice as much debt over 1837-41 as compared to 1825-28, while she barely issued any debt in the early 1830s. Overall, the states started accumulating large debts in the second half of 1830s, coinciding with the origination of several large-scale public works projects. In the next section, we highlight some similarities and differences in these states’ fiscal policies, paying particular attention to their debt financing plans.

2.1 State Fiscal Policy In this section, we provide brief synopses of the fiscal situations of various states before and during the crisis. For all states, policy decisions were integral for the level of debt and perception of default.

2.1.1 Indiana Indiana’s finances over this period were crucial for her outcome. Over-optimistic revenue forecasts and underestimates of canal costs eventually led the state to default in 1841.

Wallis (2003) provides a detailed discussion on the state tax policy and the internal improvement project for Indiana in the 1830s. The U.S. Congress granted Indiana land in 1827 for the construction of the Wabash and Erie canal that began in 1832. However, sectional rivalries slowed construction, as parts of the state far from the Wabash and Erie canal demanded canals in their areas as well. In 1836 Indiana passed an ad valorem property tax and the Mammoth Internal Improvement bill to extend improvement projects throughout the state. Compared to its predecessor, per-acre tax that fell heavily on farmers, the new tax allowed the state to tax the value of town lands and other personal property, and therefore redistributed the tax burden of financing the canals more fairly onto towns and cities that were likely to benefit the most from the project. The Mammoth bill created a Board of Internal Improvement and authorized it to borrow up to $10 million for a “system” of canals.

As part of the discussion on the $10 million bond authorization, the State Board of Internal Improvement reported to the State House in 1836 possible plans to finance the internal improvement projects, including detailed forecasts for revenues and expenditures between 1838 and 1848. Table 2 displays their baseline forecast for revenue with the following key assumptions: 1) The taxable property value would increase at an annual rate of 15%; 2) A surplus fund would be established with a $67,500 startup fund and would receive an annual return of 9%. Only the interest income from the surplus fund would be spent on the internal improvement project, while the principal would remain in the fund. Unfortunately, neither assumption materialized.

**Over-optimistic Forecasts of Revenue** Land revenue played an increasingly important role in the state budget in the late 1830s for Indiana. The ratio of land to total tax revenue climbed from 41% in 1835 to 84% in 1838, as this period witnessed a rapid increase in the land price. The land price for Indiana rose from $5.4 per acre in 1835 to $9.87 in 1837, as shown in figure 4. Land tax
Table 2: Baseline Forecasts of Indiana Revenue for 1838 to 1848 (reported in 1836): the total revenue included the revenue from taxable property that was taxed at specified rates and returns on the surplus fund. The expenditure included the interest payments on state bonds less the toll revenue that was assumed to arise each year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Surplus Fund Return (million)</th>
<th>Taxable Property</th>
<th>Tax Rate</th>
<th>Total Revenue</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1836</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837</td>
<td>67,500</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>112,350</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1838</td>
<td>140,611</td>
<td>103.2</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>192,189</td>
<td>108,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1839</td>
<td>148,188</td>
<td>118.6</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>207,502</td>
<td>177,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>150,933</td>
<td>136.4</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>219,145</td>
<td>237,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841</td>
<td>149,326</td>
<td>156.9</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>227,770</td>
<td>253,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1842</td>
<td>147,056</td>
<td>180.4</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>237,265</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843</td>
<td>141,410</td>
<td>207.5</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>348,892</td>
<td>363,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1844</td>
<td>140,140</td>
<td>238.6</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>378,744</td>
<td>424,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>136,022</td>
<td>274.4</td>
<td>0.00125</td>
<td>479,015</td>
<td>482,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>135,697</td>
<td>315.6</td>
<td>0.00125</td>
<td>530,139</td>
<td>535,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>135,256</td>
<td>362.9</td>
<td>0.00125</td>
<td>588,865</td>
<td>578,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>136,163</td>
<td>417.3</td>
<td>0.00125</td>
<td>657,813</td>
<td>610,238</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The revenue forecasts in table 2 relied on the over-optimistic expectation of continual increases in land value. Figure 5 compares the expected versus the actual tax revenue on land. The actual land revenue fell far short of the forecasts. The expected revenue from land was over $334,000 in 1848, three times as high as the actual revenue, which was less than $112,000. Even though the taxable land in acres steadily increased at an annual rate of 8%, the land price plummeted from $9.87 per acre in 1837 to $5.37 in 1842, and remained close to $5 for the next eight years, as shown in figure 4.

In addition, Indiana was unable to establish the surplus fund as planned before the state defaulted. As shown in table 2, the interest income from the surplus fund was supposed to be the primary revenue source for the project in the early years. In reality, this was never possible.

“... the wealth of a country like this is not stationary. The progress of our system of improvement, will give impulse to business of every kind, and will cause an influx of wealth from abroad, which by being employed in manufactures and other operations, will increase the commerce of the country, and add greatly to our taxable means ... if the present rule of assessment be continued, there will be an average annual increase of 15 per cent. in the valuation of taxable property. ”

– Report of the State Board of Internal Improvement (1836), p. 8 (boldface added)
Underestimates of Expenditure The State of Indiana not only overestimated its future revenue, but also underestimated expenditures for the internal improvement project. According to Kettell (1849a), the initial estimate was $10 million for the entire internal improvement project. Indiana had borrowed over $12 million when it defaulted in 1841, while none of the canals or railroads of the project had been completed. After default, Indiana negotiated with its bond holders and finished the Wabash and Erie Canal, which alone cost $20 million in total.

The forecasts on the annual expenditure shown in table 2 reflect the anticipated annual interest payments owed each year less the expected toll revenue arising from the project. Implicitly, the government assumed tax revenue only would be used to roll over the debt, while the principal of the debt would be paid off in the long run when the completion of the project greatly stimulated the state economy.

2.1.2 Ohio Ohio’s era of public works began in 1825, and the state benefited from early policy actions that established a good reputation with creditors. In her original canal law, Ohio gave the Auditor discretionary power to levy property taxes at an annual level sufficient to cover interest on the canal debt, providing direct taxation for debt relief.\footnote{Although the Auditor did not raise taxes to cover debt payments until the 1840s, Kettell (1849b) argues this provision added to initial investor confidence in the state. See Bogart (1912) for a discussion of how the tax was not truly ad valorem, as reassessments of property were not systematically undertaken.} By the end of 1835, the Ohio and Miami canals were in operation and generating revenue for the state [see Kettell (1849b)]. The level of state debt at the time was $4,500,000, while no new debt had been issued for public works since 1832 (see figure 3).

In 1836 Ohio embarked on five new canal projects, leading the state to spend $10 million on new canals over the period 1836-1845 [see Scheiber (2012)]. Unlike Indiana, a sinking fund to support expenditures for the projects was established, and by 1841 Ohio was already halfway through completion of the projects. Nevertheless, Ohio also experienced increasing financial difficulties after 1839. As neighboring states began defaulting, fears of nonpayment in Ohio were even discussed in news articles.\footnote{For instance, the January 1842 issue of the \emph{Weekly Herald} noted that “Even in Ohio, the matter (of nonpayment) is under discussion, and has caused a fall of the stocks of that State.”} Investors, worried about banks’ and states’ solvency across the U.S., grew increasingly suspicious of previous trustworthy states, such as Ohio. These fears for Ohio quickly dissipated in 1843 when a consortium of her creditors purchased $1,500,000 in new bond issues at par value, leading the market price of Ohio bonds to increase close to par value almost overnight [see Scheiber (2012), p. 154].

2.1.3 New York Like Ohio, New York benefited from early policy actions. When New York began the Erie Canal in 1817, the state dedicated two revenue sources to service canal debt: auction duties and a salt tax. By 1824, revenues for these two taxes were $290,000, which almost equaled the canal bond interest payments of $350,000. A sinking fund for tax revenues and canal receipts was established to further ensure the service of debt obligations. Like other states, New York embarked on additional internal improvement projects in 1836: enlarging the Erie canal, extending
the canal system, and investing in railroads. Between 1836 and 1841, the state borrowed more than $15 million [see Wallis, Sylla, and Grinath III (2004)].

By the early 1840s, New York was experiencing difficulties in financing interest payments and expenditures. In March 1842, the state adopted the “Stop and Tax Law,” which suspended further expenditures on improvement projects and re-instituted the state property tax. The law sent a clear message to investors and bond prices quickly rose following the austerity measure. New York was able to continue borrowing after the 1840s crisis, with voters approving a bond issue to expand the canal network in the 1850s.

2.1.4 Pennsylvania  To be included.

2.2 Bond Prices and State Fiscal Policy  These individual state stories share some common themes. Many states began authorizing and issuing unprecedented debt after 1836 for various projects. Information on these state fiscal policies was publicly available, as the states published Auditor’s and Treasurer’s reports annually. For instance, Indiana’s 1838-48 fiscal forecasts for the internal improvement projects, shown in table 2, were published by the State Board of Internal Improvement in 1836. Although states provided various financing schemes for mounting debts, bond prices remained initially stable, see figure 1. Moreover, the differences in state bond prices were quite narrow, despite their distinct fiscal policies.

Were investors paying attention to fiscal conditions as they developed before and during the crisis? Or were investors’ strong reactions during the crisis in part due to a correction from past inattentiveness? The next section empirically examines the importance of fiscal attention as contemporary events unfolded.

3 Fiscal Information Index and Bond Price

In this section we examine the importance of fiscal attention for bond prices. In particular, we construct a “fiscal information index” by relying on three of the Gale digitized databases: the nineteenth century U.S. newspapers, the nineteenth century British newspapers, and the Times digital archive 1785-2010.

3.1 Newspapers and Fiscal Information Index  The newspaper database includes 138 newspapers for the period between January 1830 and December 1845. 91 of these were U.S. newspapers, with 84 from the contemporary states and 7 from the territories, shown in table 3.1. The remaining 47 were from the U.K., with 39 from England and 8 from Scotland Ireland, and Wales. The database covers major newspapers of the time. For instance, there were six newspapers from New

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13 Although the state property tax had been suspended in 1826, New York did have other tax revenue sources throughout the 1830s.

14 Information also was printed in newspapers. For instance, Pennsylvania’s Bank Improvement Act of 1836 was printed in the National Intelligencer (Feb. 20, 1836) and the United States Telegraph (Feb. 23, 1836).
York, including the widely circulated *New York Herald* and *New York Spectator*.\(^{15}\)

In order to track the article coverage to fiscal information, we construct a “fiscal information index” by searching for the key words ‘debt’ & ‘tax’ & the state name (Indiana, Illinois, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, or Kentucky) in the three newspaper databases and accumulate the number of articles that included all three key words.\(^{16}\) The top panel of figure 6 plots the raw article counts at monthly frequency. Mott (1950) notes that the 1830s were associated with the advent of the penny paper, a daily newspaper costing a penny, and a sharp increase in newspapers, from a total of 1,200 in 1833 to about 3,000 by 1860 in the U.S. In order to account for the trend of newspapers available in general during the period, we construct an article index by dividing the fiscal article counts by the total number of articles written at the time. We then normalize the index by setting it to 100 in January 1834. The bottom panel of figure 6 plots the normalized article indices for the seven states.

The article indices rose for all states in the 1840s relative to the 1830s and were quite volatile, often rising after December when the state government published the annual Auditor’s and Treasurer’s report, and remaining high for the next couple of months. Such cyclicalism seemed less pronounced in the 1830s than the 1840s, which might reflect that investors paid less attention to relevant fiscal news/reports before the crisis. To formalize the idea, we estimate a Markov-switching model to statistically test for breaks in the composite fiscal index that covers all seven states.\(^{17}\)

Following Hamilton (1989), the model takes the form:

\[
I_t = \mu(s_t) + \sigma(s_t)\epsilon_t
\]

where \(I_t\) denotes the composite fiscal index, \(\mu(s_t)\) denotes the average level of the index, which varies according to the regime \(s_t\). In addition, we also allow the volatility of fiscal index, captured

\(^{15}\)The *New York Herald* included a section called “Money Article” by 1835, which Mott (1950) credits as precursor to modern financial page.

\(^{16}\)We exclude the advertisement section of newspapers.

\(^{17}\)In order to construct the composite fiscal index, we total the number of fiscal articles for all seven states, divide it by the total number of articles available over the same period, and normalize the index by setting it to 100 in January 1834. The results are robust to performing the regime-switching tests for individual states.
Table 4: Markov-switching fiscal index model: case (1) specifies constant volatility, while case (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(\mu_{\text{low}})</th>
<th>(\mu_{\text{high}})</th>
<th>(\sigma_{\text{low}})</th>
<th>(\sigma_{\text{high}})</th>
<th>(p_{lt})</th>
<th>(p_{hh})</th>
<th>SBIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>60.60 ***</td>
<td>183.48 ***</td>
<td>35.39</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.51)</td>
<td>(8.35)</td>
<td>(2.26)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>54.97 ***</td>
<td>154.59 ***</td>
<td>28.64</td>
<td>57.46</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>10.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.51)</td>
<td>(10.53)</td>
<td>(2.67)</td>
<td>(6.43)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Markov-switching fiscal index model: case (1) specifies constant volatility, while case (2)

by \(\sigma(s_t)\), to vary according to regime \(s_t\). \(\epsilon_t\) is independently and identically distributed from a mean zero normal distribution. We assume two latent states. Table 3.1 displays the estimation results.

Case (1) specifies constant volatility, while case (2) allows regime-switching volatility. Both cases show distinct values for the average index levels in two regimes: the estimates of the mean counts, \(\mu_{\text{low}}\) and \(\mu_{\text{high}}\), are statistically significant at the 1% level, and \(\mu_{\text{low}}\) is statistically distinct from \(\mu_{\text{high}}\) at the 1% level. The low regime is more persistent than the high regime. The last row displays the Schwarz-Bayesian Information Criteria (SBIC), which measures the fit of a model specification. A lower SBIC value implies a more favorable model specification. The specification with regime-switching volatility is preferred, as evidenced by comparing the SBIC values.

Figure 7 plots the filtered probability of being in the low article regime for the composite fiscal index. It stays high throughout the 1830s, with only one sharp drop in early 1836 when there was a lot of discussion in the news about the distribution of the federal government’s surplus to state governments. The path of the filtered probability, however, is quite different in the 1840s. High and low article regimes alternate, with high regimes almost always starting at the beginning of a year, right after the state governments published their annual Auditor’s and Treasurer’s reports. This suggests that not only were more fiscal articles published in the 1840s, but also more relevant articles were written and therefore investors were probably better informed.

Changes in fiscal policy occur at a lower frequency than bond price movements. For instance, Auditor and Treasurer reports on state financing tend to made annually, while bonds were traded daily. We posit that this distinction implies that fiscal news would affect investors’ pricing decision on state bonds to some extent throughout the year. In order to encapsulate the past relevant fiscal information, we construct rolling-window indices that measure the accumulated fiscal articles for the past 12 months. The top panel of figure 8 plots the raw rolling-window article counts at monthly frequency. For instance, the count for New York in January 1834 was 173, meaning 173 newspaper articles that included the key words were published between January and December 1833. The bottom panel of figure 8 plots the normalized rolling-window indices, which rose after January 1840 and peaked in 1842 for all seven states. To test for regime breaks, we estimate the regime-switching model on the rolling-window fiscal composite index, following the specification in equation 1. Table 3.1 displays the estimation results. Again, the estimates of the mean counts, \(\mu_{\text{low}}\) and \(\mu_{\text{high}}\), are statistically significant at the 1% level, and \(\mu_{\text{low}}\) is statistically distinct from \(\mu_{\text{high}}\) at the 1% level. Compared to table 3.1, the two regimes, particularly the low regime,
Table 5: Markov-switching rolling-window fiscal index model: case (1) specifies constant volatility, while case (2) allows regime-switching volatility. Standard errors denoted in parenthesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( \mu ) (low)</th>
<th>( \mu ) (high)</th>
<th>( \sigma ) (low)</th>
<th>( \sigma ) (high)</th>
<th>( p_{ll} )</th>
<th>( p_{lh} )</th>
<th>SBIC</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>88.41***</td>
<td>215.79***</td>
<td>28.21</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>0.992</td>
<td>9.77</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.08)</td>
<td>(3.84)</td>
<td>(1.67)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>84.23***</td>
<td>205.39***</td>
<td>13.68</td>
<td>45.65</td>
<td>0.993</td>
<td>0.992</td>
<td>9.43</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.59)</td>
<td>(5.81)</td>
<td>(1.17)</td>
<td>(4.11)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
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</table>

Table 6: Dates for the fiscal indices at peak and those for the bond prices at trough for each state.

Table 6: Dates for the fiscal indices at peak and those for the bond prices at trough for each state.

are more persistent. This is further evidenced by figure 9, which plots the filtered probability of being in the low article regime for the rolling-window composite index. The model estimates a one-time switch from the low article to the high article regime between 1841 and 1842; prior to this point, the low article count regime is highly likely, whereas after this point, the high article regime is favored.

3.2 Bond Price and Fiscal Information Index

Figure 10 plots the rolling-window fiscal index (the blue line with the left axis) against the bond price (the red line with the right axis) for each state from January 1834 to December 1845. A couple of observations emerge. There are negative co-movements between the bond price and the fiscal index for all seven states. In the 1830s, the bond price was high and the fiscal index was low; as the crisis hit, the bond price plummeted while the fiscal index surged.

In addition, the timing of the co-movements differs for the defaulting and non-defaulting states. Table 6 compares the dates when the bond prices were at their trough to those when the rolling-window fiscal indices were at their peak. The fiscal indices peaked in June 1842 for all states. Bond prices bottomed out at distinct times for each state. Interestingly, the troughs of bond prices occurred after the peaks of the fiscal indices for the defaulting states, yet ahead of the peaks for non-defaulting states. Given the limited fiscal information available, investors initially punished all states after the crisis erupted. As the demand for fiscal information surged, more news articles were written on the fiscal situation in U.S. states, and investors started to differentiate states that were likely to honor their debt from others. Thus the fiscal index preceded the drop in bond prices for the defaulting states, as investors were absorbing information and responding accordingly in the bond market. For the states with either more solid fiscal backing (New York and Ohio) or much less debt (Kentucky), investors were able to differentiate their fiscal situation and support their bond prices before the peak of fiscal indices, as confirmed in figure 10.

To more formally test how bond prices depend on the fiscal information indices, we estimate

\[ \text{The fiscal index peaked in both February and June 1842 for Pennsylvania.} \]
Table 7: Regression Results: dependent variable is the bond price $p^b_{it}$; explanatory variables include the rolling-window composite fiscal index $I^{rw}_t$, the fiscal index interacting with the crisis dummy, the lagged bond price $p^b_{i,t-1}$, and the commodity price $p^com_t$. Bond and commodity prices are converted to the natural logarithm. Standard errors denoted in parenthesis. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05., * p < 0.01

<table>
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<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RW fiscal index</td>
<td>-0.094 (0.063)</td>
<td>0.005 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.006 (0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RW fiscal index X crisis dummy</td>
<td>-0.112*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.014*** (0.005)</td>
<td>-0.019*** (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged bond price</td>
<td>0.94*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.94*** (0.057)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity price</td>
<td>-0.09*** (0.023)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-fixed effect</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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The dependent variable $p^b_{it}$ is the monthly average bond price for four states (Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, and Ohio). $I^{rw}_t$ is the rolling-window composite fiscal index, and $dR_t$ is a dummy variable for the crisis period that is equal to zero before January 1939 and one thereafter. We allow the fiscal index to interact with the crisis dummy, which measures how the impact of the fiscal index on bond prices shifted during the crisis. $z_{it}$ denotes control variables and includes state specific dummies as well as the all-commodity index of wholesale prices for the New York market from Cole (1938), $ln p^com_t$. We also allow a response to the lagged bond price.

The regression results are summarized in Table 3.2. The estimates for the rolling-window composite fiscal index and the interacted term between the fiscal index and crisis dummy are robust, regardless of whether the lagged bond price and the commodity price are included or not. In particular, the coefficient on the rolling-window fiscal index is always insignificant, while the one on the interacted fiscal index with the crisis dummy is always negative and significant at 1% level. This suggests the fiscal news reports had no significant impact on bond prices until after January 1839. In the baseline case (1), an increase in the rolling-window fiscal index by 100% reduces bond price by 11.2%. As shown in figure 10, it was common for the fiscal index to rise by 3 or 4 fold

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19 In the baseline case, we exclude Indiana, Illinois and Kentucky because their bond price data are not available until 1836 or 1838. For a robustness check, we use individual bond prices (instead of the average bond price for each state) in a panel of all seven states. In this case, we include dummy variables for each security, allowing to control for security specific effects.

20 We rescale the index for estimation so that the index takes a value of one in the benchmark month.

21 Given our limited panel of four states, we do not include dummy variables for time.
when the crisis erupted. The estimate for the lagged bond price is always significant and positive, and that for the commodity price is negative and significant. In addition, the adjusted $R^2$ is above 0.7 for all cases.

3.3 Discussion One potential explanation for our results is an expectation of bailout: investors who bought the state bonds might have expected the federal government to step in and bailout those states in case they ran into solvency problems. In this case, scant attention to state fiscal policies would be necessary as debts were implicitly guaranteed.

This conjecture is not entirely unfounded, as on August 4, 1790 the federal government did nationalize states’ debt for the American Revolutionary War. McGrane (1935) documents the heated debate over a federal government bailout in the early 1840s. Foreign investors started to discuss the possibility of a national pledge in late 1839, and debate in the U.S. about federal assumption of the state debts quickly followed. Although President Tyler in his message of 1841 declared that the states alone were responsible for their debts, European investors in 1842 refused to lend to the federal government unless it assumed the state debts. On December 29, 1842, a select committee of the House was appointed to report on the advisability of federal assumption, but ultimately the matter failed in the Congress.

Despite the bailout debate after the onset of the crisis, there was limited, if any, evidence that investors expected a bailout ex-ante when purchasing bonds. According to McGrane (1935), the U.S. state bonds were subject to fewer fluctuations in prices and appealed to British investors who held the bonds as “a safe and more or less permanent investment and not for speculative purpose.” McGrane also documents correspondence between Barings Bank—a key player in facilitating state bond issuance in England—and Hope Bank, Barings’ counterpart in Holland (see McGrane (1935), p. 33).

“... the buyers of American state stocks never contemplated until lately that the general government was in any way accountable or that it would or could interfere with them.”

– Barings to Hope, June 10, 1842

“(the twenty-six states were) all sovereign and independent, and although circumstances might in time enable the general government to aid the states, that government has no power or right to interfere.”

– Barings to Hope, May 27, 1842

Although some investors may have viewed a bailout as practicable, there is no evidence that such view was universal before (or during) the crisis. In the next section, we offer an alternative explanation as to why the fiscal news index was more informative about bond prices during the crisis based on the theory of costly information processing.

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22 English (1996) documents the broad changes in the legal prospects for creditors suing the U.S. state governments. In 1793, the first Supreme Court found against the state of Georgia, when a citizen of South Carolina sued Georgia for nonpayment of debt in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia (1793). As a response, Congress passed the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, making it very difficult for creditors to force states to repay debts in the future.
4 Theoretical Model

There is a growing literature on costly information processing. Sims (2003, 2006, 2010) proposes a rational inattention framework, in which agents make optimal decisions but have limited ability to translate external data into actions. Peng and Xiong (2006) use the rational inattention model to study the learning process of investors who face unobservable fundamental factors in their portfolio. More recently, Maggio and Pagano (2015) model explicit information costs and study how disclosure of financial information affects trading. Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) provide empirical support by showing that earning announcements on Fridays have a 15% lower immediate response and a 70% higher delayed response than weekday announcements, suggesting investors are distracted on Fridays as the weekend approaches. Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula (2010) use a survey of health, aging and retirement in Europe and find that the propensity to invest in stocks is driven by information constraints and cognitive abilities, instead of preferences or psychological traits.

In a similar spirit, we develop a simple two-period model to illustrate how attentiveness to fiscal conditions can influence bond prices. We assume that the ‘real’ fiscal stance of the state government is a latent variable that investors cannot observe. Instead, investors can extract related fiscal information at a cost. The more information they extract, the more likely they can identify the ‘real’ fiscal stance of a state and avoid poor investment decisions. As information is costly, the optimal amount of resources devoted to fiscal information processing depends on the current economic environment. As we show below, in good times it is optimal to spend less resources on processing fiscal information. As bad times materialize, however, investors are motivated to process more information and differentiate ‘good’ state bonds from ‘bad’ ones.

4.1 Two-period Model

At period $t = 0$, investors (foreigners) receive an endowment of $y_0$, and decide how much to consume $c_0$ and to save $b_0$ in that period; at next period, they consume the return from their savings $c_1$. They can save in a range of state bonds $b$ indexed by $j$. Bonds differ in default probability, reflecting distinct underlying fiscal fundamentals. The representative investor’s consumption-savings problem is given by

$$\max E_0 \{ u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1) \}$$

s.t. $$y_0 = c_0 + i_0 + \int q_0(j) b_0(j) dj$$

$$c_1 = \int (1 - \Delta_1(j)) b_0(j) dj$$

At $t = 0$, investors can spend part of their resources to collect and analyze information, $i_0$, about government bonds. The more information they process, the more likely they can differentiate which state would default next period. The state’s capacity to honor its debt jointly depends on its fiscal stance $s^i$, which is time-invariant and can be either strong $s^s$ or weak $s^w$, and the land value $L_t$, which is time-varying and can be either high $L^h$ or low $L^l$. In particular, the following chart shows the interactions: the state defaults with a haircut of $\delta$ only when the land value is low and the
fiscal stance is weak; otherwise it always honors its debt obligation.

\[
L_0 = L^x \quad \text{w/ prob of } p^{xh} \quad \text{w/ strong fiscal stance} \rightarrow (s^{w}, L^l) \rightarrow \Delta_1 = 0
\]

\[
L_0 = L^x \quad \text{w/ prob of } 1 - p^{xh} \quad \text{w/ weak fiscal stance} \rightarrow (s^{w}, L^l) \rightarrow \Delta_1 = 0
\]

\[
L_1 = L^l \quad \text{w/ strong fiscal stance} \rightarrow (s^{w}, L^l) \rightarrow \Delta_1 = \delta
\]

\[
L_1 = L^h \quad \text{w/ weak fiscal stance} \rightarrow (s^{w}, L^h) \rightarrow \Delta_1 = 0
\]

\[
L_1 = L^h \quad \text{w/ strong fiscal stance} \rightarrow (s^{w}, L^h) \rightarrow \Delta_1 = 0
\]

In order to capture the events in the 1840s, we assume that investors can observe the land value at each period \(L_t\) and knows the transition probability from one state to another \(p^{xh}\); but they cannot observe the fiscal stance \(s^i\). Instead investors have to spend some resources \(i_0\) to analyze information and infer the state. The more information they process, the more likely they know about the state’s capacity to pay off its debt and therefore invest accordingly. For simplicity, we assume that the probability of identifying a non-defaulting state bond is \(\frac{y_0}{y_0}\). Therefore, the expected consumption for period \(t = 1\) is,

\[
E_0 c_1 = b_0 \left\{ p^{xh} + (1 - p^{xh}) \left( \frac{i_0}{y_0} + (1 - \delta) \left( 1 - \frac{i_0}{y_0} \right) \right) \right\} \quad (6)
\]

Given the current land value \(L^x\), the land value will be high next period with a probability of \(p^{xh}\), in which case no states will default regardless of their fiscal stance. With a probability of \(1 - p^{xh}\), the land value will drop next period; and if investors spend \(i_0\) units of resources in processing information, they will have a probability of \(\frac{y_0}{y_0}\) for receiving the bond payment in full next period and a probability of \(1 - \frac{i_0}{y_0}\) for getting a haircut of \(\delta\).

The investor’s optimization problem can be written as

\[
\max_{i_0, b_0} u(y_0 - i_0 - q_0b_0) + \beta u \left( b_0 \left\{ p^{xh} + (1 - p^{xh}) \left( \frac{i_0}{y_0} + (1 - \delta) \left( 1 - \frac{i_0}{y_0} \right) \right) \right\} \right) \quad (7)
\]

and the first-order conditions are,

\[
\frac{1}{y_0 - i_0 - q_0b_0} = \frac{\beta}{b_0 \left( 1 - \delta(1 - p^{xh}) + \delta \frac{i_0}{y_0}(1 - p^{xh}) \right)} \frac{\delta b_0}{y_0} (1 - p^{xh}) \quad (8)
\]

\[
\frac{q_0}{y_0 - i_0 - q_0b_0} = \beta \frac{b_0 \left( 1 - \delta(1 - p^{xh}) + \delta \frac{i_0}{y_0}(1 - p^{xh}) \right) (1 - \delta(1 - p^{xh}) + \delta \frac{i_0}{y_0}(1 - p^{xh}))}{b_0 \left( 1 - \delta(1 - p^{xh}) + \delta \frac{i_0}{y_0}(1 - p^{xh}) \right) (1 - \delta(1 - p^{xh}) + \delta \frac{i_0}{y_0}(1 - p^{xh}))} \quad (9)
\]
Given $i_0 \geq 0$, we can derive

$$\frac{i_0}{y_0} = \max \left\{ 0, 1 - \frac{1}{\delta} \frac{\beta + 1}{2\beta} + \frac{1}{1 - p^{eh}} \right\}$$

(10)

The higher the haircut $\delta$, the more resources investors will spend on information. If we further assume the land value is very persistent, then $p^{hh} >> 1 - p^{hh}$, and $p^{lh} << 1 - p^{lh}$. In this case, investors will spend less resources on information if the current land value is high, which is consistent with what we observe in the 1830s and 1840s.

5 Conclusion

To be included
REFERENCES


A Data Appendix

To be included

B Causes of Crisis of 1837 and 1839

B.1 Panic of 1837 There is still an on-going debate on the causes of the panic of 1837, during which banks suspended convertibility into specie from May of 1837.

- Temin (1969) argued that international factors was at the heart of the crisis. “Two increases in the Bank of England’s discount rate in the summer of 1836 and their instructions for the Liverpool branch to reject bills of exchange drawn on houses associated with American commerce in late August were the start of a deliberate and sustained effort to ‘recover’ specie that had been presumed lost to the U.S.” (see page 7, Rousseau (2002)).

Wallis (2001) provided more details in summarizing Temin’s point. Raw cotton was the largest export of the U.S., and was often exported to Britain through middlemen. Cotton owners would consign their product to an intermediary and in return be able to draw on credits that is a share of the estimated cotton value. The owner could realize cash for those credits by drawing a bill of exchange payable at sight plus sixty days in sterling in London, or a bill on New York or Boston. If cotton prices fell, the sale price may not cover the cost of shipping and the payment advance, and therefore the 60-day bill deviations between London and Boston/New York would rise. The American economy was booming in 1836, the credit markets were tight, and discount rates on domestic commercial paper in New York and Boston were high. The Bank of England started to feel the pressure on its bullion reserves in late 1836, raising its bank rate from 4 to 5 percent and also becoming more selective in the American bills it would accept. As a result, cotton price fell and disrupted the banking system.

- Timberlake (1978) argued the distribution of the federal surplus revenues to the individual states in the Spring of 1837 drained the specie in the eastern states, particularly in New York, and caused the panic. The distribution transferred $5 million to states according to their relative populations in four equal quarterly installments starting on January 1, 1837 (see page 7, Rousseau (2002)).

- Rousseau (2002) instead believed that ‘supplemental’ transfers of public balances (ordered by the U.S. Treasury under the Deposit Act of June 23, 1836) and the Specie Circular of July 11, 1836 were the key causes. Other than the ‘official’ distribution of federal surplus to the states, the Deposit Act of June 23, 1836 also required to establish one bank as a government depository in each state. The amendment of the Deposit Act on July 4 required $38 million in ‘supplemental’ interbank transfers over the next 6 months to achieve an equitable balance among the states. In addition, the Specie Circular required all federal lands be purchased
with specie after August 15, 1836, as the federal government intended to erect a barrier for land speculators.

• As Wallis (2001) surveyed (page 5): “Democrats and some historians argued that the expansion of the banking system in the early 1830s produced an increase in the money supply, a rapid inflation and the conditions for a financial crash in 1837. Whigs and other historians maintained that Jackson’s failure to recharter the Bank of the United States, his arbitrary removal of federal deposits from the BUS to the state banks, the Specie Circular of 1836, and the mismanagement of the federal surplus distribution in 1837 disrupted the financial system.” Wallis himself found both Temin’s and Rousseau’s evidence to be compelling.

**B.2 Crisis of 1839** The crisis of 1839 is usually dated from the suspension of specie payments by the Bank of the United States of Pennsylvania on October 10, 1839, followed by suspensions in the south and west shortly thereafter (Wallis (2001), page 19).
Figure 2: Debt outstanding on September 1, 1841 by year of authorization at each state (in thousands of dollars): from U.S. Congress (1843).
Figure 3: The state debt of Ohio as of 1842 by year of issuance: from Ohio Annual Report of the Auditor of State (1842).

Figure 4: Annual land price for Indiana (1835-50): computed using the land value and the total land acres reported in the Auditor’s Reports.
Figure 5: Land tax revenue for Indiana (1837-48): “actual” revenue is computed using the actual land acres & prices and the forecast on tax rates; “forecast” revenue is computed using the forecasts on land value and tax rate.
Figure 6: Fiscal article counts and indices at monthly frequency (1834/01 - 1845/12): the top panel shows the number of articles published at each month that included the key search words; the bottom panel plots the normalized fiscal indices by dividing the fiscal article counts by the number of all articles available at the same time, and then normalizing and setting it to 100 in January 1834.

Figure 7: Probability of low article count regime for the composite fiscal index.
Figure 8: Rolling-window fiscal article counts and indices at monthly frequency (1834/01 - 1845/12): the top panel shows the number of articles published for the past 12 months (not including the current month) that included the key search words; the bottom panel plots the normalized rolling-window fiscal indices by dividing the rolling-window article counts by the number of all articles available for the same period, and then normalizing and setting it to 100 in January 1834.

Figure 9: Probability of low article count regime for the rolling-window composite fiscal index.
Figure 10: State-specific fiscal information indices and bond prices at monthly frequency (1835/12 - 1845/12): red lines (with right axis) are bond prices; blue lines (with left axis) are fiscal information indices.