A Tractable Model of Monetary Exchange with Ex-Post Heterogeneity*

Guillaume Rocheteau
University of California, Irvine

Pierre-Olivier Weill
University of California, Los Angeles

Tsz-Nga Wong
Bank of Canada

First version: August 2012
This version: April 2015

Abstract

We construct a continuous-time, pure currency economy with the following three key features. First, our modelled economy incorporates idiosyncratic uncertainty—households receive infrequent and random opportunities of lumpy consumption—and displays an endogenous, non-degenerate distribution of money holdings. Second, our model is tractable: properties of equilibria can be obtained analytically, and equilibria can be solved in closed form in a variety of cases. Third, our model admits as a special, limiting case the quasi-linear economy of Lagos and Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005). We use our modeled economy to obtain new insights on the effects of anticipated inflation on individual spending behavior, the social benefits and output effects of inflationary transfer schemes, and transitional dynamics following unanticipated monetary shocks.

JEL Classification: E40, E50
Keywords: money, inflation, lumpy consumption, risk sharing.

*We thank participants at the 2012 and 2014 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, Payments, and Finance at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, at the Search-and-Matching Workshop at UC Riverside, at the 2014 SED annual meeting, and seminar participants at Academia Sinica (Taipei), the University of California at Irvine, and Singapore Management University for useful discussions and comments. This paper does not reflect the view of the Bank of Canada or its staff.
1 Introduction

We construct a continuous-time, pure currency economy with the following three key features. First, our economy incorporates idiosyncratic uncertainty and displays an endogenous, non-degenerate distribution of money holdings, as in Bewley (1980, 1983). The nature of the idiosyncratic risk is analogous to the one in random-matching monetary models (Shi, 1995; Trejos and Wright, 1995). Second, our model is tractable, by which we mean that properties of equilibria can be obtained analytically, and equilibria (including value functions and distributions) can be solved in closed form in a variety of cases. Third, our model admits as a special, limiting case the quasi-linear economy of Lagos and Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005) that has become the workhorse paradigm for monetary theory. We use our model to revisit classical, yet topical, questions in monetary economics: the effects of anticipated inflation on individual spending behavior, the social benefits and output effects of inflationary transfer schemes, and transitional dynamics following unanticipated monetary shocks.

Pure currency economies are environments in which contracts involving intertemporal obligations are unfeasible, due to lack of monitoring and enforcement, and in which currency is the only durable object that can serve as means of payment. Despite being far remote from actual economies, they are critical constructions for our understanding of monetary exchange, and by extension of monetary policy. Following Bewley (1980, 1983), pure currency economies typically feature idiosyncratic uncertainty (in the recent literature, random matching shocks), which generates a precautionary demand for liquidity. Despite the presence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, the most recent and widely used models (e.g., Shi, 1997; Lagos and Wright, 2005) deliver equilibria with degenerate distributions of money holdings. These models are solvable in closed form and can easily be integrated with the standard representative-agent model used in macroeconomics, which led to a variety of insights on the role of money and monetary policy. Yet, this gain in tractability comes at a cost: models with degenerate distributions miss a fundamental trade-off for

---

1 Precisely, households receive infrequent and random opportunities of lumpy consumption. In the Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995) models random opportunities for lumpy consumption take place in pairwise meetings and the terms of trade are determined via ex-post bargaining. Relative to Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995) the distribution of money holdings is unharnessed by assuming that money is perfectly divisible and by removing the unit upper bound on money holdings, and all markets are competitive, as in Bewley (1980, 1983) or Rocheteau and Wright (2005).

2 In Shi’s (1997) model households are composed of a large number of members who pool their money holdings in order to secure themselves against the idiosyncratic risks associated with decentralized market activities. In the Lagos and Wright (2005) model the pooling of money holdings is achieved through a competitive market that opens periodically and quasi-linear preferences that eliminate wealth effects.

3 Some of these insights are surveyed in Williamson and Wright (2010a,b) and Nosal and Rocheteau (2011).
policy between promoting self-insurance by enhancing the rate of return of currency and providing risk sharing through transfers of money (Wallace, 2014). In the absence of ex-post heterogeneity, monetary policy is exclusively about enhancing the rate of return of currency, thereby making the Friedman rule omnipotent. Some versions of the search model that incorporate this trade-off have been studied numerically (see the literature review), but these versions are much harder to grasp due to the complex interactions between ex-post bargaining and the endogenous distribution of asset holdings.

In our model, ex-ante identical households, who enjoy consumption and leisure flows, have the possibility to trade continuously in competitive spot markets. We borrow from the search models (e.g., Shi, 1995; Trejos and Wright, 1995) the description of the idiosyncratic uncertainty: at some random times households receive idiosyncratic preference shocks that generate utility for lumps of consumption. These spending opportunities represent large shocks that cannot be paid for by a contemporaneous income flow (e.g., health shocks, large housing repairs, durable goods expenditures, changes in family composition, such as deaths, births, and marriages, and so on). By adopting the same form of idiosyncratic risk as the one commonly used in search-theoretic environments, we make our model readily comparable to existing frameworks in monetary theory. Following Kocherlakota (1998), lack of enforcement and anonymity prevent households from borrowing to finance these spending shocks, thereby creating a role for liquidity. Because the sequences of shocks are independent across households, the model generates heterogeneous individual histories and hence, possibly, heterogeneous holdings of money. Finally, time is assumed to be continuous, which has several advantages. It generates smooth density distributions (without spikes), it provides a clear representation of the mismatch between flow endowments and lumpy spending, and it makes ex-post heterogeneity generic even under the commonly-used quasi-linear preferences.

We provide a detailed characterization of the household’s consumption and saving problems under a minimal set of assumptions on preferences. We show that in equilibrium agents have a target for their real balances, which depends on their rate of time preference, the inflation rate, and the frequency of consumption opportunities. They approach this target gradually over time.

---

4For some empirical evidence on the large redistributional effect of inflation and monetary policy, see, e.g., Doepke and Schneider (2006) and Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Kueng, and Silvia (2012).

5As an example, Palumbo (1999) argues that uncertain medical expenses are important to explain precautionary savings of elderly Americans during retirement. He calculates that nearly 10% of elderly households spend a fifth or more of their incomes on out-of-pocket medical expenses, not taking into account nursing home expenses. Moreover, he reports that the likelihood that a typical sixty-five year old person enters a nursing home during her lifetime is 43% and admission to a long-term care facility can quickly deplete one’s financial wealth.
by saving a fraction of their labor income flow. When they are hit by a preference shock for lumpy consumption, agents deplete their money holdings in full, if their wealth is below a threshold, or partially otherwise. Given the household’s optimal consumption-saving behavior, we can characterize the stationary distribution of real money holdings in the population, and we solve for the value of money, thereby establishing the existence of an equilibrium. Moreover, under zero money growth ("laissez-faire"), the steady-state monetary equilibrium is unique, and it is near-efficient when households are patient, i.e., households are better off in a monetary equilibrium than under the full-insurance allocation with slightly scaled-down labor endowments (for a definition, see Green and Zhou, 2005).

If the money growth rate is large enough, then households exhaust their money holdings periodically, as in Shi (1997) or Lagos and Wright (2005), which keeps the model tractable since real balances only depend on the timing of the most recent shock. In contrast to Shi (1997) and Lagos and Wright (2005), however, households who accumulate money slowly through time hold different real money balances at the time when they trade, which makes distributional considerations relevant.

We study in details the special case where households have linear preferences over consumption and labor flows. This version of the model is worth investigating for at least two reasons. First, it admits as a limit the New-Monetarist model of Lagos and Wright (2005) or Rocheteau and Wright (2005), LRW thereafter, thereby allowing for a clear comparison with the literature. Second, the LRW version is especially tractable to investigate the welfare implications of different inflationary transfer schemes. It allows us to isolate a single parameter, the size of households’ labor endowments, $\bar{h}$, that determines the speed at which households insure themselves against preference shocks, and that parametrizes the trade-off for policy between providing incentives for self-insurance and improving risk sharing.

If labor endowments are large, there is limited ex-post heterogeneity and hence the societal benefits of lump-sum transfers of money in terms of risk sharing are small relative to the distortions induced by the inflation tax on the targeted real balances. In the limit, when the size of individual labor endowment is infinite, the equilibrium approaches the one in LRW, with a degenerate distribution and linear value functions, where welfare and output increase with the rate of return of currency. As a result, inflation is detrimental to both output and welfare.

In contrast, when labor endowments are small, the first-best aggregate output is implemented
for positive inflation rates. Output is higher than the laissez-faire level because inflation induces the richest households in the economy to keep working in order to mitigate the erosion of their real balances. For inflation rates that are neither too low nor too high, aggregate real balances are equal to the first-best consumption level so that the only inefficiency afflicting the economy is due to imperfect risk sharing. In that case moderate inflation raises welfare by reallocating consumption from households with low marginal utilities to the ones with higher marginal utilities. If preferences for lumpy consumption are linear with a satiation point, as in Green and Zhou (2005), such positive inflation rates implement a first-best allocation that could not be obtained under laissez-faire.

We calibrate our model using targets from the distribution of balances of transaction accounts in the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) and we provide comparative statics and measures of the welfare cost of inflation. We use this calibrated example to illustrate the negative relationship between the optimal inflation rate and the size of the labor endowment, $\hat{h}$. For small values of $\hat{h}$ the optimal inflation rate is positive while for sufficiently large values of $\hat{h}$ the optimal inflation is 0—negative inflation rates are not feasible in a pure currency economy with no enforcement.

As conjectured by Wallace (2014) the restriction to lump-sum transfer schemes might not allow the policy-maker to exploit effectively the trade-off between risk sharing and self-insurance. We illustrate this point by constructing an incentive-compatible, inflationary transfer scheme that improves welfare in economies with large labor endowments. This scheme assigns a lump-sum amount of money to the poorest households, thereby improving risk sharing, and a quantity of money that increases linearly with wealth to the richest households, thereby promoting self insurance. This transfer scheme, which is designed to keep households’ targeted real balances unchanged, raises aggregate real balances, and it increases social welfare relative to the laissez-faire equilibrium.

To conclude, we study two additional specifications of the model that are solvable in closed form and provide insights on the effects of money growth in the presence of ex-post heterogeneity. First, we assume quadratic preferences and show that policy functions are linear in real balances, which allows us to solve both steady states and transitional dynamics in closed form. A one-time increase in the money supply leads to a one-time increase in the price level and no effect on aggregate real quantities despite a redistribution of wealth across households that affects individual consumption and labor supply decisions. The mean-preserving decrease in the distribution of real balances raises society’s welfare.

Second, we assume that the utility over lumpy consumption is linear and the marginal utility
from lumpy consumption is stochastic. In this case agents adopt an optimal stopping rule to spend their real balances. As inflation increases, households spend their real balances more often on goods that are less valuable to them. It is a manifestation of the so-called "hot potato" effect of inflation that has proven hard to capture in models with degenerate distributions (e.g., Lagos and Rocheteau, 2005).  

**Literature**

Our contribution is to develop a pure currency economy with three key features. (i) Our economy is general in that it incorporates idiosyncratic risk, non-trivial labor supply decisions, and it generates an endogenous, non-degenerate distribution of money holdings. (ii) Our model achieves a high level of analytical tractability. (iii) It admits the workhorse model of modern monetary theory as a limiting case. As we explain below, the incomplete market literature based on Bewley (1980, 1983) features (i) but neither (ii) nor (iii). The recent monetary literature based on Shi (1997) and Lagos and Wright (2005) features (ii) but not (i).

The literature on incomplete markets describes environments where households who are subject to idiosyncratic shocks on their endowments or preferences accumulate assets in an attempt to smooth their consumption across time and states. This asset takes the form of fiat money in Bewley (1980, 1983), physical capital in Aiyagari (1994), and private IOUs in Huggett (1993). In contrast to the incomplete-market literature, but in the tradition of monetary theory, market incompleteness is not exogenous in our model: contracts involving intertemporal obligations are not incentive-feasible due to the absence of enforcement and monitoring technologies. One implication from making the frictions that render money essential explicit is that contraction of the money supply through taxation is inconsistent with the lack of enforcement technology (Wallace, 2014). Hence, we will consider positive money growth rates throughout the paper. Models of incomplete markets are most often solved by way of numerical methods while we will characterize equilibria both analytically and numerically.

We first review Bewley economies similar to ours. Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), Algan, Challe, and Ragot (2011), and Lippi, Ragni, and Trachter (2014) study Bewley economies with quasi-linear preferences. In contrast, we develop a model with general preferences and consider quasi-linear preferences.  

---

6The "hot potato" effect of inflation has also been studied by Ennis (2009), Nosal (2011), and Liu, Wang, and Wright (2011).

7This literature is surveyed in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, chapters 16-17) and Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2009).
preferences only as a special case to relate our model more squarely to Lagos-Wright economies. Scheinkman and Weiss assume ex-ante heterogeneity across agents, a constant money supply, and they consider aggregate shocks on endowments, while we assume ex-ante homogenous agents, a growing money supply through both lump sum transfer and more general schemes, and idiosyncratic preference shocks for lumpy consumption in the tradition of the search-based monetary literature. Lippi, Ragni, and Trachter characterize the optimal policy in the context of the Scheinkman and Weiss’s economy and show that it prescribes monetary expansions in recessions and monetary contractions in good times. Monetary contractions are not feasible in our environment due to lack of enforcement, but we do study more general transfer schemes to address the Wallace (2014) conjecture. Algan, Challe, and Ragot assume discrete time and they focus on equilibria with limited ex-post heterogeneity while our continuous-time model generates richer ex-post heterogeneity.\(^8\) Both Imrohoroglu (1992) and Dressler (2011) study numerically the welfare cost of inflation in Bewley economies. We also provide a calibration of our model and an estimate for the cost of inflation even though our contribution is mainly methodological and qualitative. Green and Zhou (2005) adopt mechanism design to investigate the efficiency property of a discrete-time Bewley monetary economy. They show that monetary spot trading is nearly efficient ex ante if agents are very patient. We show that this normative result also holds in our continuous-time environment with preference shocks for lumpy consumption (see our Proposition 6). Moreover, we generalize the example from Green and Zhou (2005, Section 6) and show that for economies with low labor endowments the first-best level of output is implemented for positive inflation rates.

From a methodological viewpoint, our description of idiosyncratic preference shocks for lumpy consumption in a continuous-time environment is similar to the formalization in the search-theoretic models of Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995), where prices are determined through bargaining and money holdings are restricted to \(\{0, 1\}\), and in the Baumol-Tobin model of Alvarez and Lippi (2013). Relative to Baumol-Tobin, our model has a single asset, fiat money, and households are not subject to a cash-in-advance constraint—in the absence of shocks they would not accumulate money and they would finance their flow consumption with their labor only. Moreover, we do not take the consumption path (both in terms of flows and jump sizes) as exogenous neither do we assume that labor income is exogenous.

\(^8\)The paper by Algan, Challe, and Ragot (2011) is more closely related to our companion paper, Rocheteau, Weill, and Wong (2015), where we consider a discrete-time version of the model with quasi-linear preferences in order to study analytically the transitional dynamics following one-time money injections. A key difference is that we assume random matching and bargaining.
Our work also contributes to the literature developing continuous time methods to study general equilibrium models with incomplete markets. Recently, Achdou, Han, Lasry, Lions, and Moll (2015) have proposed tools based on mean-field-games techniques to study a wide class of heterogeneous-agent models in continuous time, with Huggett (1993) as their baseline.\textsuperscript{9} The description of the idiosyncratic risk in our model is different: it involves changes in individual asset holdings in both flows and lumps so that the steady-state equilibrium value function and distribution can no longer be characterized by a system of partial differential equations, but instead obey a system of delay differential equations. We develop a methodology tailored to this problem and provide both an analytical and numerical characterization of the equilibrium objects.

Finally, formulating tractable search-theoretic monetary models with non-degenerate distributions has been considered challenging due to the interaction between bargaining and ex-post heterogeneity. Examples of such models include Camera and Corbae (1999), Zhu (2005), Molico (2006), Chiu and Molico (2010, 2011). While our preference shocks for lumpy consumption are reminiscent to random matching shocks in search models, we avoid the intricacies due to bargaining by assuming competitive prices.\textsuperscript{10} Green and Zhou (1998, 2002), Zhou (1999), and Menzio, Shi, and Sun (2013) assume price posting and a constant money supply. In Green and Zhou (1998, 2002) and Zhou (1999) search is undirected and goods are indivisible, which leads to a continuum of steady states. In contrast, our competitive pricing is non-strategic and the laissez-faire monetary equilibrium is unique. Moreover, our model is tractable to handle money growth and inflationary transfer schemes.

2 The environment

Time, $t \in \mathbb{R}_+$, is continuous and goes on forever. The economy is populated with a unit measure of infinitely-lived households who discount the future at rate $r > 0$. There is a single perishable consumption good produced according to a linear technology that transforms $h$ units of labor into $h$ units of output. Households have a finite endowment of labor per unit of time, $\tilde{h} < \infty$.

Households value consumption, $c$, and leisure flows, $\ell$, according to an increasing and concave instantaneous utility function, $u(c, \ell)$. We assume that both consumption and leisure are normal

\textsuperscript{9}Other examples of continuous-time general equilibrium models with nondegenerate distributions of wealth include Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) and Wang (2007).

\textsuperscript{10}Rocheteau, Weill, and Wong (2015) study a discrete-time version of the model with search and bargaining and alternating market structures. The model remains tractable and can be used to study transitional dynamics following one-time money injections.
goods, that \( u(c, \ell) \) is bounded above, i.e. \( \sup_{c \geq 0} u(c, \bar{h}) \equiv \|u\| < \infty \), and that it is bounded below so that we can normalize \( u(0,0) = 0 \). In addition to consuming and producing in flows, households receive preference shocks that generate lumps of utility for the consumption of discrete quantities of the good. Lumpy consumption opportunities represent large shocks (e.g., replacement of durables, health events, expenditures due to changes in family composition...) that require immediate spending.\(^{11}\) These shocks occur at Poisson arrival times, \( \{T_n\}_{n=1}^{\infty} \), with intensity \( \alpha \). The utility of consuming \( y \) units of goods at time \( T_n \) is given by the increasing, concave, and bounded utility function, \( U(y) \), and we normalize \( U(0) = 0 \).\(^{12}\) Taken together, the lifetime expected utility of a household can be written as:

\[
\mathbb{E} \left[ \int_{0}^{+\infty} e^{-rt} u(c_t, \bar{h} - h_t) \, dt + \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} e^{-rT_n} U(y_{T_n}) \right],
\]

given some adapted and left-continuous processes for \( c_t, h_t, \) and \( y_t \). We impose the following additional regularity conditions on households’ utility functions. First, \( U(y) \) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable, and satisfies the Inada condition \( U'(0) = +\infty \). Second, \( u(c, \ell) \) can have either one of the following two specifications:

1. **Smooth-Inada (SI) preferences**: \( u(c, \ell) \) is strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable, and satisfies Inada conditions with respect to both arguments, i.e., \( u_c(0, \ell) = \infty \) and \( u_c(\infty, \ell) = 0 \) for all \( \ell > 0 \), \( u_\ell(c, 0) = \infty \) for all \( c > 0 \);

2. **Linear preferences**: \( u(c, \ell) = \min\{c, \bar{c}\} + \ell \), for some \( \bar{c} \geq 0 \).

The first specification facilitates the analysis because it implies smooth policy functions for households and strictly positive consumption and labor flows. The second specification corresponds to the quasi-linear preferences commonly used in monetary theory since Lagos and Wright (2005) to eliminate wealth effects and to obtain equilibria with degenerate distributions of money balances.\(^{13}\) In our model, distributions will be *non*-degenerate even under quasi-linear preferences, because the

---

\(^{11}\)Following Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995) one could also interpret the preference shocks as random consumption opportunities in a decentralized goods market with search-and-matching frictions. For such an interpretation, see Rocheteau, Weil, and Wong (2015).

\(^{12}\)If we think of the shock as the replacement of durables, then \( U(y) = \vartheta(y)/(r + \delta) \) is the discounted sum of the utility flows, \( \vartheta(y) \), provided by a durable good, where \( \delta \) is the Poisson arrival rate at which a particular durable expires, and \( y \) is the quality of the durable.

\(^{13}\)Lagos and Wright (2005) assume quasi-linear preferences of the form \( u(c) + \ell \). See also Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) for similar preferences. The fully linear specification comes from Lagos and Rocheteau (2005). Wong (2014) shows in the context of a discrete-time model that the same results are maintained under a more general class of preferences.
feasibility constraint on labor, $h \leq \bar{h}$, will be binding for some agents in equilibrium. However, these preferences will facilitate the comparison of our model to the literature—we will obtain the model with competitive pricing from Rocheteau and Wright (2005) as a limiting case—and they will also simplify greatly policy functions allowing us to obtain closed-form solutions for all equilibrium objects, including value functions and distributions.

In order to make money essential we assume that households cannot commit and there is no monitoring technology (Kocherlakota, 1998). As a result households cannot borrow to finance lumpy consumption since otherwise they would default on their debt. The only asset in the economy is fiat money: a perfectly recognizable, durable and intrinsically worthless object. The supply of money, denoted $M_t$, grows at a constant rate, $\pi \geq 0$, through lump-sum transfers to households. Trades of money and goods take place in spot competitive markets. The price of money in terms of goods is denoted $p_t$.

**Full-insurance allocations**

Suppose that households pool together their labor endowments to insure themselves against the idiosyncratic preference shocks for lumpy consumption. Their maximization problem is:

$$\max_{c_t, y_t, y_t} \int_0^{+\infty} e^{-rt} \left[ u\left(c_t, \bar{h} - h_t\right) + \alpha U\left(y_t\right) \right] dt$$

subject to

$$c_t + \alpha y_t = h_t.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

The paths for consumption and hours are chosen so as to maximize the household’s ex-ante expected utility, (2), subject to the feasibility constraint, (3), that specifies that the aggregate consumption flows across all households, $c_t$, plus the lumpy consumption of the $\alpha$ households with a preference shock, $\alpha y_t$, must equal aggregate output, $h_t$. Under SI preferences the solution to (2)-(3) is $\left(c_t, h_t, y_t\right) = \left(c^{FI}, h^{FI}, y^{FI}\right)$ for all $t$, where the full-insurance allocation solves

$$u_c\left(c^{FI}, \bar{h} - h^{FI}\right) = u_c\left(c^{FI}, \bar{h} - h^{FI}\right) = U'\left(y^{FI}\right).$$

Households equalize the marginal utility of flow consumption, the marginal utility of leisure, and the marginal utility of lumpy consumption, and they pay a constant insurance premium, $\alpha y^{FI}$. Under linear preferences,

$$h^{FI} = \alpha y^{FI} = \min\{\alpha y^*, \bar{h}\},$$

and $c^{FI} = 0$, where $y^*$ is the quantity that equalizes the marginal utility of lumpy consumption and the unit marginal disutility of work, $U'(y^*) = 1$. If labor endowments are sufficiently large,
then the first-best allocation is such that households consume \( y^* \) whenever they receive a preference shock and they supply \( \alpha y^* \) of their labor endowment. If labor endowments are small, \( \bar{h} < \alpha y^* \), then \( y^* \) is not feasible, so households supply their whole labor endowment, \( \bar{h} \), and they share the output equally among the \( \alpha \) households with a desire to consume.

3 Stationary Monetary Equilibrium

In this section we study stationary, monetary equilibria featuring a constant rate of return of money, \( \dot{\phi}_t/\phi_t = -\pi \), and a time-invariant distribution of real balances. We start by characterizing the consumption-saving problem of a representative household. Next, we study the stationary distribution of real balances induced by the household’s optimal behavior. We then establish the existence of a stationary equilibrium. The last subsection describes a particular class of monetary equilibria for which households’ policy functions and stationary distribution are easily characterized.

3.1 The household’s problem

We analyze the household’s problem in a stationary equilibrium in which the inflation rate is equal to the growth rate of the money supply, \( \pi \geq 0 \). Let \( W(z) \) denote the maximum attainable lifetime utility of a household holding \( z \) units of real balances (money balances expressed in terms of the consumption good) at the beginning of time. In a supplementary appendix we provide a Principle of Optimality for our continuous-time environment and establish that \( W(z) \) is a solution to an almost-standard Bellman equation.\(^{14} \) The Bellman equation for \( W(z) \) is:

\[
W(z) = \sup \int_0^\infty e^{-(r+\alpha)t} \left( u(c_t, \bar{h} - h_t) + \alpha [U(y_t) + W(z_t - y_t)] \right) dt,
\]

with respect to a measurable plan \( \{c_t, h_t, y_t, z_t : t \geq 0\} \) and subject to:

\[
z_0 = z \quad (7)
\]
\[
0 \leq y_t \leq z_t \quad (8)
\]
\[
\dot{z}_t = h_t - c_t - \pi z_t + \Upsilon. \quad (9)
\]

The effective discount factor, \( e^{-(r+\alpha)t} \), in the household’s objective, (6), is equal to the time discount factor, \( e^{-rt} \), multiplied by the probability that no preference shock occurs during the time interval.

\(^{14}\)In our model it is not possible to construct an explicit solution by directly using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB). It turns out to be easier to study the Bellman equation of the household’s problem from the current period \( t \) to the next time a preference shock occurs. We can then apply standard dynamic programming techniques to show the existence and uniqueness of the value function, and viscosity theory techniques to show smoothness. These results implies the HJB equation in our main theorem below.
\[ \{0, t\}, \text{i.e., } \Pr(T_1 \geq t) = e^{-at}. \] It multiplies the household’s expected utility at time \( t \), conditional on \( T_1 \geq t \). The first term of the period utility is the utility flow of consumption and leisure, \( u(c_t, \tilde{h} - h_t) \). The second term is the expected utility associated with a preference shock at time \( t \), an event occurring with Poisson intensity \( \alpha \), which is the sum of \( U(y_t) \) from consuming a lump of \( y_t \) units of consumption good and the continuation utility \( W(z_t - y_t) \) from keeping \( z_t - y_t \) real balances.

Equation (7) is the initial condition for real balances, and (8) is a feasibility constraint stating that real balances must remain positive before and after a preference shock. The fact that \( y_t \leq z_t \) follows from the absence of enforcement and monitoring technologies that prevent households from issuing debt. Finally, (9) is the law of motion for real balances. The rate of change in real balances is equal to the household’s output flow net of consumption, \( h_t - c_t \), plus the negative flow return on currency, \(-\pi z\), and a flow lump-sum transfer of real balances, \( \Upsilon = \pi \phi M \geq 0 \).

**Theorem 1** There is a unique bounded solution, \( W(z) \), to (6). It is strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuously differentiable over \([0, \infty)\). It is twice continuously differentiable over \((0, \infty)\), except perhaps under linear preference, when this property may fail for at most two points. Moreover,

\[
W'(0) < \frac{\alpha}{r} \left( \frac{\|u\|_r + \alpha \|U\|_r}{r} \right), \quad \lim_{z \to 0} W''(z) = -\infty, \quad \text{and} \quad \lim_{z \to \infty} W'(z) = 0.
\]

Finally, \( W \) solves the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:

\[
rW(z) = \max \left\{ u(c, \tilde{h} - h) + \alpha [U(y) + W(z - y) - W(z)] + W'(z)(h - c - \pi z + \Upsilon) \right\}, \quad (10)
\]

with respect to \((c, h, y)\) and subject to \( c \geq 0, 0 \leq h \leq \tilde{h} \) and \( 0 \leq y \leq z \).

The first part of Theorem 1 follows from standard dynamic programming arguments according to which the optimization problem, (6), defines a contraction mapping from the set of continuous, increasing, concave, and bounded functions into itself. The fact that \( W'(<\infty) = 0 \) follows from concavity and boundedness. A perhaps surprising result is that \( W'(0) < \infty \) even though \( U'(0) = \infty \). Intuitively, a household with depleted money balances, \( z = 0 \), has a finite marginal utility for real balances because he has some positive time to accumulate real balances before his next opportunity for lumpy consumption, \( \mathbb{E}[T_1] = 1/\alpha > 0 \).

The main technical challenge in Theorem 1 is to establish that \( W \) is sufficiently smooth, i.e., it admits continuous derivatives of sufficiently high order. Under SI preferences, twice continuous
differentiability of $W$ ensures the continuous differentiability of the saving rate, and implies that the ODE (9) has a unique solution. Having well-behaved policy functions will also allow us to apply standard theorems in order to establish the existence of a unique stationary distribution of real balances, and to show that the mean of the distribution, $\phi M$, is continuous in $\Upsilon = \pi \phi M$, which facilitates the proof of existence of an equilibrium.\footnote{We establish these smoothness properties by adapting arguments from the theory of viscosity solutions (see, e.g., Bardi and Capuzzo-Dolcetta, 1997) in order to obtain a version of HJB that does not require continuous differentiability. Based on this weaker HJB equation, we can show that $W$ must, in fact, be continuously differentiable. We then go on to prove that, under SI preferences, $W$ is twice continuously differentiable over $z \in (0, z)$. While this property may not hold for at most two points with linear preferences, we show later that it does hold in equilibrium over the support of the distribution of real balances.}

The HJB equation, (10), has a standard interpretation as an asset-pricing condition. If we think of $W(z)$ as the price of an asset, the opportunity cost of holding that asset is $rW(z)$. The asset yields a utility flow, $u(c, \ell)$, and a capital gain, $U(y) + W(z - y) - W(z)$, in the event of a preference shock with Poisson arrival rate $\alpha$. Finally, the value of the asset changes over time due to the accumulation of real balances, which gives the last term on the right side of (10), $W'(z_t)z_t$.

**Optimal lumpy consumption.** From (10) a household chooses its optimal lumpy consumption in order to solve:

$$V(z) = \max_{0 \leq y \leq z} \{U(y) + W(z - y)\}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

In words, a household chooses its level of consumption in order to maximize the sum of its current utility, $U(y)$, and its continuation utility with $z - y$ real balances, $W(z - y)$. Because $U'(0) = \infty$ but $W'(0) < \infty$, a household always finds it optimal to choose strictly positive lumpy consumption, $y(z) > 0$, for all $z > 0$. Hence, the first-order condition of (11) is

$$U'(y) \geq W'(z - y),$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

with an equality if $y < z$. The following proposition provides a detailed characterization of the solution to (12).

**Proposition 1 (Optimal Lumpy Consumption)** The unique solution to (12), $y(z)$, admits the following properties:

1. $y(z)$ is continuous and strictly positive for any $z > 0$.

2. Both $y(z)$ and $z - y(z)$ are increasing and satisfy $\lim_{z \to -\infty} y(z) = \lim_{z \to \infty} z - y(z) = \infty$.
3. \( y(z) = z \) if and only if \( z \leq \tilde{z}_1 \), where \( \tilde{z}_1 > 0 \) solves \( U'(\tilde{z}_1) = W'(0) \).

Finally, \( V(z) \) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuously differentiable with \( V'(z) = U'[y(z)] \).

The properties of the solution, \( y(z) \), follow directly from (12). The left side of (12) is decreasing in \( y \) from \( U'(0) = \infty \) to \( U'(-\infty) = 0 \) while the right side of (12) is increasing in \( y \). Hence, there is a unique solution, \( y(z) \), to (12). An increase in \( z \) reduces the marginal utility of real balances, \( W'(z - y) \), leading the household to raise both its lumpy consumption, \( y(z) \), and its post-trade real balances (after lumpy consumption), \( z - y(z) \). When real balances go to infinity, \( z \to \infty \), \( y(z) \) must go to infinity since otherwise \( W'(z - y) \) would go to zero and \( U'(y) \) would remain bounded away from zero, thereby violating (12). A similar argument applies to the post-trade real balances, \( z - y(z) \).

Finally, Proposition 1 shows that, as long as real balances are below some threshold \( \tilde{z}_1 \), the household finds it optimal to deplete his real balances in full upon receiving a preference shock. This follows because the utility derived from spending a small amount of real balances, \( U'(0) = \infty \), is larger than the benefit from holding onto it, \( W'(0) < \infty \). This result—the fact that liquidity constraints bind over a nonempty interval of the support of the wealth distribution—is in sharp contrast with the standard incomplete-market model in continuous time where liquidity constraints never bind in the interior of the state space (Achdou, Han, Lasry, Lions, and Moll, 2015), and it will play a key role for tractability of our model.

By induction we can construct a sequence of thresholds for real balances, \( \{\tilde{z}_n\}_{n=1}^{+\infty} \), such that:

\[
\begin{align*}
z \in [0, \tilde{z}_1] & \implies z - y(z) = 0 \\
z \in [\tilde{z}_n, \tilde{z}_{n+1}] & \implies z - y(z) \in [\tilde{z}_{n-1}, \tilde{z}_n] , \ \forall n \geq 1.
\end{align*}
\]

If a household’s real balances belong to the interval \( [\tilde{z}_n, \tilde{z}_{n+1}] \), the post-trade real balances of the household following a preference shock, \( z - y(z) \), belong to the adjacent interval, \( [\tilde{z}_{n-1}, \tilde{z}_n] \). Hence, the household is insured against \( n \) consecutive preference shocks, i.e., it would take \( n \) shocks to deplete the real balances of the household. The properties of lumpy consumption, \( y(z) \), and post-trade real balances, \( z - y(z) \), are illustrated in Figure 1. Finally, the properties of \( V(z) \) follow directly from the concavity of the problem and an application of the envelope theorem.
Optimal saving. Next, we characterize a household’s optimal saving behavior. We first define the saving rate correspondence:

\[ s(z) \equiv \{ h - c - \pi z + \bar{Y} : (h, c) \text{ solves (10)} \}. \]  

Proposition 2 (Optimal Saving Rate) The saving-rate correspondence, \( s(z) \), is upper hemi-continuous, convex, decreasing, strictly positive near \( z = 0 \), and admits a unique \( z^* \in (0, \infty) \) such that \( 0 \in s(z^*) \).

1. SI preferences. The saving-rate correspondence is singled-valued, strictly decreasing, and continuously differentiable over \((0, \infty)\).

2. Linear preferences. The saving rate is equal to:

\[
s(z) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{\bar{h} - \pi z + \bar{Y}}{\bar{c} - \pi z + \bar{Y}} & \text{if } W'(z) \bigg\{ > 1 \bigg\} \leq 1 \\
\frac{\bar{c} - \pi z + \bar{Y}}{\bar{h} - \pi z + \bar{Y}} & \text{if } W'(z) \bigg\{ < 1 \bigg\} > 1.
\end{cases}
\]  

The first part of Proposition 2 highlights three general properties of households’ saving behavior. The first property states that households save less when they hold larger real balances. This follows because flow consumption and leisure are normal goods, hence \( h - c \) decreases with \( z \), and because the inflation tax, \( \pi z \), increases with \( z \). The second property of \( s(z) \) is that it is strictly positive near zero. This result follows from Theorem 1 according to which \( W'(0) < \infty \). The only way the marginal utility of wealth can remain bounded near \( z = 0 \) is if a household with depleted money balances saves enough to keep its real balances bounded away from zero at its next preference.
shock. The third property is that households have a target, \( z^* \), for their real balances. For all \( z < z^* \), the saving rate is strictly positive and finite whereas at \( z = z^* \) the saving rate is zero. We prove that \( z^* < \infty \) by showing that \( s(z) \) is negative for \( z \) large enough.\(^{16}\)

The second part of Proposition 2 provides a tighter characterization of \( s(z) \) under our two preference specifications. Under SI preferences, the HJB equation, (10), defines a strictly concave optimization problem leading to a smooth and strictly decreasing saving rate. Indeed, the first-order conditions for consumption and leisure are

\[
 u_c(c, \ell) = u_\ell(c, \ell) = W'(z). 
\] (15)

Given that flow consumption and leisure are assumed to be normal goods, it follows that \( c \) and \( \ell \) increase with \( z \) and so decrease with the marginal value of real balances. Under linear preferences (10) defines a linear optimization problem delivering a bang-bang solution for the saving rate. Households work maximally, \( h = \bar{h} \), and consume nothing, \( c = 0 \), when real balances are low enough and \( W'(z) > 1 \). They stop working, \( h = 0 \), while consuming maximally, \( c = \bar{c} \), when real balances are large enough and \( W'(z) < 1 \).

Next, we study the time path of a household's real balances, namely, the solution to the initial value problem

\[
 \dot{z}_t = s(z_t) \text{ with } z_0 = 0. 
\] (16)

Under linear preferences this problem is well defined (\( s(z) \) is single-valued) for all \( z \) except when \( W'(z) = 1 \) in which case there are multiple optimal saving rates. For such real balances we pick the saving rate that is closest to zero. As a result if \( z^* \) is such that \( W'(z^*) = 1 \), this ensures that real balances remain constant and equal to their stationary point.\(^{17}\) Given the unique solution to (16), we can define the time to reach \( z \) from \( z_0 = 0 \):

\[
 T(z) \equiv \inf\{t \geq 0 : z_t \geq z| z_0 = 0\}. 
\] (17)

**Proposition 3 (Optimal Path of Real Balances)** The initial value problem (16), has a unique solution. This solution is strictly increasing for all \( t \in [0, T(z^*)] \), where \( z_{T(z^*)} = z^* \), and it is

---

\(^{16}\)When inflation is strictly positive, \( \pi > 0 \), \( s(z) < 0 \) follows from the observation that \( \bar{h} < \infty \) cannot offset the inflation tax, \( -\pi z \), when \( z \) is large. When \( \pi = \bar{Y} = 0 \), the result comes from Theorem 1 according to which \( W'(z) \) goes to zero as \( z \) becomes large. Indeed from (10) the household’s labor supply becomes zero, implying a negative saving rate.

\(^{17}\)Under SI preferences a technical difficulty arises because \( s(z) \) is not continuously differentiable at \( z = 0 \), and hence the standard existence and uniqueness theorems for ODEs do not apply. One can nevertheless construct the unique solution of (16) by starting the ODE at some \( z > 0 \) and "run it backward" until it reaches zero.
constant and equal to \( z^* \) for all \( t \geq T(z^*) \). Under SI preferences, \( T(z^*) = \infty \). Under linear preferences, \( T(z^*) < \infty \) if and only if \( 0 \in (-\bar{c} - \pi z^* + \bar{Y}, \bar{h} - \pi z^* + \bar{Y}) \).

Proposition 3 shows that a household accumulates real money balances until it reaches its target \( z^* \). Under SI preferences \( s(z) \) is continuously differentiable to the left of \( z^* \), which implies by a standard approximation argument that real balances only reach their target asymptotically at an exponential speed dictated by \( |s'(z^*)| \). Under linear preferences the saving rate may fail to be continuously differentiable at \( z^* \) and, as a result, the target may be reached in finite time. For instance, in the laissez-faire economy where \( \pi = Y = 0 \), the saving rate jumps downward at the target \( z^* \), i.e., \( s(z) = \bar{h} > 0 \) for all \( z < z^* \), while \( s(z^*) = 0 \). Clearly, this implies that the target is reached in finite time \( T(z^*) = z^*/\bar{h} < +\infty \). In Figure 2 we illustrate the path for real balances and the spending behavior of a household subject to random preference shocks.

![Figure 2: Optimal path of real balances](image)

### 3.2 The stationary distribution of real balances

We now show that the household’s policy functions, \( y(z) \) and \( s(z) \), induce a unique stationary distribution of real balances over the support \([0, z^*]\). To this end, we define the minimal time that it takes for a household with \( z \) real balances at the time of a preference shock to accumulate strictly more than \( z' \) real balances following that shock:

\[
\Delta(z, z') \equiv \max \left\{ T(z'_+) - T[z - y(z)], 0 \right\}, \tag{18}
\]
for $z, z' \in [0, z^*)$. Notice that $\Delta(z, z^*) = \infty$ since the household never accumulates more than the target. Let $F(z)$ denote the cumulative distribution function of a candidate stationary equilibrium. It must solve the fixed-point equation:

$$1 - F(z') = \int_0^\infty ae^{-au} \int_0^\infty \mathbb{1}_{\{u \geq \Delta(z, z')\}} dF(z) \, du = \int_0^\infty e^{-\alpha \Delta(z, z')} dF(z),$$

(19)

where the second equality is obtained by changing the order of integration.\(^{18}\) The right side of (19) calculates the measure of households with real balances strictly greater than $z'$. First, it partitions the population into cohorts indexed by the date of their last preference shock. There is a density measure, $ae^{-au}$, of households who had their last preference shocks $u$ periods ago. Second, in each cohort there is a fraction $dF(z)$ of households who held $z$ real balances immediately before the shock. Those households consumed $y(z)$, which left them with $z - y(z)$ real balances. If $u \geq \Delta(z, z')$, then sufficient time has elapsed since the preference shock for their current holdings to be strictly greater than $z'$.

The fixed-point problem in (19) can be reduced to finding a stationary distribution of the discrete-time Markov process with transition probability function:

$$Q(z, [0, z')] = 1 - e^{-\alpha \Delta(z, z')}.$$  

(20)

The function $Q$ is the transition probability of the discrete-time Markov process that samples the real balances of a given household at the arrival times $\{T_n\}^\infty_{n=1}$ of its preference shocks. It is monotone in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, i.e., a household who had higher real balances at its last preference shock tends to have higher current real balances. One can also show that $Q$ satisfies the Feller property, as well as an appropriate mixing condition allowing us to apply Theorem 12.12 and 12.13 in Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989). We obtain:

**Proposition 4 (Stationary Distribution of Real Balances)** The fixed point problem, (19), admits a unique solution, $F(z)$. This solution is continuous in the lump-sum transfer parameter, $\Upsilon$, in the sense of weak-convergence.

In addition to obtaining existence and uniqueness of a stationary distribution, Proposition 4 shows that $F$ is continuous in $\Upsilon$ because all policy functions are appropriately continuous in that

\(^{18}\)The sequence of preference shocks, $\{T_n\}$, provides a natural discrete-time formulation for both the Bellman equation and the stochastic process for individual real balances. This allows us to apply standard results for the existence and uniqueness of stationary distributions of discrete-time Markov processes. Moreover, we will see that the distribution of real balances is easily characterized with $T(z)$ in the case of equilibria with full depletion of real balances ($z^* < \bar{z}_1$). Alternatively, we could work with Kolmogorov forward equations as described in our supplementary numerical appendix.
parameter. This continuity property is helpful to establish equilibrium existence, as it ensures that the market-clearing condition is continuous in the price of money, $\phi$. Moreover, $F$ has no mass point, except maybe at the target, $z^*$. One might find it counterintuitive that there is no mass point at $z = 0$, given that we showed in Proposition 1 that a large flow of household, $\alpha F(z_1)$, deplete their money holdings at each point in time. However, recall from Proposition 2 that households with depleted money balances immediately accumulate real balances, $s(0) > 0$, in order to have strictly positive real balances at their next preference shock.

### 3.3 The real value of money

We look for a stationary equilibrium where aggregate real balances, $\phi_t M_t$, are constant over time, i.e., $\dot{\phi}_t/\phi_t = -\pi$. The household’s path for real balances, $z_t$, depends on aggregate real balances because the real value of the lump-sum transfer received by each household is proportional to $\phi M$, i.e., $\Upsilon = \pi \phi M$. By definition aggregate real balances solve:

$$\phi M = \int_0^\infty zdF(z | \pi \phi M),$$

where the right side makes it explicit that the stationary distribution depends on the lump-sum transfer, $\Upsilon = \phi \pi M$. From (21) money is neutral as aggregate real balances are determined independently of $M$. As it is standard, however, a change in the money growth rate will have real effects by affecting the rate of return on household’s savings. We are now in position to define an equilibrium.

**Definition 1** A stationary monetary equilibrium is composed of a value function, $W(z)$, a distribution of real balances, $F(z)$, and a price, $\phi > 0$, solving (6), (19), and (21).

In order to establish the existence of an equilibrium we study (21) at its boundaries. As $\phi M$ approaches zero the left side of (21) goes to zero, but the right side remains strictly positive. Indeed, from Proposition 2 households accumulate strictly positive real balances even when they receive no lump-sum transfer, $\Upsilon = 0$. As $\phi M$ tends to infinity, the lump sum transfer becomes so large that households only consume and stop working, which contradicts market clearing in the goods market. Equivalently, in the money market, the left side of (21) becomes larger than the right side. Finally, Proposition 4 established that the stationary distribution, $F$, is continuous in $\Upsilon = \phi \pi M$. Hence, we can apply the intermediate value theorem and we obtain:
Proposition 5  *(Existence and Uniqueness.)* For all $\pi \geq 0$ there exists a stationary monetary equilibrium. Moreover, the laissez-faire equilibrium, $\pi = Y = 0$, is unique.

From Proposition 5 a monetary equilibrium exists for all inflation rates. Indeed, we showed in Proposition 2 that, as a result of the Inada condition on $U(y)$, the saving rate, $s(z)$, is always strictly positive near $z = 0$. In the laissez-faire where $\pi = Y = 0$ the equilibrium has a simple recursive structure allowing to prove uniqueness. From Theorem 1 the value and policy functions are uniquely determined independently of $F$. From Proposition 4, $F$ is uniquely determined given the policy functions.

We now establish that the laissez-faire monetary equilibrium, $\pi = 0$, is nearly efficient when households are patient. We adapt Green and Zhou’s (2005) definition of near efficiency as follows. An equilibrium allocation is said to be $\delta$-efficient, for $\delta \in (0, 1]$, if it is weakly preferred ex-ante by households to the full risk-sharing allocation of the environment in which the labor endowment, $h$, is shrunk by a factor $\delta$.

**Proposition 6  *(Near-Efficiency of the Laissez-Faire Monetary Equilibrium)* For all $\delta \in (0, 1)$ there is a $\tilde{r}_\delta > 0$ such that for all $r < \tilde{r}_\delta$ the laissez-faire monetary equilibrium is $\delta$-efficient.

Proposition 6 is analogous to Proposition 2 in Green and Zhou (2005) and Theorem A in Levine and Zame (2002). It states that patient households are as well off in the laissez-faire monetary equilibrium than under the full-insurance allocation with a slightly scaled-down labor endowment, $\delta h$. The logic of the proof goes as follows. Suppose that households adopt the following strategy. They consume a flow consumption $c^{FI}$, they supply a flow labor $h < h^{FI}$, and they consume $y(z) = y^{FI}$ whenever $z \geq y^{FI}$ and $y(z) = 0$ otherwise. Households mimic the full-insurance consumption behavior whenever it is possible given their real balances, and they supply a flow of labor no greater than the first-best level. Interestingly, this strategy is almost identical to the inventory accumulation strategy in the environment described in Diamond and Yellin (1985). One can show that on average households spend a fraction $(h - c^{FI})/\alpha y^{FI}$ of their time with $z \geq y^{FI}$. As $h$ approaches $h^{FI}$, households’ real balances are almost always larger than $y^{FI}$. Hence, provided that households are very patient, the average household’s utility approaches the full-insurance one.

### 3.4 Equilibria with full depletion of real balances

In this section we study the class of equilibria with full depletion, in which households find it optimal to spend all their money holdings whenever a preference shock occurs, i.e., $y(z) = z$ for all
In this case our model is very tractable and it lends itself to a tight characterization of decision rules and distributions. We also show that full depletion occurs under appropriate parameter restrictions.

The optimal path for real balances under full depletion. The ODE for the optimal path of real balances, (9), can be rewritten as:

$$\dot{z}_t = h(\lambda_t) - c(\lambda_t) - \pi z_t + \Upsilon,$$

(22)

where $\lambda_t \equiv W'(z_t)$ is the marginal value of real balances, while $h(\lambda_t)$ and $c(\lambda_t)$ are the solutions to

$$\max_{c \geq 0, \bar{h} \leq h} \{ u(c, \bar{h} - h) + \lambda (h - c - \pi z + \Upsilon) \}. \quad (23)$$

To solve for $\lambda_t$ we apply the envelope condition to differentiate the HJB (10) with respect to $z$ along the optimal path of money holdings. This leads to the ODE:

$$r \lambda_t = \alpha [U'(z_t) - \lambda_t] - \pi \lambda_t + \dot{\lambda}_t,$$

(24)

where we used that $V'(z_t) = U'[y(z_t)] = U'(z_t)$ from Proposition 1. According to the first term on the right side of (24) a household enjoys a surplus $U'(z_t) - \lambda_t$ from spending his marginal real balances in the event of a preference shock with arrival rate $\alpha$. The second term corresponds to the inflation tax that erodes the value of money at rate $\pi$, and the third term is the change in the marginal value of real balances as the household accumulates more money over time.

The pair, $(z_t, \lambda_t)$, solves a system of two ODEs, (22) and (24).\(^{19}\) We represent the phase diagram associated with this system in Figure 3. One can show that the stationary point of this system is a saddle point and the optimal solution to the household’s problem is the associated saddle path. In the laissez-faire economy with $\pi = \Upsilon = 0$ the $z$-isocline is horizontal and the dynamic system is independent of the distribution of real balances.

The stationary distribution of real balances under full depletion. Under full depletion, $y(z) = z$, the time it takes for a household to accumulate $z'$ real balances following a preference shock is $\Delta(z, z') = T(z'_t)$. Hence, from (20), the transition probability function,

$$Q(z, [0, z']) = 1 - e^{-\alpha T(z'_t)}, \quad (25)$$

\(^{19}\)A similar system of ODEs holds under partial depletion, where $U'(z_t)$ is replaced by $U'[y(z_t)]$. Hence, in order to solve for this system, one also needs to solve for the unknown function $y(z)$. In Appendix B, we provide a numerical solution to this problem.
Figure 3: Phase diagram of an equilibrium with full depletion of real balances

does not depend on \( z \). In words, the probability that a household holds less than \( z' \) is independent on his real balances just before his last lumpy consumption opportunity, \( z \). This result is intuitive since households "re-start from zero" after a lumpy consumption opportunity. It follows that the stationary probabilities coincide with the transition probabilities, i.e.,

\[
F(z') = Q(z, [0, z']) .
\]  

Finally, the equilibrium equation for the price level, (21), simplifies as well:

\[
\phi M = \int_0^\infty zdF(z \mid \phi \pi M) = \int_0^\infty [1 - F(z \mid \phi \pi M)] dz = \int_0^{z^*} e^{-\alpha T(z \mid \phi \pi M)} dz ,
\]  

where our notation highlights that the time to accumulate real balances, \( T \), is a function of the real money transfer, \( \Upsilon = \phi \pi M \).

Verifying full depletion. From the first-order condition, (12), households find it optimal to deplete their money holdings in full when a lumpy consumption opportunity occurs, \( y(z) = z \) for all \( z \in [0, z^*] \), if and only if

\[
U'(z^*) \geq W'(0) = \lambda_0 .
\]  

According to (28) the marginal utility of consumption when \( y(z^*) = z^* \) must be greater than the marginal value of money at \( z = 0 \). In order to verify this condition one must solve for the equilibrium price, \( \phi \), and the associated real transfer, \( \Upsilon = \phi \pi M \). We turn to this task in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 (Sufficient Conditions for Full Depletion) Under either SI or linear preferences, there exists a threshold for the inflation rate, $\pi_F$, such that, for all $\pi \geq \pi_F$, all stationary monetary equilibria feature full depletion.

Under Linear preference, there exists a threshold for the labor endowment, $\tilde{h}_F$, such that, for all $\tilde{h} \geq \tilde{h}_F$, there exists a unique stationary monetary equilibrium, and this equilibrium must feature full depletion.

Proposition 7 identifies two conditions on exogenous parameters ensuring full depletion. If inflation is large enough, then money holdings become "hot potatoes": they depreciate quickly so that households always find it optimal to spend all their money when given the opportunity. Under linear preferences, if the labor endowment is large enough, then households spend all of their money holdings when a preference shock hits because they anticipate that they can rebuild their money inventories quickly.

4 The quasi-linear economy

In this section we provide a detailed characterization of the model under linear preferences. We describe first the laissez-faire equilibrium ($\pi = 0$). We show that the model can be solved in closed form for a broad set of parameter values, and it admits at the limit when labor endowments grow very large, $\tilde{h} \to \infty$, the LRW equilibrium with linear value functions and a degenerate distribution of money holdings. Next, we study the effects of inflationary transfer schemes on output and welfare and show how they depend on $\tilde{h}$ that parametrizes the policy trade-off between promoting self-insurance and providing risk-sharing. We pursue our investigation with a calibrated example where we target the distribution of the balances of transaction accounts in the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF).

4.1 Laissez-faire

We focus on equilibria with full depletion of real balances. From (23) households choose $\dot{z} = h \leq \tilde{h}$ to maximize $\dot{z} (\lambda - 1)$ where $\lambda$ solves the envelope condition (24). The solution is such that $z_t = \tilde{h} t$ for all $t \leq T(z^*) = z^*/\tilde{h}$, where $t$ is the length of time since the last preference shock, and $z^*$ is the stationary solution to (24). The marginal value of money at the target is $\lambda = 1$ because a household who keeps his real balances constant must be indifferent between working at a disutility
cost of one in order to accumulate one unit of real balances worth \( \lambda \) and not working. From (24):

\[
U'(z^*) = 1 + \frac{r}{\alpha}.
\]

(29)

The marginal utility of lumpy consumption is equal to the marginal disutility of labor augmented by a wedge, \( r/\alpha \), due to discounting. If households are more impatient, or if preference shocks are less frequent, households reduce their targeted real balances.

From (25)-(26) the steady-state distribution of real balances is a truncated exponential distribution,

\[
F(z) = 1 - e^{-\frac{\alpha z}{h}} \mathbb{1}_{\{z < z^*\}} \text{ for all } z \in \mathbb{R}_+.
\]

(30)

Note that it has a mass point at the targeted real balances, \( 1 - F(z^*) = e^{-\alpha z^*/h} \), which is increasing with \( \tilde{h} \). From market clearing, (27), aggregate real balances are:

\[
\phi M = \frac{\tilde{h}}{\alpha} \left( 1 - e^{-\frac{\alpha z^*}{\tilde{h}}} \right).
\]

(31)

Aggregate real balances are smaller than the target, \( \phi M < z^* \), and they are increasing with the household’s labor endowment. They do not depend on the nominal stock of money—money is neutral in the long-run.\(^{20}\)

We now check the condition for full depletion of money balances, (28). Integrating (24) over \([t, T(z^*)]\) and using the change of variable \( z = \tilde{h}t \) we obtain a closed-form expression for \( \lambda \) as a function of \( z \),

\[
\lambda(z) = 1 + \alpha \int_{z}^{z^*} e^{-\frac{r+\alpha}{\tilde{h}}(x-z)} \left[ \frac{U''(x) - U''(z^*)}{\tilde{h}} \right] dx.
\]

(32)

The marginal value of real balances is equal to the marginal disutility of labor, one, plus a discounted sum of the differences between the marginal utility of lumpy consumption on the path going from \( z \) to \( z^* \), \( U'(z_t) \), and at the target, \( U'(z^*) \). It is easy to check that \( \lambda'(z) < 0 \), i.e., the value function is strictly concave, and as \( z \) approaches \( z^* \) the marginal value of real balances approaches one. From (32) the condition for full depletion, (28), can be expressed as

\[
\frac{r}{\alpha} \geq \alpha \int_{0}^{T(z^*)} e^{-(r+\alpha)\tau} \left\{ U'[z(\tau)] - U'(z^*) \right\} d\tau.
\]

(33)

The right side of (33) is monotone decreasing in \( \tilde{h} \) (since \( T(z^*) = z^*/\tilde{h} \)) and it approaches 0 as \( \tilde{h} \) tends to \(+\infty\). So, we extend Proposition 7 by showing that the equilibrium features full depletion if and only if \( \tilde{h} \) is above some threshold, \( h_0^{\phi} \). Alternatively, (33) holds if households are sufficiently

\(^{20}\)In Rocheteau, Weill, and Wong (2015) we show in a discrete-time version of our model that one-time money injections are not neutral in the short run.
impatient because the cost of holding money outweighs the insurance benefits from hoarding real balances. Finally, from (32) we are able to compute the value function in closed form:

\[
W(z) = z + W(z^*) - z^* - \frac{\alpha}{r + \alpha} \int_z^{z^*} \left[1 - e^{-\frac{(r+\alpha)(u-z)}{h}}\right] \left[U'(u) - U'(z^*)\right] du \quad \forall z < z^* \tag{34}
\]

\[
W(z^*) = \frac{\alpha}{r} \left\{U(z^*) - z^* - \frac{\alpha}{r + \alpha} \int_0^{z^*} \left[1 - e^{-\frac{(r+\alpha)u}{h}}\right] \left[U'(u) - U'(z^*)\right] du\right\} \tag{35}
\]

The first term on the right side of (34) is linear in wealth, which is reminiscent of the linear value function in LRW. However, the last term is strictly concave: it measures the distance between the marginal utility of consumption, \(U'(y)\), and its target, \(U'(z^*) = 1\), as households accumulate real balances slowly through time.

The following proposition establishes that as \(\bar{h}\) tends to infinity the equilibrium approaches an equilibrium with degenerate distribution and linear value function analogous to the one in LRW.\(^{21}\)

**Proposition 8 (Convergence to LRW)** As \(\bar{h} \to \infty\) the measure of households holding \(z^*\) tends to one, the value of money approaches \(z^*/M\), and \(W(z)\) converges uniformly to \(z - z^* + \frac{\alpha [U(z^*) - z^*]}{r}\).

Not too surprisingly, when \(\bar{h} = +\infty\) households can replenish their real balances instantly following a trade. As a result, the equilibrium features a degenerate distribution of money holding, as in LRW. In a continuous-time environment, however, degeneracy of the distribution of wealth only holds at the limit. Provided that labor endowments are finite, \(\bar{h} < +\infty\), irrespective of how large they are, the equilibrium will always feature some ex-post heterogeneity.

### 4.2 Output and welfare effects of inflation

We now investigate the effects of anticipated inflation implemented with lump-sum transfers on output and welfare. We focus first on equilibria with full depletion, \(y(z^*) = z^*\). (We explore equilibria with partial depletion numerically with a calibrated version of our model in the next subsection). In the presence of money growth, \(\pi > 0\), the target for real balances can take two expressions depending on whether the feasibility constraint, \(h(z^*) \leq \bar{h}\), is slack or binding:

\[
z^* \equiv \min \{z_s, z_b\}, \tag{36}
\]

where

\[
z_s \equiv \left(U'\right)^{-1} \left(1 + \frac{r + \pi}{\alpha}\right), \quad \text{and} \quad z_b \equiv \frac{\bar{h}}{\pi} + \phi M. \tag{37}
\]

\(^{21}\)The proof follows directly from (30), (31), and (34), and it is therefore omitted.
The quantity $z_s$ is the target level of real balances in a slack-labor regime that solves (24) when $\lambda = 1$ and $\dot{\lambda} = 0$. It equalizes the marginal utility of lumpy consumption, $U'(z)$, and the cost of holding real balances, $1 + (r + \pi)/\alpha$, thereby generalizing (29) by replacing $r$ with $r + \pi$. It can be interpreted as the ideal target that households aim for. It is feasible to reach it only if $\bar{h} + \Upsilon \geq \pi z_s$.

The quantity $z_b$ defined by (37) is the target level of real balances in a binding-labor regime. It is the highest level of real balances that is feasible to accumulate given households’ finite labor endowment, $\bar{h}$, the inflation tax on real balances, $\pi z$, and the lump-sum transfer, $\Upsilon = \pi \phi M$, i.e., it is the stationary solution to (22) with $h(\lambda) - c(\lambda) = \bar{h}$. So $z_b$ is a constrained target. From (36) the effective target, $z^*$, is the minimum between these two quantities.

From (22) the trajectory for individual real balances is $z_t = z_b(1 - e^{-\pi t})$, and the time to reach real balances $z$ is $T(z \mid \pi \phi M) = -\log (1 - z/z_b)/\pi$. Given that the time since the last preference shock is exponentially distributed, the distribution of real balances is

$$F(z) = 1 - \left(\frac{z_b - z}{z_b}\right)^{\alpha + \pi} \quad \text{for all } z < z^*, \quad (38)$$

and $F(z) = 1$ for all $z \geq z^*$. If $z_b \leq z_s$ then households reach $z^* = \min\{z_b, z_s\}$ only asymptotically, and the distribution of real balances has no mass point. In contrast, if $z_b > z_s$ then households reach $z^*$ in finite time and the distribution has a mass point at $z = z^*$. Substituting the closed-form expressions for $T(z \mid \pi \phi M)$ and $z_b$ into the market-clearing condition, (27) we obtain after a few lines of algebra that aggregate real balances solve:

$$\frac{\phi M}{\bar{h}/\pi + \phi M} = \frac{\pi}{\alpha + \pi} \left\{1 - \left(1 - \min\left\{1, \frac{z_s}{\bar{h}/\pi + \phi M}\right\}\right)^{\alpha + \pi}\right\}. \quad (39)$$

Clearly, the left side is strictly increasing in $\phi$ and the right side is decreasing in $\phi$. Hence, (39) has a unique solution and there is a unique candidate equilibrium with full depletion. Suppose first that $z^* = z_b \leq z_s$. In this regime all households supply $\bar{h}$. The solution to (39) is $\phi M = \bar{h}/\alpha$. So both aggregate output, $H = \bar{h}$, and aggregate real balances are independent of the inflation rate. Substituting $\phi M = \bar{h}/\alpha$ into (37) the condition $z_b \leq z_s$ can be expressed as $\bar{h}/\pi + \bar{h}/\alpha \leq z_s$. The second regime is such that $z^* = z_s \leq z_b$, in which case (39) has a unique solution, $\phi M \in (0, \bar{h}/\alpha]$. Finally, the condition for full depletion of money balances is given by (33) where $r$ is replaced with $r + \pi$ and $T(z \mid \pi \phi M) = -\log (1 - z/z_b)/\pi$. 

25
We now define aggregate output and households’ ex-ante welfare by:

\[ H(\pi, \bar{h}) \equiv \int h(z; \pi, \bar{h}) dF(z; \pi, \bar{h}) \]

\[ W(\pi, \bar{h}) \equiv \int [-h(z; \pi, \bar{h}) + \alpha U(z)] dF(z; \pi, \bar{h}). \]

The pointwise limits for those quantities when individual labor endowments go to infinity are denoted by \( H^\infty(\pi) \equiv \lim_{\bar{h} \to \infty} H(\pi, \bar{h}) \) and \( W^\infty(\pi) \equiv \lim_{\bar{h} \to \infty} W(\pi, \bar{h}) \). The following proposition shows that the effects of money growth on \( H \) and \( W \) are qualitatively different depending on the size of \( \bar{h} \).

**Proposition 9 (Output and welfare effects of inflation.) In the quasi-linear economy:**

1. **Large labor endowment.** Both \( H^\infty(\pi) \) and \( W^\infty(\pi) \) are decreasing with \( \pi \).

2. **Small labor endowment.** If \( U(z) / [zU'(z)] \) is bounded above near zero, then there exists some minimum inflation rate, \( \pi^* \), and a continuous function \( \tilde{H} : [\pi, \infty) \to \mathbb{R}_+ \) with limits \( \lim_{\pi \to 0} \tilde{H}(\pi) = \lim_{\pi \to \infty} \tilde{H}(\pi) = 0 \), such that, for all \( \pi \geq \pi^* \) and \( \bar{h} \in [0, \tilde{H}(\pi)] \), there exists an equilibrium with binding labor and full depletion. In this equilibrium \( H(\pi, \bar{h}) \) attains its first-best level, \( \bar{h}^* \), and \( W(\pi, \bar{h}) \) increases with \( \pi \).

3. **Large inflation.** As \( \pi \to \infty \), \( H(\pi, \bar{h}) \to 0 \) and \( W(\pi, \bar{h}) \to 0 \).

The size of the labor endowment, \( \bar{h} \), determines the speed at which households can reach their targeted real balances, and the extent of ex-post heterogeneity across households that prevails in equilibrium. As a result, \( \bar{h} \) proves to be a key parameter to determine the extent to which lump-sum transfers of money provide risk-sharing and deter self-insurance and, ultimately, how they affect households’ ex-ante welfare.

With large labor endowments, \( \bar{h} \to \infty \), there is no role for risk-sharing as all households reach their target almost instantly. However, money growth implemented with lump-sum transfers reduces the rate of return of money, which affects adversely the incentives to self insure, as measured by \( z^* \). Hence, aggregate output, which is approximately \( \alpha z^* \), and social welfare, approximately, \( \alpha [U(z^*) - z^*] \), are decreasing with the inflation rate. These are the standard comparative statics in models with degenerate distributions (e.g., Lagos and Wright, 2005).

With small labor endowments, risk-sharing considerations dominate because even though \( \pi \) reduces \( z^* \) it takes a long time for households to reach their target. Indeed, in the laissez-faire
equilibrium the time that it takes, in the absence of any shock, to reach the target, \( T(z^*) = z^*/\tilde{h} \), can be arbitrarily large when \( \tilde{h} \) is small. Consider the regime where the equilibrium features both full depletion, \( y(z^*) = z^* \), and binding labor, \( h(z^*) = \tilde{h} \). From Part 2 of Proposition 9 this regime occurs when the inflation rate is not too low and the labor endowment not too high. Because households cannot reach their ideal target, \( z_s \), they all supply \( \tilde{h} \) irrespective of their wealth, and aggregate output is constant and equal to \( \tilde{h} \). This output level is also the full-insurance one, \( h_{FI} = \tilde{h} \). Indeed, the condition for the binding labor constraint is \( \tilde{h}/\pi + \tilde{h}/\alpha \leq z_s < y^* \), which implies \( \tilde{h} < \alpha y^* \), and from (5) \( h_{FI} = \tilde{h} \). In addition, aggregate real balances are equal to the first-best level of consumption, \( \phi M = \tilde{h}/\alpha \). So, risk-sharing is the only consideration for policy as the only source of inefficiency arises from the non-degenerate distribution of real balances. Wealthy households who hold more real balances than the socially desirable level of consumption, \( z > \tilde{h}/\alpha \), pay a tax equal to \( \pi(z - \tilde{h}/\alpha) \) while the poor households who hold less real balances than the socially-desirable level of consumption, \( z < \tilde{h}/\alpha \), receive a subsidy equal to \( \pi(\tilde{h}/\alpha - z) \). Hence, moderate inflation moves individual consumption levels toward the first best, thereby smoothing consumption across households and raising household’s ex-ante welfare.

Even though an equilibrium can attain the first-best level of output for intermediate inflation rates when \( \tilde{h} \) is sufficiently small, it fails to implement the first-best allocation because there is ex-post heterogeneity in terms of lumpy consumption across risk-averse households. Suppose, instead, that the utility for lumpy consumption is linear with a satiation point, \( U(y) = A \min\{y, \bar{y}\} \). In this case, we can construct an equilibrium in which positive inflation leads households to work full time, \( h = \tilde{h} \), households’ lumpy consumption levels are smaller than \( \bar{y} \), and marginal utilities of lumpy consumption are equalized. Just as in Green and Zhou (2005, Section 6), this economy implements the first best for positive inflation rates. To see this, we assume that \( \tilde{h} < \alpha \bar{y} \), which implies that first-best allocations are such that all households supply \( h = \tilde{h} \). Assuming that \( z^* \leq \bar{y} \), the ODE for the marginal value of real balances, (24), becomes

\[
(r + \pi)\lambda_t = \alpha(A - \lambda_t) + \hat{\lambda}_t, \quad \forall t \in [0, T(z^*)],
\]

with \( \hat{\lambda}_{T(z^*)} = 0 \). With Poisson arrival rate, \( \alpha \), the household spends all his real balances, which generates a marginal surplus equal to \( A - \lambda \). The solution is \( \lambda_t = \mathbb{E} \left[ e^{-(r+\pi)T_1} A \right] = \alpha A/(r + \pi + \alpha) \), for all \( t \in \mathbb{R}_+ \). Moreover, \( A > \lambda_0 = \alpha A/(r + \pi + \alpha) \) holds so that full depletion is optimal. The equilibrium features full employment, \( h = \tilde{h} \), if the target for real balances is \( z^* = z_b = \tilde{h}(1/\pi + 1/\alpha) \leq z_s \), where \( z_s \geq \bar{y} \) if \( A \geq 1 + (r + \pi)/\alpha \). This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 10 (Implementation of the first best.) Assume \( U(y) = A \min\{y, \bar{y}\} \). Sufficient conditions for a monetary equilibrium to implement a first best are:

\[
\frac{\alpha h}{\alpha y - h} \leq \pi \leq \alpha (A - 1) - r.
\]  

Provided that the rate of time preference is not too large and labor endowment is sufficiently low, there is a range of inflation rates that implement a first-best allocation. The inflation rate cannot be too low since otherwise some households find it optimal not to work. For instance, if \( \pi = 0 \) households reach their target in a finite amount of time, and hence a fraction of them do not supply any labor. The inflation rate cannot too high or households will not find it optimal to self insure by accumulating real balances.

4.3 Calibrated example

In the following we pursue our investigation with a calibrated example.\(^{22}\) We normalize a unit of time to a year and we set \( r = 4\% \). The average inflation rate is \( \pi = 2\% \). We adopt a CRRA specification for the utility of lumpy consumption: \( U(y) = y^{1-a}/(1 - a) \) over the relevant range \( y \in [0, 1] \). Provided that \( \bar{h} \geq \alpha \) the first-best level of lumpy consumption is 1. The remaining parameters, \( a, \alpha \), and \( \bar{h} \), are calibrated to the distribution of the balances of transaction accounts in the 2013 SCF.\(^{23}\)

We adopt the following three targets: the ratio of the balances of the 80th-percentile household to the average balances, \( F^{-1}(0.8)/\phi M \),\(^{24}\) the ratio of the average balances to the average income, \( \phi M/H \), and the semi-elasticity of money demand, \( \eta \equiv \partial \log \phi M/(100 \times \partial \pi) \). In the SCF of 2013 \( F^{-1}(0.8)/\phi M = 1.23 \) and \( \phi M/H = .39\).\(^{25}\) Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2011) estimate that \( \eta = -.06 \). These calibration targets are matched with \( a = .31 \), \( \alpha = 3.21 \) and \( \bar{h} = 6.26 \). So lumpy consumption shocks occur every 3.6 months on average and the annual labor endowment is more than 6 times the first-best level of consumption in the event of a shock. In the calibrated economy,

---

\(^{22}\)We no longer need to restrict our attention to equilibria featuring full depletion of real balances. Indeed, while equilibria with partial depletion of real balances, \( y(z') < z' \), cannot be solved analytically, they can be easily computed numerically from a system of delayed differential equations. See Appendix B for details.

\(^{23}\)Transaction accounts in SCF include checking, savings, money market, and call accounts, but they do not include currency. Hence, we interpret money holdings in the model as pre-loaded (no credit involved) payment accounts mainly used for transactional purposes.

\(^{24}\)We pick the 80th percentile as the calibration target for the following reason. In the data the median to mean ratio for transaction balances is 0.11. In contrast, the model with linear utility tends to generate a distribution skewed to the right, with a high median.

\(^{25}\)In SCF 2013 93.2% of all households have transaction accounts. Conditional on those having transaction accounts, the average balances are $36.3k (in 2013 dollars). The average income is $87k. Thus, the average balances to the average income ratio is \( 0.932 \times 36.3/87 = 0.3889 \).
the welfare cost relative to the first best is 1.29% of total consumption.\textsuperscript{26}

The middle and right panels in the bottom row of Figure 4 plot the distribution of real balances and the household’s lumpy-consumption rule for this parametrization. The threshold below which there is full depletion, $z_1$, is about 0.54 while the target for real balances is about $z^* = 1.6$, i.e., the equilibrium features partial depletion. We increase the inflation rate from $\pi = 2\%$ to $\pi = 10\%$. From the bottom left panel $z_1$ increases to 0.56—households deplete their money holdings more often—while $z^*$ decreases to 1.2—households have lower incentives to self-insure. The bottom left panel shows that $y(z)$ increases for all $z$. So households target lower real balances and they spend more given a level of wealth when a preference shock happens, in accordance with a ‘hot potato’ effect. From the top panels aggregate output and aggregate real balances decrease with inflation. The welfare cost of 10 percent inflation is about 1.27 % of total consumption, a smaller number than the one obtained with the LRW model (see, e.g., Rocheteau and Wright, 2009).\textsuperscript{27}

Figure 4: Calibrated example

In order to illustrate the non-monotone effects of inflation on output and welfare we keep

\textsuperscript{26}The welfare loss relative to the first best with full insurance is measured by the percentage of households’ consumption that a social planner would be willing to give up to have constant lumpy consumption (subject to the same output level so that it is feasible).

\textsuperscript{27}As it is standard in the literature our measure of the welfare cost of inflation is equal to the percentage of households’ consumption that a social planner would be willing to give up to have zero inflation instead of $\pi$. This measure does not take into account transitional dynamics. Our estimate of the welfare cost of inflation is consistent with the ones in discrete-time models with alternating competitive markets and ex-ante heterogeneous buyers and sellers. In the absence of distributional considerations Rocheteau and Wright (2009) found a welfare cost of 10 percent inflation equal to 1.54% of GDP. Dressler (2011) departs from quasi-linear preferences in order to obtain a non-degenerate distribution and finds a cost of inflation equal to 1.23%. Imrohoroglu (1992) in a Bewley model with income shocks found a welfare cost of inflation equal to 1.07%.
the same parametrization but we allow $\bar{h}$ to vary. In Figure 5 we distinguish four regimes: full versus partial depletion of real balances ($y(z^*) = z^*$ versus $y(z^*) < z^*$) and slack versus binding labor constraint ($h(z^*) < \bar{h}$ versus $h(z^*) = \bar{h}$). For sufficiently high $\pi$ and sufficiently low $\bar{h}$, the equilibrium features full depletion and binding labor: this corresponds to the area marked III in the figure. The lower bond for inflation and the upper boundary of this area correspond respectively to $\pi$ and $\log [\bar{H}(\pi)]$ in Proposition 9. As $\pi$ is reduced below $\bar{\pi}$ the equilibrium features partial depletion of real balances (areas I and II). Finally, provided that $\bar{h}$ is sufficiently large, the equilibrium features both full depletion and slack labor (area IV). The equilibria we have characterized in closed form correspond to the areas III and IV. Note that for all $\bar{h} \leq \alpha = 3.21$ (i.e., $\log \bar{h} \leq 1.14$) the first-best level of output is $h^{FI} = \bar{h}$. It is achieved in areas II and III.

![Figure 5: Region I: Slack labor & Partial depletion; Region II: Binding labor & Partial depletion; Region III: Binding labor & Full depletion; Region IV: Slack labor & Full depletion.](image)

Propositions 9 and 10 established that for high $\bar{h}$ inflation is detrimental to society’s welfare whereas for low $\bar{h}$ positive inflation implemented with lump-sum transfers raises welfare relative to the laissez-faire. In Figure 5 we illustrate these results by plotting with a black, thick curve the welfare-maximizing inflation rate as a function of the labor endowment. As $\bar{h}$ increases the optimal inflation rate decreases, and for sufficiently high value of $\bar{h}$ the laissez-faire equilibrium dominates any equilibrium with positive inflation. Moreover, when equilibria with full depletion and binding labor exist (region III) then the optimal inflation rate is the highest one that is consistent with such an equilibrium. A higher inflation rate would relax the labor constraint (region IV) and would reduce output below its efficient level, $\bar{h}$. For values of $\bar{h}$ that are large enough such that region
III does not exist, then the optimal inflation rate corresponds to an equilibrium with slack labor and partial depletion (region I). In region IV with slack labor and full depletion a reduction of the inflation rate is always welfare improving. We will revisit this result in the next section under a more general transfer scheme.

Figure 6: Non-monotonic effects of inflation on output and welfare. Top panels: \( \bar{h} = 0.15 \). Bottom panels: \( \bar{h} = 1 \).

In the top panels of Figure 6 we plot aggregate output, real balances, and the welfare cost of inflation in the case where \( \bar{h} = 0.15 \) (i.e., \( \log(\bar{h}) = -1.90 \)). As shown in Figure 5, as inflation increases the economy transitions between different regimes with different comparative statics. In the first regime with slack labor, \( h(z^*) < \bar{h} \), and partial depletion, \( y(z^*) < z^* \), an increase in inflation leads to higher employment and output, lower aggregate real balances, and higher welfare (a negative welfare cost). If inflation increases further, then the labor constraint, \( h(z^*) \leq \bar{h} \), binds and aggregate output is independent of the inflation rate. In the third regime both aggregate output and real balances are independent of the inflation rate, but welfare is still increasing with inflation. For large inflation rates aggregate output, real balances, and welfare fall.

In the bottom panels of Figure 6 we plot the same variables for a larger labor endowment, \( \bar{h} = 1 \). For low inflation rates the economy is in a regime with slack labor and partial depletion, and it transitions to a regime with full depletion for larger inflation rates. Except for very low inflation rates, inflation affects negatively both output and aggregate real balances. The optimal inflation rate is strictly positive, corresponding to an equilibrium featuring partial depletion of real balances. These examples illustrate the key role played by \( \bar{h} \) for the output and welfare effects of inflation.
4.4 Beyond lump-sum transfers

We showed in Proposition 9 and Figure 5 that when $\hat{h}$ is sufficiently large then inflation implemented through lump-sum transfers is welfare-worsening as the societal cost of lowering $z^*$ outweighs the risk-sharing benefits associated with lump-sum transfers. In contrast, Wallace (2014) conjectures that money creation is almost always optimal in pure-currency economies, but it might not necessarily be produced by way of lump-sum transfers. In accordance with this conjecture, we establish in the following that inflation is optimal once one allows for more general, incentive-compatible, transfer schemes.\(^{28}\)

Suppose new money, $M = \pi M$, is injected through the following transfer scheme:

$$
\tau(z) = \begin{cases} 
\tau_0 & \text{if } z \leq z^*_\pi \\
\tau_z z - \tau_1 \pi z & \text{if } z \in (z^*_\pi, z^*_0] \\
\pi z & \text{if } z > z^*_0 
\end{cases}
$$

(42)

where $z^*_\pi$ solves $U'(z^*_\pi) = 1 + (r + \pi) / \alpha$. The real transfer, $\tau(z)$, is non-negative because in pure currency economies with no enforcement taxation is not feasible (Wallace, 2014). The transfer is non-decreasing so that households have no incentive to hide some of their money balances. Hence, $\tau_0 \geq 0$ and $\tau_z \geq 0$. Moreover, we assume that $\tau(z)$ is continuous, $\tau_z = (\pi z^*_0 - \tau_0) / (z^*_0 - z^*_\pi)$ and $\tau_1 = (\pi z^*_\pi - \tau_0) z^*_0 / (z^*_0 - z^*_\pi)$. From the government budget constraint, the sum of the transfers to households net of the inflation tax must be zero, $\int [\tau(z) - \pi z] dF_r(z) = 0$, where the distribution $F_r$ is now indexed by the transfer scheme. Hence, $\tau_z \geq \pi$ and $\tau_1 \leq 0$. So the first tier is a lump-sum transfer, the second tier is a linear regressive transfer, and the third tier is neutral.

Our proposed scheme, illustrated in Figure 7, takes into account the trade-off between self-insurance and risk sharing in economies with non-degenerate distributions. It has a regressive component that guarantees a positive rate of return on real balances above a threshold. As a result of this component households accumulate the same amount they would accumulate in the laissez-faire equilibrium, $z^*_0$. It has a lump-sum component that improves risk sharing by transferring wealth from the richest households to the poorest ones.

In the following proposition we denote $\bar{h}^0_F$, the threshold for labor endowments above which the laissez-faire equilibrium features full depletion, i.e., (33) holds.

**Proposition 11 (Socially beneficial inflation)** Suppose that $\hat{h} \geq \bar{h}^0_F$. There is a transfer scheme, $\tau(z)$ given by (42), with $\pi > 0$ that raises society’s welfare relative to the laissez-faire.

---

\(^{28}\)This result is consistent with Wallace (2014) conjecture according to which in pure-currency economies with nondegenerate distribution of money, there are transfer schemes financed by money creation that improve ex ante representative-agent welfare relative to what can be achieved holding the stock of money fixed. Andolfatto (2010) shows that a regressive transfer scheme is optimal in the context of the Rocheteau and Wright (2005) model.
In order to prove that the transfer scheme is socially beneficial we show that it not only redistributes wealth but it also raises aggregate real balances. In order to make the second claim we establish that it takes longer to accumulate $z^*_0$ under the transfer scheme, $\tau$, than under laissez faire. Relative to laissez faire, households accumulate real balances at a faster pace when they are poor, because $\tau(z) - \pi z > 0$, and at a slower pace when they are rich, because $\tau(z) - \pi z < 0$. Even though the sum of the net transfers across households is zero, only a fraction of the households become sufficiently rich to be net contributors to the scheme before they are hit by a new preference shock. As a result, the burden on the rich households outweighs the subsidies they received while being poor, and hence they reach their desired real balances later relative to the laissez faire. It follows that there is a larger fraction of households who are producing making aggregate real balances larger under the inflationary scheme. In summary, the transfer scheme, $\tau$, raises society’s welfare by redistributing a higher stock of real balances from rich to poor households without giving incentives to households to lower their targeted real balances.

We now summarize the findings of this section. We have shown in Propositions 9-10 that for low values of $\tilde{h}$ the first-best level of output can be implemented with an inflationary lump-sum transfer scheme, in which case a household’s ex-ante welfare is locally increasing with anticipated inflation. We have provided a calibrated numerical example for which there is a negative relationship between the optimal inflation rate and $\tilde{h}$. This example also suggests that for large values of $\tilde{h}$ inflation implemented via lump-sum transfers reduces welfare. However, Proposition 11 constructed
a generalized transfer scheme, with both a lump-sum and a regressive component, that raises ex-ante welfare relative to the laissez-faire. These findings are consistent with Wallace’s (2014) conjecture according to which in pure currency economies "there are transfer schemes financed by money creation that improve ex ante representative-agent welfare relative to what can be achieved holding the stock of money fixed."

5 Other applications

In the following we depart from the linear specification for \( u(c, \tilde{h} - h) \) adopted in Section 4 in order to illustrate additional insights and other tractable cases of our model. We first provide an example with quadratic preferences allowing us to characterize in closed form the transitional dynamics following a one-time money injection. Second, we assume general preferences over \( c \) and \( h \) but linear and stochastic preferences over lumpy consumption in order to discuss the effects of inflation on households’ spending behavior.

5.1 Money in the short run

Suppose now that preferences are quadratic: \( U(y) = Ay - y^2 / 2 \) and \( u(c, \tilde{h} - h) = \varepsilon c - c^2 / 2 - h^2 / 2. \)\(^{29}\)

From (15), and assuming interiority, the optimal choices of consumption and labor are \( c_t = \varepsilon - \lambda_t \) and \( h_t = \lambda_t. \) Under full depletion of real balances the stationary solution to the system of ODEs, (22)-(24), is \( \lambda^* = \varepsilon / 2 \) and \( z^* = A - (1 + r/\alpha) \varepsilon / 2. \) We assume that \( A > (1 + r/\alpha) \varepsilon / 2 \) to guarantee \( z^* > 0. \) Along the saddle path trajectory

\[
\lambda(z) = \frac{\nu}{2} (z - z^*) + \lambda^*,
\]

where \( \nu = \left(r + \alpha - \sqrt{(r + \alpha)^2 + 8\alpha}\right) / 2 < 0. \) It follows that the household’s policy functions are:

\[
\begin{align*}
    c(z) & = \frac{\varepsilon - \nu (z - z^*)}{2} \quad (44) \\
    h(z) & = \frac{\varepsilon + \nu (z - z^*)}{2}. \quad (45)
\end{align*}
\]

As households get richer their marginal value of wealth decreases, their consumption flow increases, and their supply of labor decreases. The condition for full depletion is \( A - z^* > - \nu z^*/2 + \lambda^* \) and \( c(z) \) is interior for all \( z \) if \( c(0) \geq 0. \) It can be checked that the set of parameter values for which these restrictions hold is non-empty.

\(^{29}\)Notice that these preferences do not satisfy the Inada conditions imposed earlier. But previous results are not needed as we are able to solve the equilibrium in closed form.
The saddle path of (22)-(24) is such that \( z_t = z^* \left( 1 - e^{\nu t} \right) \) where \( t \) is the length of the time interval since the last preference shock. Using that \( t \) is exponentially distributed the distribution of real balances is:

\[
F(z) = 1 - \left( \frac{z^* - z}{z^*} \right)^{-\frac{\alpha}{\nu}} \text{ for all } z \leq z^*. \tag{46}
\]

In contrast to the model of Section 4 the distribution of real balances has no mass point at \( z^* \) as households reach their target asymptotically. Market clearing gives

\[
\phi M = \int_0^{z^*} [1 - F(z)] \, dz = \frac{\nu}{\nu - \alpha} z^*. \tag{47}
\]

As before aggregate real balances depend on all preference parameters \((\nu, \alpha, \Lambda)\) but not on \( M \): money is neutral in the long run.

We now turn to the transitional dynamics following a one-time increase in the money supply, from \( M \) to \( \gamma M \), where \( \gamma > 1 \). We conjecture the existence of an equilibrium where the value of money adjusts instantly to its new steady-state value, \( \phi/\gamma \). Along the equilibrium path aggregate real balances, \( Z = \phi M \), are constant. To check that our proposed equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium we show that the goods market clear at any point in time. From (44) and (45) it is easy to check that aggregate consumption is

\[
C = \int c(z) dF_1(z) + \alpha \int z dF_1(z) = [\nu - \nu (Z - z^*)] \nu + \alpha Z \text{ while aggregate output is } H = \int h(z) dF_1(z) = [\nu + \nu (Z - z^*)] / 2. \tag{47}
\]

From (47) it follows that \( C + \alpha Z = H \), i.e., the goods market clear. The predictions of the model for aggregate quantities are consistent with the quantity theory: the price level moves in proportion to the money supply and real quantities are unaffected. So, from an aggregate viewpoint, money is neutral in the short run.\(^{30}\)

However, money affects the distribution of real balances and consumption levels across households, which is relevant for welfare under strictly concave preferences. We compute society’s welfare at the time of the money injection as \( \int W(z) dF_0(z) \) where

\[
F_0(z) = F [\gamma z - (\gamma - 1)Z]. \tag{48}
\]

According to (48) the measure of households who hold less than \( z \) real balances immediately after the money injection is equal to the measure of households who were holding less than \( \gamma z - (\gamma - 1)Z \) just before the shock: they received a lump-sum transfer of size \( (\gamma - 1)Z \) and their real wealth is

\[^{30}\text{This result is certainly not general, but it is a useful benchmark suggesting that the effects of a one-time money injection on aggregate real quantities will depend crucially on preferences that determine the relationship between labor supply decisions and wealth. In Rocheteau, Weill, and Wong (2015) we study transitional dynamic following one-time money injections in a discrete-time version of our model with search and bargaining and quasi-linear preferences. We show that the money injection affects the rate of return of money, aggregate real balances, and output levels.}\]
scaled down by a factor $\gamma^{-1}$ due to the increase in the price level. The value function, $W(z)$, being strictly concave ($\lambda(z)$ is a decreasing function of $z$), the reduction in the spread of the distribution leads to an increase in welfare.

5.2 Inflation and velocity

Suppose now that $U(y) = Ay$ where $A$ is an i.i.d. draw from some distribution $\Psi(A)$. We will use this version of the model to capture the common wisdom according to which households spend their real balances faster on less valuable commodities as inflation increases, thereby generating a misallocation of resources.\(^{31}\)

We conjecture that $W(z)$ is linear with slope $\lambda$. The HJB equation, (10), becomes:

$$rW(z) = \max_{c,h} \left\{ u(c, h - h) + \alpha \int V(z) + \lambda(h - c - \pi z + Y) \right\}$$

(49)

where $V(z) \equiv \int V(z, A) d\Psi(A)$ with

$$V(z, A) \equiv \max_{0 \leq y \leq z} \{ Ay + W(z - y) \} = \max_{0 \leq y \leq z} (A - \lambda) y + W(z).$$

(50)

From (50) the household spends all his real balances whenever $A > \lambda$. Differentiating (49) and using that $V'(z) - \lambda = \int_{A}^{\lambda} (A - \lambda) d\Psi(A)$, $\lambda$ solves:

$$(r + \pi) \lambda = \alpha \left[ \int_{A}^{\lambda} (A - \lambda) d\Psi(A) \right] = \alpha \int_{A}^{\lambda} \left[ 1 - \Psi(A) \right] dA.$$  

(51)

Equation (51) has the interpretation of an optimal stopping rule. According to the left side of (51) by spending his real balances the household saves the opportunity cost of holding money as measured by $r + \pi$. According to the middle term in (51) if the household does not spend his real balances, then he has to wait for the next preference shock with $A \geq \lambda$. Such a shock occurs with Poisson arrival rate $\alpha \left[ 1 - \Psi(\lambda) \right]$, in which case the expected surplus from spending one unit of real balances is $\mathbb{E}[A - \lambda| A \geq \lambda] = \int_{A}^{\lambda} (A - \lambda) d\Psi(A) / [1 - \Psi(\lambda)]$. Finally, the right side of (51) is obtained by integration by parts. It is easy to check that there is a unique, $\lambda^*$, solution to (51), and this solution is independent of the household’s real balances as initially guessed. As inflation increases $\lambda^*$ decreases and, in accordance with a "hot potato" effect, households spend their money holdings on goods for which they have a lower marginal utility of consumption. Given $\lambda^*$ the flow of consumption, $c^*$, and hours, $h^*$, are given by (15).

\(^{31}\)This wisdom has proved difficult to formalize in models with degenerate distributions. See Lagos and Rocheteau (2005), Ennis (2009), Liu, Wang, and Wright (2011), and Nosal (2011) for several attempts to generate a 'hot potato' effect in this class of models.
The real balances of a household who depleted his money holdings $t$ periods ago are $z_t = (h^* - c^* + \pi \phi M) (1 - e^{-\pi t})/\pi$. The probability that a household does not receive a preference shock with $A \geq \lambda^*$ over a time interval of length $t$ is $e^{-\alpha [1 - \Psi(\lambda^*)] t}$. Consequently,

$$F(z) = 1 - \left[ \frac{h^* - c^* + \pi(\phi M - z)}{h^* - c^* + \pi \phi M} \right]^\frac{1}{\alpha [1 - \Psi(\lambda^*)]} \quad \text{for all } z \leq \frac{h^* - c^* + \pi \phi M}{\pi}.$$  \hfill (52)

By market clearing, (21),

$$\phi M = \frac{h^* - c^*}{\alpha [1 - \Psi(\lambda^*)]}.$$  \hfill (53)

Aggregate real balances fall with inflation because households save less, $h^* - c^*$ is lower, and because they spend their real balances more rapidly, $\alpha [1 - \Psi(\lambda^*)]$ increases. The velocity of money, denoted $\mathcal{V}$, is defined as nominal aggregate output divided by the stock of money. From (53),

$$\mathcal{V} = \frac{h^*}{\phi M} = \frac{\alpha [1 - \Psi(\lambda^*)]}{1 - \frac{c^*}{h^*}}.$$  \hfill (54)

The velocity of money increases with inflation for two reasons: households spend their real balances more often following preference shocks, $1 - \Psi(\lambda^*)$ increases, and the saving rate, $(h^* - c^*)/h^*$, decreases. A monetary equilibrium exists if $h^* - c^* > 0$, which holds if the inflation rate is not too large and the preference shocks are sufficiently frequent.

Finally, if preferences over flow consumption and leisure are also linear, then all households supply $\bar{h}$ provided that $\pi < \alpha \int_1^A [1 - \Psi(A)] dA$. So inflation has not effect on aggregate output. Welfare at a steady-state monetary equilibrium is

$$\mathcal{W} = \alpha \int \int A z dF(z) d\Psi(A) - \bar{h} = \bar{h} \left[ \frac{\int_1^A A d\Psi(A)}{1 - \Psi(\lambda^*)} - 1 \right].$$

It is increasing with $\lambda^*$ and hence decreasing with $\pi$. As inflation increases output is consumed by households with lower marginal utilities, which reduces social welfare.

6 Conclusion

We constructed a continuous-time, pure currency economy in which households are subject to idiosyncratic preference shocks for lumpy consumption. We offered a complete characterization of steady-state equilibria for general preferences and we proved existence and near-efficiency of equilibrium. We provided closed-form solutions for a class of equilibria where households deplete their money holdings in full periodically and for special classes of preferences. We studied both analytically and numerically a version of our economy with quasi-linear preferences resembling the
New-Monetarist framework of Lagos and Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005). In the presence of finite labor endowments the equilibrium of this economy features a non-degenerate distribution of real balances and a trade-off for policy between self-insurance and risk sharing parameterized by the size of labor endowments. The model has a variety of new insights, including non-monotonic effects of inflation on output and welfare and the optimality of inflationary transfer schemes in accordance with Wallace’s (2014) conjecture.
References


Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions

PROOF OF THEOREM 1. The Theorem summarizes a series of results from the Supplementary Appendix. Lemma II.3 shows that the Bellman equation has a unique bounded solution, and that this solution is concave, continuous, and increasing. Lemma II.5 shows that the value function is strictly increasing. Lemma II.8 shows that the value function is a viscosity solution of the HJB equation. Proposition II.11 uses this result to show that the value function is continuously differentiable, and that its derivative is strictly decreasing. This implies that the value function is strictly concave, that it is twice continuously differentiable almost everywhere, and that it is a classical solution of the HJB equation, i.e., that it satisfies (10).

Proposition II.14 shows that the value function is twice continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of any \( z > 0 \), except perhaps if saving rate is zero, and under linear preferences if \( W'(z) = 1 \). Since there is a unique level of real balances such that the saving rate is zero (see Proposition 2), and since \( W'(z) \) is strictly decreasing, this means that the value function is twice continuously differentiable except for two levels of real balances. Under SI preferences, Proposition IV.4 shows that the value function is twice continuously differentiable even when the saving rate is zero. Under linear preferences, Lemma VI.6 shows that, in equilibrium, the value function is twice continuously differentiable over the support of the distribution of real balances.

To derive the bound on \( W'(0) \), consider some small \( \varepsilon > 0 \). By working full time, \( h_t = \hat{h} \) and consuming nothing, the household can reach \( \varepsilon \) at time \( T_\varepsilon \) solving \( z_{T_\varepsilon} = \varepsilon \), where \( \dot{z}_t = \hat{h} + \Upsilon - \pi z_t \). Solving this ODE explicitly gives:

\[
T_\varepsilon = -\frac{1}{\pi} \log \left( 1 - \frac{\pi}{\hat{h} + \Upsilon} \varepsilon \right) = \frac{\varepsilon}{\hat{h} + \Upsilon} + o(\varepsilon).
\]

Since utility flows are bounded below by zero, we must have that \( W(0) \geq e^{-(r+\alpha)T_\varepsilon} W(\varepsilon) \), which implies in turn that:

\[
0 \leq W(\varepsilon) - W(0) \leq \left( 1 - e^{-(r+\alpha)T_\varepsilon} \right) W(\varepsilon).
\]

Dividing both side by \( \varepsilon \) and taking the limit \( \varepsilon \to 0 \), we obtain that:

\[
W'(0) \leq \frac{r + \alpha}{\hat{h} + \Upsilon} W(0).
\]

By taking the sup norm on both sides of (6) we obtain that \( r\|W\| \leq \|u\| + \alpha\|U\| \), and the result follows. Finally, the result that \( \lim_{z \to \infty} W'(z) = 0 \) follows from the fact that \( W(z) \) is concave and
bounded (see Corollary II.4 in the Supplementary Appendix), and the result that \( \lim_{z \to 0} W''(z) = \infty \) is shown in Corollary II.17 of the Supplementary Appendix.

**PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.** The results follow directly because \( U(y) \) and \( W(z) \) are both strictly concave and continuously differentiable, because \( U'(0) = \infty \) while \( W'(0) < \infty \), and because \( U'(\infty) = W'(\infty) = 0 \).

**PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.** Note that the saving rate correspondence can be written as
\[
s(z) = \tilde{h} - c - \pi z + \Upsilon, \quad \text{where} \quad (h, c) \in X(\lambda) \quad \text{and} \quad X(\lambda) = \arg \max \{ u(c, \tilde{h} - h) + \lambda (h - c - \pi z + \Upsilon) \},
\]
with respect to \( c \geq 0, \quad 0 \leq h \leq \tilde{h} \). With linear preferences, \( X(\lambda) = (\tilde{c}, 0) \) if \( \lambda < 1 \), \( X(\lambda) = [0, \tilde{c}] \times [0, \tilde{h}] \) if \( \lambda = 1 \) and \( X(\lambda) = (0, \tilde{h}) \) if \( \lambda > 1 \). With SI preferences, one can easily check that \( X(\lambda) \) is single-valued and continuous, that the optimal consumption choice, \( c(\lambda) \), is strictly decreasing, and that the optimal labor choice, \( h(\lambda) \), is increasing (see Lemma I.2 in the Supplementary Appendix for details). Combined with the fact, established in Theorem 1, that \( W'(z) \) is strictly decreasing and continuous, all the statements of the Lemma follow except for \( s(z) > 0 \).

To establish that \( s(z) > 0 \) near zero, recall that the value function is twice differentiable almost everywhere. Consider any \( z > 0 \) such that \( W''(z) \) exists. Then, we can apply the envelope condition to the right side of the HJB equation (see Theorem 1 in Milgrom and Segal, 2002). We obtain that:
\[
(r + \alpha + \pi)W'(z) = \alpha V'(z) + W''(z)s(z). \tag{55}
\]
From Proposition 1 we have that \( V'(z) = U'[y(z)] \). Since \( y(z) \leq z \) and \( \lim_{z \to 0} U'(z) = \infty \), it follows that \( \lim_{z \to 0} V'(z) = \infty \). From \( W'(0) < \infty \) and (55), \( \lim_{z \to 0} W''(z)s(z) = -\infty \). Since \( W''(z) \leq 0 \), it then follows that \( s(z) > 0 \) for some \( z \) close enough to zero. Since \( s(z) \) is decreasing, it follows that \( s(z) > 0 \) for all \( z \) close enough to zero.

**PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.** The proof is based on results from two sections of the Supplementary Appendix: Section IV.3, which studies the initial value problem in the case of SI preferences, and Section V.2, which explicitly solves for the solution to this problem in the case of linear preferences.


**Lemma 1** At the target level of real balances, \( z^* \):
\[
W'(z^*) = \frac{\alpha}{r + \alpha + \pi} V'(z^*).
\]
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. First, we note that the stationary distribution cannot be concentrated at \( z = 0 \), since \( Q(z, \{0\}) = 0 \) for all \( z \). Hence, when \( \phi = 0 \), the left-hand side of (21) is zero and so is less than the right-hand side, which is strictly positive. When \( \phi \to \infty \), we have from the upper bound of Theorem 1 that \( W'(z) \to 0 \) for all \( z \in [0, \infty) \). This implies that labor supply is zero and consumption is strictly positive for all \( z \in [0, z^*] \), hence the saving rate is \( s(z) = -\pi z + \Upsilon \). Plugging \( s(z^*) = 0 \), it follows that \( z \leq z^* < \Upsilon / \pi \) for all real balances \( z \) in the support of the stationary distribution, \([0, z^*] \), implying that the right-hand side of (21) is less than the left-hand side. Finally, note that (21) is continuous in \( \phi \) because, by Proposition 4, the stationary distribution is continuous in \( \phi \) in the sense of weak convergence. The result then follows by an application of the intermediate value theorem.

PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Note that, at \( z^* \), there exists some optimal consumption and labor choices, \((c^*, h^*)\) such that \( h^* - c^* - \pi z^* + \Upsilon = 0 \). Hence, from the HJB:

\[
(r + \alpha)W(z) \geq u(c^*, \bar{h} - h^*) + \alpha V(z) + W'(z) (h^* - c^* - \pi z + \Upsilon) \\
(r + \alpha)W(z^*) = u(c^*, \bar{h} - h^*) + \alpha V(z^*),
\]

where the inequality in the first equation follows because we evaluate the right side of the HJB at a point that may not achieve the maximum. Taking the difference between these two equations, and recalling that \( h(z^*) - c(z^*) - \pi z^* + \Upsilon = 0 \), we obtain that:

\[
(r + \alpha) [W(z) - W(z^*)] \geq \alpha [V(z) - V(z^*)] - \pi W'(z) (z - z^*)
\]

The result follows by dividing both sides by \( z - z^* \), for \( z > z^* \) and then for \( z < z^* \), and taking the limit as \( z \to z^* \), keeping in mind that \( V(z) \) is differentiable at \( z^* \) and that \( W(z) \) is continuously differentiable.

**Lemma 2** Under either SI or linear preferences, for \( z \in [0, z^*] \):

\[
W'(z) = \frac{\alpha}{r + \alpha + \pi} \int_0^{z^*} V'(x) dG(x \mid z), \text{ where } G(x \mid z) \equiv 1 - e^{-(r+\alpha+\pi)|T(x_1) - T(z)|}
\]

**PROOF OF LEMMA 2.** First, recall from Theorem 1 that the value function is twice continuously differentiable over \((0, \infty)\), except perhaps under linear preferences, when this property may not hold for at most two points. Hence, we can take derivatives on the right side of the HJB equation along the path of real balances \( z_t \), except perhaps at two points. Applying the envelope condition, we obtain that:

\[
(r + \alpha + \pi)W'(z_t) = \alpha V'(z_t) + W''(z_t) \dot{z}_t,
\]
if $z_t < z^*$, except perhaps at two points. At $z = z^*$, Lemma 1 shows that

$$(r + \alpha + \pi)W'(z^*) = \alpha V'(z^*).$$

In all cases we can integrate this formula forward over the time interval $[t, T(z^*)]$ and we obtain that:

$$W'(z_t) = \int_t^{T(z^*)} \alpha V'(z_s)e^{-(r+\alpha+\pi)(s-t)} \, ds + e^{-(r+\alpha+\pi)[T(z^*)-t]} \frac{\alpha V'(z^*)}{r + \alpha + \pi}. \quad (56)$$

Consider the integral on the right side of (56). The inverse of $z_t$ when restricted to the time interval $[0, T(z^*)]$ is the strictly increasing function $T(x)$, the time to reach the real balances $x$ starting from time zero. Let $M(x) \equiv 1 - e^{-(r+\alpha+\pi)[T(x)-t]}$ and note that $M \circ z(s) = 1 - e^{-(r+\alpha+\pi)(s-t)}$.

With these notations, the first integral can be written:

$$\int_t^{T(z^*)} \alpha V'(z_s)e^{-(r+\alpha+\pi)(s-t)} \, ds = \frac{\alpha}{r + \alpha + \pi} \int_t^{T(z^*)} V' \circ z_s \, d[M \circ z_s]$$

$$= \frac{\alpha}{r + \alpha + \pi} \int_{x \in [z, z^*]} V'(x) \, dM(x) = \frac{\alpha}{r + \alpha + \pi} \int_{x \in [z, z^*]} V'(x) \, dG(x \mid z).$$

where the second equality follows by an application of the change of variable formula for Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral (see Carter and van Brunt, 2000, Theorem 6.2.1), and the second line follows because $G(x \mid z) = M(x)$ for all $x \in [z, z^*)$. The result follows by noting that the second integral can be written: $\frac{\alpha V'(z^*)}{r + \alpha + \pi} \times \left[ G(z^* \mid z) - G(z^* \mid z) \right]$. □

**PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6.**

Recall from (2)-(3) that the full-insurance allocation is determined by:

$$(c^{FI}, y^{FI}, h^{FI}) \in \arg \max \left\{ u(c, \bar{h} - h) + \alpha U(y) \right\}$$

s.t. $\alpha y + c = h$ and $h \leq \bar{h}$.

We propose arbitrary strategies for households and evaluate these strategies in order to obtain a lower bound for households’ lifetime expected utility in a laissez-faire monetary equilibrium, $W(z)$.

The strategy we are considering for the accumulation of real balances replicates the inventory-accumulation strategy in Diamond and Yellin (1985). Households consume a constant $y$ units of lumpy consumption whenever their real balances allow them to do so, $z \geq y$, and nothing otherwise. Moreover, their flow consumption is constant and equal to $c$, and their flow labor supply is constant and equal to $h$. Their flow saving rate is $\dot{z} = s = h - c > 0$. Denote $u = u(c, \bar{h} - h)$ and $U = U(y)$. Notice also that this strategy coincides with the one sustaining the full-insurance allocation, provided that $(c, h, y)$ is appropriately chosen, except when $z < y$.  

47
The value of a household following that strategy starting with \( z \) real balances is:

\[
\tilde{W}(z) = \int_{0}^{+\infty} e^{-rt} \left( u + \alpha U \int_{y}^{+\infty} p(z', t; z')dz' \right) dt,
\]

where \( p(z', t; z) \) is the probability that the household has \( z' \) real balances at time \( t \) starting from \( z \) at \( t = 0 \). From (57) the household enjoys a constant utility flow, \( u \), and the utility of lumpy consumption, \( U \), with probability \( \alpha dt \), if his real balances at time \( t \) are greater than \( y \), with probability \( \int_{y}^{+\infty} p(z', t; z)dz' \). The household value function can be rewritten as:

\[
\tilde{W}(z) = \frac{u}{r} + \alpha U \int_{0}^{+\infty} e^{-rt} \int_{y}^{+\infty} p(z', t; z)dz' dt.
\]

Except for the first term, this corresponds to (4.2) in Diamond and Yellin (1985). It is clear that \( \tilde{W}(z) \) is non-decreasing in \( z \). So in the following we will focus on \( \tilde{W}(0) \) which will give us a lower bound for \( \tilde{W}(z) \). For all \( z < y \) the value function satisfies the following HJB equation:

\[
r\tilde{W}(z) = u + \tilde{W}'(z)s.
\]

The household enjoys the utility flow \( u \) but do not consume when preference shocks for lumpy consumption occur (since the strategy specifies \( y(z) = 0 \) for all \( z < y \)). Moreover, he accumulates real balances at rate \( s \), which leads to an increase in his value function equal to \( \tilde{W}'(z)s \). Using the integrating factor method the value of the household with depleted real balances is:

\[
\tilde{W}(0) = e^{-\frac{r}{y}y} \tilde{W}(y) + \frac{u}{r} \left( 1 - e^{-\frac{r}{y}y} \right).
\]

The value of a household with depleted real balances is equal to his value with \( y \) real balances discounted at rate \( r \) over a time interval of length \( y/s \), the time that it takes to reach \( y \); it is augmented with the discounted sum of the utility flow, \( u \), over that period. Define:

\[
H(x) = \int_{0}^{x} \int_{0}^{\infty} re^{-rt} p(z, t; y)dt dz.
\]

The quantity \( G(x) \) is the average probability that the household will hold less than \( x \) real balances over his lifetime, if he starts with \( y \), with weights decreasing at rate \( r \) over time. From (58) the value of a household with \( y \) real balances is:

\[
\tilde{W}(y) = \frac{u + \alpha [1 - H(y)] U}{r}.
\]

The first term on the right side of (61) is simply the discounted sum of utility flows, \( u/r \). The second term on the right side is the discounted sum of the utilities from lumpy consumption, taking into
account that such opportunities occur on average at rate \( \alpha[1 - G(y)] \). Substituting \( \tilde{W}(y) \) by its expression into (60):

\[
\tilde{W}(0) = e^{-\frac{r}{\alpha}y} \frac{\alpha U}{r} [1 - H(y)] + \frac{u}{r}.
\] (62)

We obtain the term, \( 1 - H(y) \), directly from Diamond and Yellin (1985, eq. (4.12)),

\[
1 - H(y) = \frac{r}{\alpha} \frac{(1 + \frac{r}{\alpha y})}{1 - e^{-\frac{r}{\alpha}y}},
\] (63)

where \( \theta \) is the unique negative real root of:

\[
s\theta = \alpha (e^{\theta y} - 1) - r.
\] (64)

Note that when \( r = 0 \) (64) is the characteristic equation for the stationary distribution of real balances. Moreover, from (63),

\[
\lim_{r \to 0} [1 - H(y)] = \frac{s}{\alpha y},
\]

which is the fraction of households with real balances larger than \( y \) in a steady state where all households play the inventory-accumulation strategy of Diamond and Yellin (1985, eq. (3.9)). Substituting \( 1 - H(y) \) from (63) into (62):

\[
\tilde{W}(0) = e^{-\frac{r}{\alpha}y} \frac{\alpha U}{r} \frac{\alpha U}{\alpha U} \left(1 + \frac{r}{\alpha y}\right) + \frac{u}{r}.
\] (65)

Now, we set \( (y, c, h) \) equal to their levels at the full-insurance allocation, \( (y^{FI}, c^{FI}, h^{FI}) \). So, households follow a strategy that implements the full insurance allocation except when their real balances are lower than \( y^{FI} \), in which case they do not consume if a preference shock occurs. The saving rate is then \( s = \alpha y^{FI} \) and the value of the household with depleted real balances is:

\[
\tilde{W}^{FI}(0) = e^{-\frac{r}{\alpha}y} \frac{\alpha U}{r} \frac{\alpha U}{\alpha U} \left(1 + \frac{r}{\alpha y}\right) + \frac{u}{r}.
\] (66)

Multiplying by \( r \) both sides and taking the limit as \( r \) goes to 0:

\[
\lim_{r \to 0} r\tilde{W}^{FI}(0) \to \alpha U(y^{FI}) + u(c^{FI}, \bar{h} - h^{FI}).
\] (67)

The right side of (67) is the flow lifetime expected utility of a household at the full-insurance allocation.

The ex-ante expected utility of the household in the laissez-faire monetary equilibrium is measured by \( \int rW(z)dF(z) \). Because households follow their optimal strategy, \( W(z) \geq \tilde{W}(z) \geq \tilde{W}(0) \) for all \( z \). Moreover, the ex-ante expected utility of a household in the laissez-faire monetary
equilibrium is bounded above by the utility at the full-insurance allocation, \( \int W(z) dF(z) \leq [u(c^{FI}, \bar{h} - h^{FI}) + \alpha U(y^{FI})] / r. \) Hence:

\[
rW^{FI}(0) \leq \int rW(z) dF(z) \leq u(c^{FI}, \bar{h} - h^{FI}) + \alpha U(y^{FI}).
\] (68)

From (67) it follows that:

\[
\lim_{r \to 0} \int rW(z) dF(z) = u(c^{FI}, \bar{h} - h^{FI}) + \alpha U(y^{FI}).
\] (69)

Let \((h^{FI}_0, c^{FI}_0, y^{FI}_0)\) denote the full-insurance allocation corresponding to an environment where labor endowments have been scaled down by a factor \(\delta < 1\). Since \(u(c^{FI}_0, \delta \bar{h} - h^{FI}_0) + \alpha U(y^{FI}_0) < u(c^{FI}, \bar{h} - h^{FI}) + \alpha U(y^{FI})\) for all \(\delta < 1\), and from (69), it follows that for all \(\delta \in (0, 1)\) there is a \(\bar{r}_\delta > 0\) such for all \(r < \bar{r}_\delta\),

\[
\int rW(z) dF(z) > u(c^{FI}_0, \delta \bar{h} - h^{FI}_0) + \alpha U(y^{FI}_0).
\]

The ex-ante expected utility of the household is larger at the laissez-faire monetary equilibrium than at the full-insurance allocation when labor endowments have been scaled down by a factor \(\delta\).

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7. To establish the first point of the Proposition, we note that, at the target \(z^*, h^* - c^* - \pi z^* + \Upsilon = 0\), where \((c^*, h^*)\) are optimal consumption and labor choices when \(z = z^*\). Since, in equilibrium, \(\Upsilon = \pi \int_0^{z^*} zdF(z) < \pi z^*\), we obtain that \(h^* - c^* > 0\). This implies that the marginal value of real balances satisfies \(W'(z^*) \geq \Lambda > 0\), where the constant \(\Lambda\) is independent of the rate of inflation, \(\pi\). With linear preferences, \(\Lambda = 1\). With SI preferences, \(\Lambda\) solves \(h(\Lambda) - c(\Lambda) = 0\). Next, we use Lemma 1:

\[
(r + \alpha + \pi)W'(z^*) = U'(y(z^*)).
\]

Since \(W'(z^*) \geq \Lambda\), this implies that \(\lim_{\pi \to \infty} y(z^*) = 0\). Finally, since we have established in Theorem 1 that \(W'(0) \leq (r + \alpha) / \bar{h} \leq (\|u\| + \alpha \|U\|)/r\), we obtain that \(W'(0) < U'[y(z^*)]\) for \(\pi\) large enough. Therefore, the solution of the optimal lumpy consumption problem is \(y(z^*) = z^*\), i.e., there is full depletion. We conclude that \(\lim_{\pi \to \infty} z^* = \lim_{\pi \to \infty} y(z^*) = 0\).

The second part of the Proposition, which deals with linear preference, requires some notations and results from Section 4. The proof can be found at the beginning of the proof of Proposition 9, in the paragraph "(i) Large labor endowments".
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9. Part (i): Large labor endowment. Fix some $\pi \geq 0$. We first note that $y(z^*) \leq z^* \leq z_s$, hence equilibrium aggregate demand is bounded by $\alpha z_s$ independently of $\tilde{h}$. Equilibrium aggregate supply can be written:

$$F(z^*_s)\tilde{h} + [1 - F(z^*_s)]h^*.$$ 

To remain bounded as $\tilde{h} \to \infty$, it must be the case that $\lim_{\tilde{h} \to \infty} F(z^*_s) = 0$. This also implies that, for $\tilde{h}$ large enough, there is an atom at $z^*$, so that $W'(z^*) = 1$ and $z^* = z_s$. Because $F$ converges to a Dirac distribution concentrated at $z^* = z_s$, we have that $\lim_{\tilde{h} \to \infty} \phi M = z_s$.

Next we argue that, as $\tilde{h}$ is large enough, $y(z^*) = y(z_s) = z_s$, i.e., all equilibria must feature full depletion. For this we use the expression for $W'(z)$ derived in Lemma 2:

$$W'(0) = \frac{\alpha}{r + \alpha + \pi} \int_0^{z^*} U'[y(z)] \, dG(z \mid 0) \leq \frac{\alpha}{r + \alpha + \pi} \int_0^{z^*} \max\{U'(z), W'(0)\} \, dG(z \mid 0)$$

$$\leq \frac{\alpha}{r + \alpha + \pi} \left[ G(z_s^- \mid 0) \int_{z \in [0, z_s]} \max\{U'(z), W'(0)\} \frac{dG(z \mid 0)}{G(z \mid 0)} + \left[ 1 - G(z_s^- \mid 0) \right] \max\{U'(z), W'(0)\} \right],$$

as long as $\tilde{h}$ is large enough. To obtain the inequality of the first line, we have used that $U'[y(z)] = U'(z)$ if there is full depletion, while $U'[y(z)] = W'[z - y(z)] \leq W'(0)$ if there is partial depletion. To obtain the second line, we have used that $z^* = z_s$ as long as $\tilde{h}$ is large enough. Substituting the expression for $T(z \mid \pi \phi M)$ into the definition of $G(z \mid 0)$, we obtain that:

$$G(z \mid 0) = \left\{\begin{array}{ll}
1 - \left(1 - \frac{z}{z_b}\right)^{1 + \frac{r + \alpha}{\pi}} & \text{if } z < z_s \\
1 & \text{if } z = z_s.
\end{array}\right.$$ 

Given that $z_b$ goes to infinity as $\tilde{h}$ goes to infinity, one sees that $G(z \mid 0)$ converges weakly to a Dirac distribution concentrated at $z_s$. We also have:

$$\frac{G'(z \mid 0)}{G(z_s^- \mid 0)} = \left(1 + \frac{r + \alpha}{\pi}\right) \frac{\frac{1}{z_b} \left(1 - \frac{z}{z_b}\right)^{1 + \frac{r + \alpha}{\pi}}}{1 - \left(1 - \frac{z}{z_b}\right)^{1 + \frac{r + \alpha}{\pi}}} \leq \left(1 + \frac{r + \alpha}{\pi}\right) \frac{\frac{1}{z_b}}{1 - \left(1 - \frac{z}{z_b}\right)^{1 + \frac{r + \alpha}{\pi}}} \to \frac{1}{z_s},$$

as $\tilde{h}$ goes to infinity (since it implies $z_b \to \infty$). Thus, the conditional probability distribution, $G(z \mid 0)/G(z_s^- \mid 0)$, has a density that can be bounded uniformly in $\tilde{h}$. Finally, our bound for $W'(0)$ in Theorem 1 can be written, in the case of linear preferences, as

$$W'(0) \leq \frac{r + \alpha}{\tilde{h}} \left(\frac{\tilde{h} + \bar{c}}{r} + \alpha \frac{\|U\|}{r}\right) \to 1 + \frac{\alpha}{r},$$

as $\tilde{h} \to \infty$. Taken together, these observations imply that:

$$\int_{z \in [0, z_s]} \max\{U'(z), W'(0)\} \frac{dG(z \mid 0)}{G(z_s^- \mid 0)} \leq \frac{1}{z_s} \int_0^{z_s} \max\{U'(z), 1 + \frac{\alpha}{r}\} \, dz + \varepsilon$$

51
for some \( \varepsilon > 0 \) as long as \( \bar{h} \) is large enough (note that the integral on the right side is well defined since \( U(z) = \int_0^z U'(z) \, dx \)). Together with the fact that \( G(z^-_0) \to 0 \) as \( \bar{h} \to \infty \), we obtain that:

\[
G(z^-_0) \int_{z \in [0, z_s]} \max \{U'(z), W'(0)\} \, \frac{dG(z)}{G(z^-_0)} \to 0 \quad \text{and} \quad 1 - G(z^-_0) \to 1
\]
as \( \bar{h} \to \infty \). Hence, for any \( \varepsilon > 0 \), \( W'(0) \leq \frac{\alpha}{r + \alpha + \pi} \max \{U'(z_s), W'(0)\} + \varepsilon \) as long as \( \bar{h} \) is large enough. Picking \( \varepsilon < \frac{r + \alpha}{r + \alpha + \pi} U'(z_s) \), we obtain that \( W'(0) < \max \{W'(0), U'(z_s)\} \), which implies that \( W'(0) < U'(z_s) \), for \( \bar{h} \) large enough, i.e., there is full depletion.

Because \( H = \alpha \phi M \) under full depletion, and because the distribution of real balances converges towards a Dirac distribution concentrated at \( z_s \), we obtain that \( \lim_{\bar{h} \to \infty} H = H^\infty(\pi) = \alpha z_s \), which is decreasing in \( \pi \). Aggregate welfare can be written as \( \alpha \int U(z) \, dF(z) - H \), the average utility enjoyed from lumpy consumption net of the average disutility of supplying labor. As \( \bar{h} \to \infty \), \( F \) converges weakly to a Dirac distribution concentrated at \( z_s \), and \( H \) converges to \( \alpha z_s \). It follows that welfare converges to \( W^\infty = \alpha \{U(z_s) - z_s\} \), which is decreasing with \( \pi \).

**Part (ii): Small labor endowment.** We have shown that there exists a unique candidate equilibrium with full depletion. In this candidate equilibrium, the condition for binding labor is that \( z_s \geq z_b \) or, using the definition of \( z_s \):

\[
U'(z_b) \leq 1 + \frac{r + \pi}{\alpha}.
\]

Recall that \( z_b = \frac{\bar{h}}{\pi} + \frac{\bar{h}}{\alpha} \) is an increasing function of \( \bar{h} \). Since marginal utility is decreasing, the condition for binding labor can be written:

\[
\bar{h} \in \left[0, \bar{H}(\pi)\right] \quad \text{where} \quad \bar{H}(\pi) = \frac{\alpha \pi}{a + \pi} \left(U' \right)^{-1} \left(1 + \frac{r + \pi}{\alpha}\right).
\]

One immediately sees that \( \lim_{\pi \to 0} \bar{H}(\pi) = \lim_{\pi \to \infty} \bar{H}(\pi) = 0 \).

Next, we turn to the sufficient condition for full depletion. Using Lemma 2 we have, in the candidate equilibrium with full depletion:

\[
W'(0) = \frac{\alpha}{r + \alpha + \pi} \int_0^{z_b} U'(z) \, dG(z) \quad \text{where} \quad G(z) = 1 - \left(1 - \frac{z}{z_b}\right)^{1 + \frac{\varepsilon_0}{\pi}}.
\]

Substituting the expression for \( G(z) \) in the integral, we obtain:

\[
W'(0) = \frac{\alpha}{\pi} \frac{1}{z_b} \int_0^{z_b} U'(z) \left(1 - \frac{z}{z_b}\right)^{\frac{r + \alpha}{\pi}} \, dz \leq \frac{\alpha}{\pi} \frac{U(z_b)}{z_b},
\]

where the inequality follows by using \( \left(1 - \frac{z}{z_b}\right)^{\frac{r + \alpha}{\pi}} \leq 1 \), integrating, and keeping in mind that \( U(0) = 0 \). Full depletion obtains if \( W'(0) \leq U'(z_b) \). Using the above upper bound for \( W'(0) \), we
obtain that a sufficient condition for full depletion is:

\[ \frac{\pi}{\alpha} \geq \frac{U(z_b)}{z_b U'(z_b)}. \]

Note that \( z_b \leq (U')^{-1}(1) \), that the function \( z \mapsto [U(z) - U(0)] / [z U'(z)] \) is continuous over \((0, (U')^{-1}(1))\) and, by our maintained assumption in the Lemma, bounded near zero. Hence, it is bounded over the closed interval \([0, (U')^{-1}(1)]\). Therefore, the condition for full depletion is satisfied if:

\[ \pi \geq \pi \equiv \alpha \times \sup_{z \in [0, (U')^{-1}(1)]} \frac{U(z)}{z U'(z)}. \]

**Output effect of inflation.** In the regime with binding labor, \( h(z) = \bar{h} \) for all \( z \in \text{supp}(F) \). Hence, for all \( \bar{h} \in [0, \hat{h}] \) and for all \( \pi \in [\pi, \bar{\pi}] \), \( H = \bar{h} \).

**Welfare effect of inflation.** From (39) in the regime with binding labor, \( \phi M = \bar{h}/\alpha \). Hence, an increase in the money growth rate through lump-sum transfers is a mean-preserving reduction in the distribution of real balances. In this regime social welfare is measured by

\[ W = \int [-h(z) + \alpha U(z)] dF(z) = -\bar{h} + \alpha \int U(z) dF(z). \]

Given the strict concavity of \( U(y) \) money growth leads to an increase in welfare.

**Part (iii): Large inflation.** From (36), as \( \pi \to \infty, z^* \to 0, \phi M \to 0, H \to 0, \) and \( W \to 0 \).

**PROOF OF PROPOSITION 11.**

The proof is structured as follows. Given a policy, \((\pi, \tau)\), we conjecture that households behave as follows: \( y(z) = z \) for all \( z \in [0, z^*_0] \); \( h(z) = \bar{h} \) for all \( z < z^*_0 \), and \( h(z^*_0) = 0 \). We also assume that parameters are such that \( \bar{h} + \tau(z) - \pi z > 0 \) for all \( z \in [0, z^*_0] \). Given this conjecture we will show that: (i) Aggregate real balances under \( \tau \) are larger than under laissez faire (\( \tau_0 = \tau_1 = \tau_z = 0 \)). (ii) Welfare under \( \tau \) is larger than under laissez-faire. The second part of the proof will consist in checking that: (iii) For \( \pi \) small enough, there is a transfer scheme, \( \tau \), of the form described in (42), that balances the government budget; (iv) Households’ conjectured behavior is optimal.

Guessing that the equilibrium features full depletion, and keeping in mind that \( \tau(z^*_0) = \pi z^*_0 \) by construction, the government budget constraint under the transfer scheme, \( \tau \), is:

\[ \int [\tau(z) - \pi z] dF(z) = \int_{0}^{T(z^*_0, \tau)} \{\tau \{z(t) - \pi z(t)\} \alpha e^{-\alpha t} dt = 0, \quad (70) \]
where $T(z_0^*;\tau)$ is the time to accumulate $z_0^*$ under the transfer scheme $\tau$ and $z(t)$ is the solution to

$$\dot{z} = \bar{h} + \tau(z) - \pi z \quad \text{for all } z < z_0^*.$$

$$= 0 \text{ if } z = z_0^*.$$

We denote $Z_\tau \equiv \int [1 - F_\tau(z)] \, dz$ the aggregate real balances under the transfer scheme, $\tau$, and $Z_0 \equiv \int [1 - F_0(z)] \, dz$ the aggregate real balances under laissez faire. Moreover, denote $T_\tau \equiv T(z_0^*;\tau)$ and $T_0 = T(z_0^*,0)$ under laissez-faire.

**RESULT #1:** $T_\tau > T_0$ and $Z_\tau > Z_0$.

**PROOF:** By construction the transfer scheme in (42) is such that there is a level of real balances, $z_\hat{t}$, with $\hat{t} \in (0,T_\tau)$, below which the net transfer to the household is positive, since $\pi_0 > 0$, and above which the net transfer is negative, since from (70) the sum of those transfers must be 0:

$$\tau(z_t) - \pi z_t > 0 \text{ for all } t \in (0, \hat{t})$$

$$\tau(z_t) - \pi z_t < 0 \text{ for all } t \in (\hat{t}, T_\tau).$$

Dividing the government budget constraint by $\alpha e^{-\alpha t}$, (70) becomes:

$$\int_0^\hat{t} [\tau(z_t) - \pi z_t] \frac{e^{-\alpha t}}{\alpha e^{-\alpha t}} dt + \int_{\hat{t}}^{T_\tau} [\tau(z_t) - \pi z_t] \frac{e^{-\alpha t}}{\alpha e^{-\alpha t}} dt = 0. \quad (72)$$

Given $\hat{t}$, $\alpha e^{-\alpha t}/\alpha e^{-\alpha t}$ is decreasing in $t$, $\alpha e^{-\alpha t}/\alpha e^{-\alpha t} > 1$ for all $t < \hat{t}$ and $\alpha e^{-\alpha t}/\alpha e^{-\alpha t} < 1$ for all $t > \hat{t}$. It follows that

$$\int_0^\hat{t} [\tau(z_t) - \pi z_t] \frac{e^{-\alpha t}}{\alpha e^{-\alpha t}} dt > \int_0^{T_\tau} [\tau(z_t) - \pi z_t] \frac{e^{-\alpha t}}{\alpha e^{-\alpha t}} dt. \quad (73)$$

$$\int_{\hat{t}}^{T_\tau} [\tau(z_t) - \pi z_t] \frac{e^{-\alpha t}}{\alpha e^{-\alpha t}} dt < \int_{\hat{t}}^{T_\tau} [\tau(z_t) - \pi z_t] \frac{e^{-\alpha t}}{\alpha e^{-\alpha t}} dt. \quad (74)$$

From (72) and the two inequalities, (73)-(74),

$$\int_0^T_\tau [\tau(z_t) - \pi z_t] \frac{e^{-\alpha t}}{\alpha e^{-\alpha t}} dt = 0 > \int_0^{T_\tau} [\tau(z_t) - \pi z_t] \frac{e^{-\alpha t}}{\alpha e^{-\alpha t}} dt. \quad (75)$$

From (71) and (75),

$$\int_0^{T_\tau} [\tau(z_t) - \pi z_t] \, dt = \int_0^{T_\tau} [\dot{z}_t - \bar{h}] \, dt = z_0^* - \bar{h} T_\tau < 0,$$

where we used that $z_0 = 0$ and $z_{T_\tau} = z_0^*$. So $T_\tau > T_0 = z_0^*/\bar{h}$. As a result the measure of households holding their targeted real balances is

$$1 - F_\tau(z_0^*) = e^{-\alpha T_\tau} < e^{-\alpha z_0^*/\bar{h}} = 1 - F_0(z_0^*).$$
The law of motion for aggregate real balances is $\dot{Z}_\tau = F_\tau(z_0^*) \bar{h} - \alpha Z_\tau$. At a steady state, $Z_\tau = F_\tau(z_0^*) \bar{h}/\alpha$, which is larger than $Z_0 = F_0(z_0^*) \bar{h}/\alpha$ under laissez faire.

Social welfare is measured by the sum of utilities across households:

$$W_\tau = \int [-h(z) + \alpha U(z)] dF_\tau(z) = \alpha \int [-z + U(z)] dF_\tau(z), \quad (76)$$

where the second equality is obtained by market clearing, $\int h(z) dF_\tau(z) = \alpha \int y(z) dF_\tau(z) = \alpha \int z dF_\tau(z)$. Using that $U(z) - z = \int_0^z [U'(x) - 1] dx + U(0)$ (76) can be rewritten as

$$W_\tau = \alpha \int \int [U'(x) - 1] \mathbb{I}_{\{0 \leq x \leq z\}} dx dF_\tau(z) + \alpha U(0). \quad (77)$$

Changing the order of integration,

$$\int \int [U'(x) - 1] \mathbb{I}_{\{0 \leq x \leq z\}} dx dF_\tau(z) = \int \int \mathbb{I}_{\{0 \leq x \leq z\}} dF_\tau(z) [U'(x) - 1] dx$$

$$= \int [1 - F_\tau(z)] [U'(x) - 1] dx. \quad (78)$$

Plugging (78) into (77):

$$W_\tau = \alpha \int \int [1 - F_\tau(x)] [U'(x) - 1] dx + \alpha U(0). \quad (79)$$

**RESULT #2:** Social welfare under $\tau$ is higher than welfare at the laissez-faire.

**PROOF:** The welfare gain under $\tau$ relative to laissez faire is:

$$W_\tau - W_0 = \alpha \int [1 - F_\tau(x)] [U'(x) - 1] dx - \alpha \int [1 - F_0(x)] [U'(x) - 1] dx$$

$$= \alpha \int [F_0(x) - F_\tau(x)] [U'(x) - 1] dx. \quad (80)$$

Given our conjecture that the equilibrium features full depletion we have:

$$F_\tau(z_{\tau,t}) = F_0(z_{0,t}) = 1 - e^{-\alpha t},$$

where $z_{\tau,t}$ and $z_{0,t}$ denote the real balances of a household who received his last preference shock $t$ periods ago under the transfer scheme $\tau$ and under laissez-faire, respectively. Integrating the law of motion of real balances, (71):

$$z_{0,t} = \bar{h} t \text{ for all } t < z_0^*/\bar{h}$$

$$z_{\tau,t} = \bar{h} t + \int_0^t [\tau(z_{\tau,x}) - \pi z_{\tau,x}] dx \text{ for all } t \leq T_\tau.$$
By definition of the transfer scheme,

\[ \tau(z_t) - \pi z_t > 0 \text{ for all } t \in (0, \hat{t}) \]
\[ \tau(z_t) - \pi z_t < 0 \text{ for all } t \in (\hat{t}, T_t) \] 

and, from (70), \( \int_0^{T_t} [\tau(z_{t,x}) - \pi z_{t,x}] \, dx < 0 \). It follows that there is a \( \hat{t} \in (\hat{t}, T_0) \) such that \( z_{0,\hat{t}} = z_{\hat{t},\hat{t}} = z_s \). For all \( t \in (0, \hat{t}) \), \( z_{0,t} < z_{\hat{t},t} \). For all \( t \in (\hat{t}, T_t) \) and \( z_{0,t} > z_{\hat{t},t} \). Equivalently, \( F_t(z) < F_0(z) \) for all \( z < z_s \) and \( F_t(z) > F_0(z) \) for all \( z > z_s \). From (80):

\[ \mathcal{W}_t - W_0 = \alpha \left\{ \int_0^{z_s} [F_0(x) - F_t(x)] \left[ U'(x) - 1 \right] \, dx + \int_{z_s}^{z_0^*} [F_0(x) - F_t(x)] \left[ U'(x) - 1 \right] \, dx \right\}. \tag{81} \]

By the definition of \( z_s \) and the fact that \( U'(z) \) is decreasing:

\[ [F_0(x) - F_t(x)] \left[ U'(x) - 1 \right] > [F_0(x) - F_t(x)] \left[ U'(\hat{x}) - 1 \right] \text{ for all } x \in (0, z_s) \]
\[ [F_0(x) - F_t(x)] \left[ U'(x) - 1 \right] > [F_0(x) - F_t(x)] \left[ U'(\hat{x}) - 1 \right] \text{ for all } x \in (z_s, z_0^*). \]

Plugging these two inequalities into (81):

\[ \mathcal{W}_t - W_0 \geq \alpha \left[ U'(z_s) - 1 \right] \int_0^{z_0^*} [F_0(x) - F_t(x)] \, dx. \tag{82} \]

We proved that

\[ \int z \, dF_t(z) = \int [1 - F_t(z)] \, dz \geq \int z \, dF_0(z) = \int [1 - F_0(z)] \, dz. \]

Hence, \( \int_0^{z_0^*} [F_0(x) - F_t(x)] \, dx > 0 \). Moreover, \( U'(z_s) \geq U'(z_0^*) = 1 + r / \alpha \). Hence, \( U'(\hat{z}) - 1 > 0 \). It follows from (82) that \( \mathcal{W}_t > W_0. \)

The transfer scheme, \( \tau \), is fully characterized by \( \pi \) and \( \tau_0 \) since \( \tau_z = (\pi z_0^* - \tau_0) / (z_0^* - z_\pi) \) and \( \tau_1 = (\pi z_\pi - \tau_0) z_0^*/(z_0^* - z_\pi) \). We now establish that for a given inflation rate, \( \pi \), there exists a lump-sum component, \( \tau_0 \), that balances the government budget.

**RESULT #3:** For \( \pi \) sufficiently small, there is a \( \tau_0 \in (0, \pi z_\pi) \) such that \( \int [\tau(z) - \pi z] \, dF_t(z) = 0 \) holds and \( \dot{z}_t > 0 \) for all \( t \in [0, T(z_0^*)] \).

**PROOF:** The government budget constraint, (70), can be re-expressed as

\[ \Gamma(\tau_0) \equiv \int_0^{T(z_0^*, \tau_0)} \{ \tau[z(t)] - \pi z(t) \} \alpha e^{-t} \, dt = 0, \]

By direct integration of the ODE for real balances, (71), one obtains that both \( z(t) \) and \( T(z_0^*, \tau_0) \) are continuous functions of \( \tau_0 \). Since \( \tau(z) \) is, by construction, continuous in \( z \), we obtain that \( \Gamma(\tau_0) \)
For all $t$, the ODE for the marginal value of money is:

$$\tau(z) - \pi z = \begin{cases} -\pi z & \text{if } z \leq z^*_n \\ \pi z & \text{if } z \in (z^*_n, z^*_0) \end{cases}.$$

Hence, $\tau(z_t) - \pi z_t < 0$ for all $t \in (0, T(z^*_0))$ and $\Gamma(0) < 0$. If $\tau_0 = \pi z^*_n$, then from (42):

$$\tau(z) = \begin{cases} \pi z^*_n & \text{if } z \leq z^*_n \\ \pi z & \text{if } z \in (z^*_n, z^*_0) \end{cases}.$$

Consequently, $\tau(z(t)) - \pi z(t) > 0$ for all $t < T(z^*_n)$ and $\tau(z_t) - \pi z_t = 0$ for all $t \geq T(z^*_n)$. Hence, $\Gamma(\pi z^*_n) > 0$. By the Intermediate Value Theorem there is $\tau_0 \in (0, \pi z^*_n)$ such that $\Gamma(\tau_0) = 0$.

Finally, for the transfer scheme to be feasible, it must be that $\dot{z} > 0$ for all $z < z^*_0$. This requires $\dot{h} + \tau_0 - \pi z^*_n > 0$, since net transfers achieve their minimum at $z = z^*_n$. This condition will be satisfied for $\pi$ sufficiently small. ■

Finally, we need to check that household’s conjectured behavior is optimal: households find it optimal to supply $\tilde{h}$ units of labor until they reach $z^*_0$ and to deplete their money holdings in full when a preference shock occurs. The ODE for the marginal value of money is:

$$(r + \pi)\lambda_t = \alpha [U'(z_t) - \lambda_t] + \lambda_t \tau'(z_t) + \dot{\lambda}_t. \quad (83)$$

RESULT #4: For $\pi$ and $\tau_0$ sufficiently small the solution to (83) is such that: $\lambda_t > 1$ for all $t < T^*_t$, $\lambda_{T^*_t} = 1$, and $\lambda_t \leq U'(z^*_0)$ for all $t \in [0, T^*_t]$.

PROOF: Integrating (83), we obtain that the marginal value of money solves:

$$\lambda_t = 1 + \int_t^{T(z^*_n)} e^{-(r+\pi+\alpha)(s-t)} \alpha \left[ U'(z_s) - U'(z^*_n) \right] ds + e^{-(r+\pi+\alpha)[T(z^*_n)-t]} \left[ \lambda_{T(z^*_n)} - 1 \right], \quad (84)$$

for all $t \leq T^*_t$, and

$$\lambda_t = 1 + \int_t^{T(z^*_n)} e^{-(r+\pi+\alpha-\tau^*_z)(s-t)} \left[ U'(z_s) - U'(z^*_0) + \frac{\tau z - \pi}{\alpha} \right] ds, \quad (85)$$

for all $t \geq T(z^*_n)$, where we used that $\lambda_{T^*_t} = 1$ and $T(z^*_n) = -\frac{1}{\pi} \ln \left[ 1 - \pi z^*_n / (\dot{h} + \tau_0) \right]$. For all $t \in (T^*_t, T^*_r)$, $z_t < z^*_0$ and hence $U'(z_t) > U'(z^*_0)$. Given that $\tau^*_z > \pi$ it follows from (85) that $\lambda_t > 1$ for all $t \in (T^*_t, T^*_r)$. Similarly, for all $t < T^*_t$, $z_t < z^*_n$ and hence $U'(z_t) > U'(z^*_n)$. Given that $\lambda_{T(z^*_n)} > 1$, it follows from (84) that $\lambda_t > 1$ for all $t \leq T(z^*_n)$.

For the second part of the Lemma we note that, when $\pi = \tau_0 = 0$, we have that $\lambda_t < U'(z^*_0)$ for all $t \in [0, T(z^*_0)]$. Since $\lambda$ is continuous with respect to $(t, \pi, \tau_0)$ and since $T(z^*_0)$ is finite at $\pi = \tau = 0$, we obtain by uniform continuity that $\lambda_t < U'(z^*_0)$ for $(\pi, \tau_0)$ sufficiently small.
Note that, by Result #3, the $\tau_0$ balancing the government budget constraint is less than $\pi z^*_n$, hence it goes to zero as $\pi$ goes to zero. Hence, when $\pi$ is sufficiently small, the solution to the ODE (83) satisfies all the properties of Result #4. This allows us to construct a candidate value function for all $z \in [0, z^*_n]$. Namely, we let $\lambda(z) \equiv \lambda_T(z)$, where $\lambda_t$ is the solution to the ODE (83):

$$W(z) \equiv W(0) + \int_0^z \lambda(x) \, dx \text{ where } rW(0) \equiv \lambda(0) \left( \bar{h} + \tau_0 \right).$$

Next, we construct a candidate value function for $z \geq z^*_n$:

**RESULT #5:** For $\pi$ and $\tau_0$ sufficiently small, there exists a continuously differentiable and bounded function, $W(z)$, and two absolutely continuous functions, $V(z)$ and $\lambda(z)$, such that: For $z \leq z^*_n$, $W(z)$, $V(z)$ and $\lambda(z)$ are the functions constructed following Result #4; For $z \geq z^*_n$:

\begin{align*}
W(z) &= W(z_0) + \int_{z_0}^z \lambda(x) \, dx \\
V(z) &= \max_{y \in [0,z]} U(y) + W(z - y) \\
(r + \alpha)\lambda(z) &= V'(z) - \bar{c}\lambda'(z) \text{ almost everywhere} \\
\lambda(z) &\in [0,1].
\end{align*}

**Proof.** We construct a solution to the problem (86)-(89) as follows. Suppose that we have constructed a solution over some interval $[z^*_0, Z]$, where $Z \geq z^*_0$. We first observe that:

$$U'(z^*_0) = 1 + \frac{r}{\alpha} \geq \sup_{x \in [0,z^*_0]} \lambda(x) = \sup_{x \in [0,Z]} \lambda(x),$$

where the first equality and the first inequality follow from our construction of $W(z)$ and $\lambda(z)$ over $[0, z^*_0]$, and the last equality follows because $\lambda(z) \leq 1$ for $z \in [z^*_0, Z]$. We now show how to extend this solution over the interval $[Z, Z + z^*_0]$. First, we let:

$$\tilde{V}(z) \equiv \max_{y \in [z-Z,z]} U(y) + W(z - y),$$

which is well defined for all $z \in [Z, Z + z^*_0]$, given that we have constructed $W(z)$ for all $z \leq Z$ and since $z - y \leq Z$ by the choice of our constraint set. Note that, in principle, the function $\tilde{V}(z)$ differs from $V(z)$ because it imposes the constraint that $y \geq z - Z$. Our goal is to show that, nevertheless, $\tilde{V}(z) = V(z)$. Precisely, if one extends $\lambda(z)$ over $[Z, Z + z^*_0]$ using (88), and define $W(z)$ using (86), then the household never finds it optimal to choose $y < z^*_0$, implying that the additional constraint we imposed to define $\tilde{V}(z)$ is not binding.
We first establish that $\hat{V}(z)$ is absolutely continuous and $\hat{V}'(z) \leq U'(z_0^*)$. Consider first $z \in [Z, Z + z_0^*/2]$. Given (90), it follows that the solution to (91) must be greater than $z_0^*$. By implication since $z - Z \leq z_0^*/2$, the solution $y$ to (91) must be greater than $z - Z + z_0^*/2$. Given this observation and after making the change of variable $x = z - y$, we obtain that

$$\hat{V}(z) \equiv \max_{x \in [0, Z - z_0^*/2]} U(z - x) + W(x).$$

The objective is continuously differentiable with respect to $z$, and its partial derivative is $U'(z-x) \leq U'(z_0^*/2)$ given that $z \leq Z + z_0^*/2$ and $x \leq Z - z_0^*/2$. Proceeding to the interval $z \in [Z + z_0^*/2, Z + z_0^*]$, we make the change of variable $x = z - y$ in (91) and obtain that $\hat{V}(z) = \max_{x \in [0Z]} U(z-x) + W(x)$.

Again, the objective is continuously differentiable with a partial derivative with respect to $z$ equal to $U'(z-x) \leq U'(z_0^*/2)$, since $z \geq Z + z_0^*/2$ and $x \leq Z$. Hence, in both cases, given that the objective has a bounded partial derivative with respect to $z$, we can apply Theorem 2 in Milgrom and Segal (2002): $\hat{V}(z)$ is absolutely continuous and the envelope condition holds, i.e., $\hat{V}'(z) = U'[y(z)]$ whenever this derivative exists. By condition (90), it follows that $y(z) \geq z_0^*$, hence $\hat{V}'(z) \leq U'(z_0^*)$, as claimed.

Next, we construct a solution over $[Z, Z + z_0^*]$. Given that the function $\hat{V}(z)$ constructed above is absolutely continuous, we can integrate the ODE (88) with $\hat{V}'(z)$ and we obtain a candidate solution:

$$\hat{\lambda}(z) = \lambda(Z) e^{-\frac{r}{c} (z-Z)} + \frac{\alpha}{c} \int_{Z}^{z} \hat{V}'(x)e^{-\frac{r}{c}(z-x)} \, dx.$$

Given that $\lambda(Z) \leq 1$ and $\hat{V}'(z) \leq U'(z_0^*) = 1 + r/\alpha$, one sees after direct integration that $\hat{\lambda}(z) \leq 1 \leq U'(z_0^*)$ for all $z \in [Z, Z + z_0^*]$. Now let

$$\hat{W}(z) = W(Z) + \int_{Z}^{z} \hat{\lambda}(x) \, dx.$$

We now show that, if we extend $W(z)$ by $\hat{W}(z)$, $\lambda(z)$ by $\hat{\lambda}(z)$, and $V(z)$ by $\hat{V}(z)$ over the interval $[Z, Z + z_0^*]$, we obtain a solution of the problem (86)-(88) over $[Z, Z + z_0^*]$: indeed, we have just shown that $\hat{\lambda}(z) = \hat{W}'(z) \leq U'(z_0^*)$ for all $z \in [Z, Z + z_0^*]$, implying that the constraint $y \geq z - Z$ we imposed in the definition of $\hat{V}(z)$ is not binding. That is:

$$V(z) = \max_{y \in [0,z]} U(y) + W(z-y) = \max_{y \in [z-Z,Z]} U(y) + W(z-y) = \hat{V}(z).$$

Hence, we have extended the solution from $[z_0^*, Z]$ to $[Z, Z + z_0^*]$. Notice that the argument does not depend on $Z$: we can start with $Z = z_0^*$, and repeat this extension until we obtain a solution defined over $[z_0^*, \infty)$. 
Finally, we show that $W(z)$ is bounded. By construction we have:

$$\lambda(z) = \lambda(z^*_0)e^{-\frac{r+\alpha}{c}(z-z^*_0)} + \frac{\alpha}{c} \int_{z^*_0}^{z} V'(x)e^{-\frac{r+\alpha}{c}(x-z^*_0)} \, dx$$

$$W(z) = W(z^*_0) + \int_{z^*_0}^{z} \lambda(y) \, dy.$$  

Plugging the first equation into the second, keeping in mind that $\lambda(z^*_0) = 1$, and changing the order of integration we obtain:

$$W(z) = W(z^*_0) + \frac{\tilde{c}}{r+\alpha} \left(1 - e^{-\frac{r+\alpha}{c}(z-z^*_0)}\right) + \frac{\alpha}{r+\alpha} \int_{z^*_0}^{z} V'(x) \left[1 - e^{-\frac{r+\alpha}{c}(z-x)}\right] \, dy$$

$$\leq W(z^*_0) + \frac{\tilde{c}}{r+\alpha} + \frac{\alpha}{r+\alpha} [V(z) - V(z^*_0)]$$

$$\leq W(z^*_0) + \frac{\tilde{c}}{r+\alpha} + \frac{\alpha}{r+\alpha} [W(z) + \|U\| - W(z^*_0)],$$

where the first inequality follows because $1 - e^{-\frac{r+\alpha}{c}(z-x)} \leq 1$ for all $x \in [z^*_0, z]$, and the second inequality because $W(z) \leq V(z) \leq W(z) + \|U\|$. Rearranging and simplifying we obtain that

$$W(z) \leq W(z^*_0) + \frac{\tilde{c} + \alpha\|U\|}{r},$$

establishing the claim. 

**RESULT #6**: For $\pi$ sufficiently small and $\tau_0$ chosen, as in RESULT #3, to balance the government budget constraint, the households conjectured behavior is optimal.

**Proof.** Consider the candidate value function constructed in Result #4 and #5. By construction, $W(z)$ is continuously differentiable and it solves the HJB equation:

$$(r+\alpha)W(z) = \max_{c \geq 0, 0 \leq h \leq h, 0 \leq y \leq z} \left\{ \min\{c, \tilde{c}\} + \tilde{h} - h + \alpha [U(y) + W(z-y)] + W'(z) [h - c + \tau(z) - \pi z] \right\}.$$  

Then, the optimality verification argument of Section VII in the supplementary appendix establishes that $W(z)$ is equal to the maximum attainable utility of a households, and that the associated decision rules are optimal. 

---

60
Appendix B: Numerical methods

Overview. In this section we provide a step-by-step numerical method to compute the stationary equilibrium with standard packages, for example Matlab. A detailed discussion of the numerical method is provided in the supplementary Appendix. To solve the system we need to start from some initial values close to the solution. Step 1 suggests an efficient method to compute initial values of $\lambda_0$ and $\Upsilon$: the solution to an economy with zero inflation and full depletion, which is close to the equilibrium if the money growth rate is not very large but $\bar{r}$ is not very low. Given $\lambda_0$ and $\Upsilon$, Step 2 (or 2' under linear preferences) computes the system of delay differential equations (DDE), which summarizes the household’s optimal actions. Step 3 and 4 (or 4' under linear preferences) computes the Kolmogorov forward equation (KFE), which solves the stationary distribution. Step 5 solves $\lambda_0$ and $\Upsilon$ as fixed points.

Step 1a. Fix $y(z) = z$ and $\pi = 0$. Solve the following values for initiation:

\[
\begin{align*}
h(\lambda^*) &= c(\lambda^*) \\
\lambda^* &= \left(\frac{r + \alpha}{\alpha}\right)^{-1}\left[\left(h'(\lambda^*) - c'(\lambda^*)\right) \lambda^*\right], \\
p &= \frac{\xi}{h'(\lambda^*) - c'(\lambda^*)},
\end{align*}
\]

where $\xi$ is the negative eigenvalue of the Jacobian given by

\[
\xi = -\frac{r + \alpha}{2} \left[1 - \frac{4\alpha U''(z^*)}{(r + \alpha)^2} \left[h'(\lambda^*) - c'(\lambda^*)\right]^{1/2} - 1\right].
\]

Under linear preferences, we have $h(\lambda^*) = c(\lambda^*) = 0$, $\lambda^* = 1$, $z^* = (U')^{-1}\left(\frac{r + \alpha}{\alpha}\right)$ and $p = \frac{\alpha}{r + \alpha} U''(z^*)$.

Step 1b. Use ode45 routine of Matlab to integrate the following ODE of $\lambda(z)$ backward from $z = z^*$ to $z = 0$:

\[
\lambda'(z) = \frac{(r + \alpha) \lambda - \alpha U'(z)}{h(\lambda) - c(\lambda)},
\]

where the initial values are given by $\lambda(z^*) = \lambda^*$ and $\lambda'(z^*) = p$.

Step 1c. Having obtained $\lambda(z)$, use ode45 routine to integrate the following ODE of $f(z)$ forward from $z = 0$ to $z = z^*$:

\[
f'(z) = -\frac{\alpha + \lambda'(z) [h'(\lambda) - c'(\lambda)]}{h(\lambda) - c(\lambda)} f(z)
\]

where the initial value is given by $f(0) = 1$. If $s(z^*) > 0$ (for example under the slack labor equilibrium of LRW models) then we construct the probability mass $1 - F(z^*)$ by the following
KFE boundary condition

\[ 1 - F(z^*) = \frac{s(z^*) f(z^*)}{\alpha}. \]

It obtains \( f(z) \).

**Step 1d.** The initial values of \( \lambda_0 \) and \( \Upsilon \) are set to \( \lambda_0 = \lambda(0) \) and \( \Upsilon = \pi \int_0^{z^*} z f(z) \, dz / \int_0^{z^*} f(z) \, dz \).

**Step 2a.** Jump to Step 2’ a if under linear preferences. Given \( \lambda_0 \) and \( \Upsilon \) (from Step 1 if it is the first time to run the iteration), use ddesd routine to integrate the following DDE system of \( z(\zeta) \) and \( \Omega(\zeta) \)

\[
\begin{align*}
z'(\zeta) &= \frac{h(-\zeta) - c(-\zeta) - \pi z + \Upsilon}{(r + \alpha + \pi)\zeta + \alpha \Omega(\zeta)}, \\
\Omega'(\zeta) &= z'(\zeta) \left[ U'' \left( (U')^{-1} \Omega(\zeta) \right) \right]^{-1} + \mathbb{I}[\Omega(\zeta) < \lambda_0] \left( z'[-\Omega(\zeta)] \right) \right]^{-1},
\end{align*}
\]

where the initial values are given by \( z(\lambda_0) = 0 \) and \( \Omega(-\lambda_0) = U'(0) \) (or some arbitrary large value if \( U'(0) = \infty \)). Stop integrating whenever \( h(-\zeta) - c(-\zeta) - \pi z(\zeta) + \Upsilon = 0 \). Denote the stopping \( \zeta \) and \( z \) as \( \zeta^*(\lambda_0, \Upsilon) \) and \( z^*(\lambda_0, \Upsilon) \). It obtains \( z(\zeta) \) and \( \Omega(\zeta) \).

**Step 2b.** Define

\[
\begin{align*}
y(z) &\equiv (U')^{-1} \circ \Omega \circ z^{-1}(z), \\
z_d &\equiv z^* - y(z^*), \\
s(z) &\equiv h[-z^{-1}(z)] - c[-z^{-1}(z)] - \pi(z - \Upsilon).
\end{align*}
\]

Jump to Step 3.

**Step 2’a.** Given \( \lambda_0 \) and \( \Upsilon \) (from Step 1 if it is the first time to run the iteration), use ddesd routine to integrate the following DDE of \( y(z) \)

\[
y' = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } z \leq (U')^{-1}(\lambda_0), \\
\frac{h - \pi(z-y)+\Upsilon}{1 + U''(y) \frac{h - \pi(z-y)+\Upsilon}{(r + \alpha + \pi)U''[y(z)]}} & \text{if } z > (U')^{-1}(\lambda_0),
\end{cases}
\]

where the initial value is given by \( y(0) = 0 \). Stop integrating at either \( z = (h + \Upsilon) / \pi \) or \( U'[y(z)] = 1 + \frac{r + \pi}{\alpha} \). It obtains \( y(z) \). Denote the stopping \( z \) as \( z^*(\lambda_0, \Upsilon) \). Define

\[
\begin{align*}
z_d &\equiv z^* - y(z^*), \\
s(z) &\equiv \frac{h - \pi z + \Upsilon}{h - \pi(z - \Upsilon)}.
\end{align*}
\]

**Step 2’b.** Use ode45 routine to integrate the following ODE of \( \lambda(z) \) forward from \( z = 0 \) to \( z^* \):

\[
\lambda'(z) = \frac{(r + \alpha + \pi) \lambda(z) - \alpha U'[y(z)]}{h - \pi(z - \Upsilon)},
\]

\[ 62 \]
with the initial condition \( \lambda(0) = \lambda_0 \). It obtains \( \lambda(z) \). Define \( \zeta^* (\lambda_0, \Upsilon) = -\lambda(z^*) \).

**Step 3.** Define \( \varphi(z) \) as the solution to \( \varphi - y(\varphi) = z \). Consider the region \([z_d, z^*]\), where the density function \( f(z) \) is simply an ODE solution of the following KFE:

\[
f'(z) = -\frac{\alpha + s'(z)}{s(z)} f(z), \quad \text{for all } z \in (z_d, z^*),
\]

which has closed-form solution

\[
f(z) = \left[ \frac{s(z)}{s(z_d)} \right]^{\frac{\alpha}{s}} - 1, \quad \text{for all } z \in (z_d, z^*)
\]

under linear preferences (and we need to construct the probability mass \( 1 - F(z_1^*) \) by the same KFE boundary condition in the Step 1c). Otherwise, use ode45 routine to solve \( f(t) \) forward from \( z = z_d \) to \( z = z^* \) with initial value \( f(z_d) = 1 \). It obtains \( f(z) \) for all \( z \in [z_d, z^*] \).

**Step 4.** Jump to Step 4' if under linear preferences. Construct the "history" of \( \phi(t) \) for all \( t \in [-z^* - z_d, 0] \), by setting \( \phi(t) = f(z_d - t) \), where \( f(z) \) is given by Step 3. Use ddesd routine to integrate the following DDE of \( \phi(t) \) forward from \( t = 0 \) to \( t = z_d \):

\[
\phi'(t) = \left[ \frac{\alpha - s'(z_d - t)}{s(z_d - t)} \right] \phi(t) - \alpha \frac{s(\varphi(z_d - t))}{s(z_d - t)^{\alpha - 1}} \phi[z_d - \varphi(z_d - t)], \quad \text{for all } t \in (0, z_d)
\]

where the initial value \( \phi(0) \) is given by

\[
\phi(0) = 1 - \frac{s(z_d^*)}{s(z_d)} f(z_d^*).
\]

Having obtained \( \phi(t) \), set \( f(z) = \phi(z_d - z) \) for all \( z \in [0, z_d] \). Jump to Step 5.

**Step 4'.** Under linear preferences, use ode45 routine to integrate the following DDE of \( \phi(t) \) forward from \( t = 0 \) to \( t = z_d \):

\[
\phi'(t) = \frac{\alpha + \pi}{s(z_d - t)} \phi(t) - \alpha s(z_d) \frac{s(\varphi(z_d - t))}{s(z_d - t)^{\alpha - 1}}, \quad \text{for all } t \in (0, z_d),
\]

where the initial value \( \phi(0) \) is given by

\[
\phi(0) = 1 - \left[ \frac{s(z_d^*)}{s(z_d)} \right]^{\frac{\alpha}{s}}.
\]

Having obtained \( \phi(t) \), set \( f(z) = \phi(z_d - z) \) for all \( z \in [0, z_d] \).

**Step 5.** Define a function \( \Gamma(\lambda_0, \Upsilon) : \mathbb{R}_+^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^2 \), where the first and second coordinates are given by

\[
\Gamma^{(1)}(\lambda_0, \Upsilon) = (r + \alpha + \pi) \zeta^* + \alpha U' y(z^*),
\]

\[
\Gamma^{(2)}(\lambda_0, \Upsilon) = \pi \int_0^{z^*} f(z) \, dz - \Upsilon,
\]

63
where \( \zeta^*, z^*, y \) and \( f \) are constructed given \( \lambda_0 \) and \( \Upsilon \) from previous steps. Use fsolve routine to solve \( \lambda_0^* \) and \( \Upsilon^* \) such that \( \Gamma(\lambda_0^*, \Upsilon^*) = 0 \).

**Step 6.** Finally, the stationary equilibrium is given by the marginal value function \( W'(z) = -z^{-1}(z; \lambda_0^*, \Upsilon^*) \) and the density function \( f(z; \lambda_0^*, \Upsilon^*) \). Agents accumulate real balances according to \( \dot{z} = s(z; \lambda_0^*, \Upsilon^*) \), and the lumpy consumption is given by \( y(z; \lambda_0^*, \Upsilon^*) \). The above numerical algorithm works whether the equilibrium features periodic full money depletion or periodic partial money depletion.