More Trade, Less Diffusion: Technology Transfers and the Dynamic Effects of Import Liberalization

Gustavo de Souza, Ruben Gaetani, and Marti Mestieri

The ideas presented here do not represent those of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Motivation: Trade and Diffusion

• Canonical View: More trade, More diffusion

 $\circ~$ Firms learn from exporters or international suppliers

Eaton and Kortum (1999); Buera and Oberfield (2020); Santacreu (2015, 2022); Cai, Li and Santacreu (2020); Lind and Ramondo (2019, 2023); among many others

 $\circ~$ Implication: larger gains from trade in the long-run

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- $\circ~$ Implication: larger gains from trade in the long-run
- Empirical Evidence to the Canonical View:
 - $\circ~$ Correlation between openness to trade and technology adoption

Comin and Hobijn(2004, 2010); Comin et al. (2013);Comin and Mestieri (2018)

• Trade increases firm-level TFP

Pavcnik (2002), Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare (2010)

o no causal evidence linking exposure to foreign products to diffusion

• Question:

• How does trade policy affect the diffusion of technologies across countries?

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- Data: measures diffusion across countries
 - citation across countries (PATSTAT)
 - \circ international intellectual property transferred to Brazil (de Souza (2023))

Example of Technology Transfer and Citation



Gerdau S.A.

Technology Transfer

Steel Bars Production



Nippon Steel



Citation

• Question:

• How does trade policy affect the diffusion of technologies across countries?

• Data: measures diffusion across countries

- patent and citation across countries (PATSTAT)
- \circ international intellectual property transferred to Brazil (de Souza (2023))

• Policy Variation:

• Brazilian trade liberalization (Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017))

- Result: More Trade, Less Diffusion
 - $\circ~$ Tariffs increase international technology transfers and citations to foreign patents
 - $\circ~$ E.g.: tariff against Japanese steel increases tech. transf. f/ and citations to Nippon Steel

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- Model: adding technology transfers to Buera and Oberfield (2020)
 Trade-off: technology transfer × export to Brazil

Firms Transfer Technology if Tariffs are High

High Import Tariffs



Foreign Firms:

Profit of Transferring technology > Profit Exporting

Nippon Steel

• Technology Transfer to Brazil 🕈

Low Import Tariffs

Firms Transfer Technology if Tariffs are High

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CSN

Brazilian Firms:

- Learn and build on foreign technology
- Foreign technology diffuses
- 🔹 Citation to foreign patents 🕈

Firms Export if Tariffs are Low

High Import Tariffs



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Low Import Tariffs



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CSN

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CSN

Brazilian Firms:

- Don't learn from foreign firms
- Citation to foreign patents ↓

Dynamic gains from trade are 60% smaller

Contribution

- Trade and Diffusion: Openness to trade increases diffusion
 - Eaton and Kortum (1999); Buera and Oberfield (2020); Santacreu (2015, 2022); Cai, Li and Santacreu (2020); Lind and Ramondo (2019,2023); Rodriguez-Clare (2007), Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2011); Lind et al. (2023); Cai et al. (2022)
- ⇒ **Contribution**: tariff increases diffusion through technology transfers
 - Trade, Technology Adoption, and Industrial Policy:
 - Bustos et al. (2016); Comin and Mestieri (2018); Juhasz (2018); Verhoogen (2023); Cirera et al. (2024); Lashkaripour and Lugovskyy (2023); Farrokhi and Pellegrina (2024)
- ⇒ **Contribution**: subsidy to technology transfers

DATA

Data: Measures Knowledge Diffusion Across Countries

PATSTAT

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PATSTAT

Citations by Brazilian firms to foreign patents Measures whose ideas Brazilian firms are upgrading

Data: Measures Knowledge Diffusion Across Countries

Technology Transfer

Universe of industrial knowledge transferred to Brazil Measures whose technology firms are using





PATSTAT

Citations by Brazilian firms to foreign patents Measures whose ideas Brazilian firms are upgrading

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 - Capital control in the 60s limited profit payments to foreigners
 - Requirement for firms to register any industrial knowledge transfer
 - $\circ~$ International royalty payment authorized only with Patent Office Approval

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- Today firms register because of
 - hefty charges and fines for firms and managers faking international payments
 - $\circ~$ possibility to settle disputes in the court system
- ⇒ Universe of technology transfers

Data: Three Types of Technology Transfers

• Patent Transfer:

 $\circ~$ licensing or transfer of patent ownership

• Trademark Transfers:

• licensing or transfer of trademarks

• Know-How:

- $\circ~$ Transfer of knowledge not protected by a patent
- $\circ~$ Ex.: Nippon Steel supported Gerdau S/A on the design of a production line of steel round bars

EMPIRICS

Empirics: Gravity of Citations and Tech. Transfers

• Empirical Model:

$$\mathbf{y}_{o,s,t} = \beta \tau_{o,s,t} + \eta_{o,s} + \eta_{s,t} + \eta_{o,t} + X'_{o,s,t} \kappa + \epsilon_{o,s,t}$$

where

- $\circ y_{o,s,t}$: outcome of origin country o, sector s, in year t
- \circ technology transfers in next 3 years from country *o* to sector *s*
- \circ citations in next 3 years to country *o* by sector *s*

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where

 $\circ \tau_{o,s,t}$: import tariff in Brazil against country *o*, sector *s*, in year *t*

Empirics: Fixed Effects Isolate Diffusion

• Empirical Model:

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where

- $\circ \eta_{s,t}$: identification and isolating channel
- \circ Identification
 - · productivity shock, industrial policy, technological progress
- $\circ~$ Isolating diffusion:
 - · removes effect of tariff on competition, firm exit, and other margins unrelated to diffusion

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where

 \circ $\eta_{o,t}$: captures intellectual property agreements and country shocks

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
where


- ο β: effect of tariff on diffusion from a particular country-sector pair
- $\circ \begin{array}{c} \textbf{Canonical View: } \tau_{o,s,t} \uparrow \Longrightarrow imports \downarrow \Longrightarrow learning from foreigners \downarrow \Longrightarrow \beta < o \\ \text{(Eaton and Kortum (1999); Buera and Oberfield (2020); Santacreu (2015, 2022); Cai, Li and Santacreu (2020); Lind and Ramondo (2019, 2023), Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare(2010), among many others)} \\ \end{array}$


Empirics: Identification by Instrument


• Endogeneity:

- \circ political interference
- \circ trade \implies tariffs
- Instrument: Boehm, Levchenko, and Pandalai-Nayar (2023)
 - After a MFN tariff change, compare small MFN partners to preferential partners









Empirics: Identification by Instrument

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- Instrument: Boehm, Levchenko, and Pandalai-Nayar (2023)
 After a MFN tariff change, compare small MFN partners to preferential partners

• Formal Instrument and Sample Selection:

• Instrument:

$$\tau_{o,p,t}^{\textit{instr}} = \mathbb{I}_{o,p,t} \left\{ \textit{MFN Partner at } t \right\} \times \mathbb{I}_{o,p,t-1} \left\{ \textit{MFN Partner at } t - 1 \right\} \times \tau_{p,t}^{\textit{MFN}}$$

 $\circ~$ Sample selection: drop largest partners of product p in t and t - 1

Validation


- i. Concern: Government targets particular markets
- i. Validation:
 - * the instrument don't correlate with patents, citations, TFP, or production of the origin market
- ii. Concern: Political interference
- ii. Validation:
 - \star the instrument don't correlate with campaign contribution
- iii. Concern: Correlation with other policies
- iii. Validation:
 - * the instrument don't correlate with subsidized loans, public procurement, and subsidies
- iv. **Concern**: Trends on citation or technology transfers
- iv. Validation:
 - * pre-period parallel trends

Empirical Results

Tariffs Increase Technology Transfers

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	IHS N.	IHS	IHS N.
	Tech.	N.Unique	Unique
		Licensees	Licensors
Tariff	0.157**	0.131**	0.154**
	(0.0712)	(0.0643)	(0.0707)
Ν	1,229,689	1,229,689	1,229,689


Impulse Response of Technology Transfers to Tariffs



Tariffs Increase Citation to Foreign Firms

	(1)	(2)
	IHS	At Least
	Citations	One Cit.
Tariff	0.577***	0.411***
	(0.140)	(0.0825)
N	1,229,689	1,229,689

Impulse Response of Citations to Tariffs



Empirical Results

- Tariffs increase:
 - \circ international technology transfers
 - \circ citations to foreign patents
- ⇒ More Trade, Less Diffusion

Citations are Directed to Firms Transferring Technologies

	(1)	(2)		
	IHS. Cit. to	IHS Cit. to		
	Licensor	Non-Licensor		
Tariff	0.565***	0.206		
	(0.132)	(0.126)		
Ν	1,229,689	1,229,689		

Citations are Made by Firms without Connection to Foreign Markets

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	IHS Cit. by	IHS Cit. by				
	Tech.	Non-Tech.				
	Licensees	Licensees		Importers		Exporters
Tariff	0.164	0.452***				
	(0.106)	(0.133)				
Ν	1,229,689	1,229,689	1,229,689	1,229,689	1,229,689	1,229,689

Citations are Made by Firms without Connection to Foreign Markets

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	IHS Cit. by	IHS Cit. by	IHS Cit. by	IHS Cit. by		
	Tech.	Non-Tech.	Importers	Non-		
	Licensees	Licensees		Importers		Exporters
Tariff	0.164	0.452***	0.179	0.461***		
	(0.106)	(0.133)	(0.110)	(0.133)		
Ν	1,229,689	1,229,689	1,229,689	1,229,689	1,229,689	1,229,689

Citations are Made by Firms without Connection to Foreign Markets

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	IHS Cit. by	IHS Cit. by	IHS Cit. by	IHS Cit. by	IHS Cit. by	IHS Cit. by
	Tech.	Non-Tech.	Importers	Non-	Exporters	Non-
	Licensees	Licensees	*	Importers	*	Exporters
Tariff	0.164 (0.106)	0.452 ^{***} (0.133)	0.179 (0.110)	0.461*** (0.133)	0.173 (0.110)	0.460 ^{***} (0.133)
N	1,229,689	1,229,689	1,229,689	1,229,689	1,229,689	1,229,689

Technology Transfers Diffuse Locally

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	IHS. Cit.	IHS. Cit.	IHS Cit.	IHS Cit.
	Same Zip	Diff. Zip	Same City	Diff. City
Tariff	0.312***	0.206*	0.351***	0.136
	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.120)
Ν	1,229,689	1,229,689	1,229,689	1,229,689

Are Markets that Send More Technology Receiving More Citations?


- Results suggest that citation to foreign firms increase because of technology transfers
- If that is true, markets sending more technologies should receive more citations
- Long difference model:

$$\Delta y_{o,s} = \beta \left(Z_{o,s} \right) \Delta \tau_{o,s}^{inst} + \eta_{o,s} + X_{o,s}' \kappa + \varepsilon_{o,s}$$

- $\beta(Z_{o,s})$ reduced form effect as function of $Z_{o,s}$
- $\circ~~\beta~(Z_{o,s})$ estimated using random-forest (Wagner and Athey (2018), Athey and Imbens (2019))

Markets Sending More Technology Receive More Citations

Figure: Correlation Between the Effect of Tariffs on Technology Transfers and on Citations



Empirical Results

- Tariffs increase:
 - \circ international technology transfers
 - citations to foreign patents
 - $\circ~$ technological similarity to foreign patents
- ⇒ More Trade, Less Diffusion
- Citations are:
 - $\circ~$ directed to firms transferring technology to Brazil
 - $\circ~$ made by firms in the same zip code of those receiving technology
 - markets sending more technology receive more citations
 - ⇒ Transferred technology <mark>spreads</mark> among Brazilian firms

Alternative Explanations

- **FDI**:
 - tariffs do not affect FDI

Alternative Explanations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	IHS N.For.	IHS	II (At Least 1	IHS N.For.	IHS	II (At Least 1
	Partners	N.Firms	Firm)	Partners,3y	N.Firms	Firm,3y)
		F.Owned			F.Owned,3y	
Tariff	-0.0436	-0.0249	-0.0236	-0.0495	-0.0284	0.00282
	(0.0287)	(0.0239)	(0.0227)	(0.0636)	(0.0542)	(0.0476)
Ν	1,053,236	1,053,236	1,053,236	1,053,236	1,053,236	1,053,236

Alternative Explanations

• FDI:

 \circ tariffs do not affect FDI

• Tariffs on Inputs:

• results are the same after controlling for input tariff

• Tariffs Against Brazil:

• results are the same after controlling for tariffs against Brazil

Model

Model: Bird's Eye View

- Important elements:
 - 1. foreign firms face a trade-off between transferring technology and exporting to Brazil
 - 2. Brazilian firms learn from exporters and from technology transfers
- A increase in tariff:
 - increases technology transfers;
 - $\circ~$ increases diffusion if firms learn more from foreign technologies

Model: Demographics and Production

- There are three countries: Brazil (B), high-income (H), and low-income (L)
- $k \in K$ sectors and $s \in [0, 1]$ varieties
- Infinitely lived representative consumer in country $i \in \{B, H, L\}$
- Production technology:

$$y_t^{i,k} = q_t^{i,k}(s) l_t^{i,k}(s)$$

Model: High-Income Country Chooses Between Exporting or Licensing

- Firms in the developed country chooses between transferring tech to Brazil or exporting
- If firm export (or produce in house):
 - \circ iceberg trade cost: $\tau^k_{H \to B}$
 - productivity: $q_t^{X,k}(s)$
- If firm transfer technology:
 - \circ iceberg transfer cost: d^k
 - productivity: $q_t^{T,k}(s)$
 - o captures all the surplus

•
$$\left(q_t^{X,k}(s), q_t^{T,k}(s)\right)$$
 is a joint Frechet with correlation ρ

Model: Production and Prices in Brazil

• Distribution of highest productivity in Brazil

$$Pr(q_t^{B,k}(s) \leqslant z) = \exp\left(-\lambda_t^{B,k}z^{-\theta}\right)$$

• Price faced for variety *s* by consumers in Brazil after two-stage pricing:

$$p_t^{B,k}(s) = \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} \times \min\left\{\frac{w_t^B}{q_t^{B,k}(s)}, \frac{w_t^B d^k}{q_t^{T,k}(s)}, \frac{w_t^H \tau_{H \to B}^{k,t}}{q_t^{X,k}(s)}, \frac{w_t^L \tau_{L \to B}^{k,t}}{q_t^{L,k}(s)}\right\}$$

• $\lambda_t^{B,k}$ grows endogenously depending on the exposure to foreign ideas

Model: Diffusion of Ideas

- Brazilian entrepreneurs combine personal insight with ideas from:
 o exporters (as in Buera and Oberfield (2020))
 - technology transfers
- Contact rate with foreigners exporters:

$$lpha_{X
ightarrow B}^{k,t} = lpha_t^k \, \pi_{X
ightarrow B}^{k,t}$$

• Contact rate with licensors:

$$a_{T o B}^{k,t} = \alpha_t^k \, \mathbf{\omega}_T \, \pi_{T o B}^{k,t}$$

Model: Diffusion of Ideas

• Arrival rate of insights larger than z is

$$A^{k,t}_{i \rightarrow B}(z) \equiv a^{k,t}_{i \rightarrow B} z^{-\Theta}$$
, $i \in \{X, L\}$

• New idea:

$$q' = zq^{\beta}$$

where

- z: local insight
- q: idea draw from foreigner
- $\circ \beta$: weight of learning from foreigner

Model: Productivity Growth in Brazil

• Law of motion of $\lambda_t^{B,k}$:

$$\dot{\lambda}_{t}^{B,k} = \alpha_{t}^{k} \left[\boldsymbol{\omega}_{T} \boldsymbol{\pi}_{T \to B}^{k,t} E\left[\left(\boldsymbol{q}_{t}^{T,k} \right)^{\boldsymbol{\beta} \boldsymbol{\theta}} \right] + \boldsymbol{\pi}_{X \to B}^{k,t} E\left[\left(\boldsymbol{q}_{t}^{X,k} \right)^{\boldsymbol{\beta} \boldsymbol{\theta}} \right] \right]$$

- where:
 - learning from technology transfer
 - \circ learning from exporters (Buera and Oberfield (2020))

Model: Productivity Growth in Brazil

• Law of motion of $\lambda_t^{B,k}$:

$$\dot{\lambda}_{t}^{B,k} = \alpha_{t}^{k} \left[\omega_{T} \pi_{T \to B}^{k,t} E\left[\left(q_{t}^{T,k} \right)^{\beta \Theta} \right] + \pi_{X \to B}^{k,t} E\left[\left(q_{t}^{X,k} \right)^{\beta \Theta} \right] \right]$$

- where:
 - $\circ \omega_T$: meeting rate from technology transfers
 - $\circ \pi^{k,t}_{T \to B}$: share of varieties with tech. transfers
 - $\circ E\left[\left(q_t^{T,k}\right)^{\beta\theta}\right]: \text{ avg quality of technology transfer, function of }\rho$

Model: Productivity Growth in Brazil

• Law of motion of $\lambda_t^{B,k}$:

$$\dot{\lambda}_{t}^{B,k} = \alpha_{t}^{k} \left[\omega_{T} \pi_{T \to B}^{k,t} E\left[\left(q_{t}^{T,k} \right)^{\beta \theta} \right] + \pi_{X \to B}^{k,t} E\left[\left(q_{t}^{X,k} \right)^{\beta \theta} \right] \right]$$

- If import tariffs increase:
 - \circ iceberg trade cost increase: $\tau^k_{H \to B} \uparrow$
 - \circ increase technology transfers and decrease exports: $\pi_{T \to B}^{k,t} \uparrow, \pi_{X \to B}^{k,t} \downarrow$
 - $\circ~$ productivity in Brazil increases depending on ω_{T} and ρ

CALIBRATION


Calibration: Key Parameters

• Key Parameters:


- ο ρ: correlation between productivity of exporting or transferring technology
- $\circ \omega_T$: arrival rate of ideas from technology transfers
- Identification: effect of tariffs on:
 - $\circ~$ the number of technology transfers
 - $\circ~$ the number of citations

QUANTITATIVE RESULTS


Brazilian Liberalization led to Lower Prices




Brazilian Liberalization led to Lower Diffusion




Liberalization: Static Gains but Dynamic Losses




Diffusion from Technology Transfers Matter for Welfare!



Subsidy to Technology Transfers



Gains from Trade are Larger with Subsidy to Technology Transfers



- Before this paper:
 - more trade, more diffusion
 - $\circ~$ policy implication: trade reforms leads to growth

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 $\circ~$ first paper to identify the effect of tariffs on diffusion across countries

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- **Answer**: when tariffs increase:
 - $\circ~$ foreign firms transfer technologies to Brazil
 - o transferred technology diffuses among Brazilian firms
 - $\circ~$ Brazilian firms become more productive

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• Implication for policy:

 $\circ~$ industrial policy subsidizing technology transfer